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Since its return, the CSC has emerged as a critical forum to advance cooperation in the maritime domain, amidst the fractured state of regional cohesion in the Indian Ocean.
In November 2025, India hosted the 7th National Security Advisor-level summit of the Colombo Security Conclave (CSC). The CSC was formed to promote closer cooperation on security matters and strengthen partnerships, thereby enhancing the regional security of the Indian Ocean Region. What began as a trilateral group between India, Maldives, and Sri Lanka in 2011, led by the National Security Advisors of the three countries, has gained momentum in recent years. Although the group lost steam due to political differences between New Delhi and regimes in Colombo and Malé, it reconvened in 2020 as the CSC. Since its return, the CSC has emerged as a critical forum to seek synergies and advance cooperation in the maritime domain, amidst the fractured state of regional cohesion in the Indian Ocean. This is demonstrated by the growing momentum within the group, as well as by its steady expansion and the fostering of mutual responsibility.
The status and extent of regional cohesion in the Indian Ocean remain minimal, rendering the scope of cooperation amongst resident partners vulnerable. This may be attributed to various reasons, including disparity in capabilities, differing regional threat perceptions, and a lack of regional consciousness. As a result, there remains a vital strategic vacuum of institutional mechanisms to foster cooperation, even when the Indian Ocean littoral continues to be confronted by common challenges emanating from the maritime domain, and seeks shared opportunities to further its comprehensive national security interests.
The underperformance of IORA and IONS can partly be attributed to the geographical vastness of the Indian Ocean and the lack of a singular regional agenda.
Among the institutional frameworks in the Indian Ocean, the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) and the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS) stand out, given their ongoing efforts to foster cooperation and regional partnership on key issues of maritime security and governance. However, considering the fractured nature of regional governance initiatives in the region, the extent of success of these forums remains debatable. The underperformance of IORA and IONS can partly be attributed to the geographical vastness of the Indian Ocean and the lack of a singular regional agenda. Importantly, security imperatives of the broader Indian Ocean theatre remain diverse owing to the vast contours of its geography.
Towards this end, the emergence and bolstering of the Colombo Security Conclave appear to represent a new mechanism of fostering cooperation and enhancing security in the IOR. Being limited to memberships by fewer countries, in close geographical proximity, has the potential to set a comprehensive agenda of governance based on common challenges and shared opportunities. Therefore, the limited geographical scope of the forum may serve as a useful factor to ensure steady momentum and synergy among its member countries.
The continued momentum of the group remains underlined by its steady expansion. While the group began as a trilateral between India, Sri Lanka, and Maldives, in 2022, Mauritius joined as a full member, and Bangladesh joined in 2024. This year, Seychelles acceded to the CSC as a full member, and Malaysia participated as a guest state. But the group has continued to craft its strategy by way of five key pillars, which include: Maritime Safety and Security; Countering Terrorism and Radicalisation; Combating Trafficking and Transnational Organised Crime; Cyber Security and Protection of Critical Infrastructure and Technology; and Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief.
Being limited to memberships by fewer countries, in close geographical proximity, has the potential to set a comprehensive agenda of governance based on common challenges and shared opportunities.
The group’s expansion by focusing on the same pillars underscores its attempts to work on mutually shared security concerns, especially in areas of non-traditional security. This issue-based grouping underscores that the remit of cooperation remains vital and urgent, especially as concerns of trafficking, piracy, terrorism, cyber threats, maritime disasters and accidents increase. The focus on non-traditional challenges of maritime security also underlines the fact that for much of the Indian Ocean littoral, maritime security challenges overlap with developmental priorities and require urgent mitigation.
In many ways, the CSC is also a platform for members where security is fostered as a mutual responsibility. The organisation led by India has helped all members to gradually shift their focus from land to the maritime domain. It offers an opportunity to collaborate and cooperate on maritime threats and interests with a larger neighbour and with like-minded littoral countries. The preference for mini-lateral cooperation over a bilateral one also assuages concerns of over-dependence on India for defence cooperation. For Small Island Developing States (SIDS) like the Maldives, Mauritius, and Seychelles, the grouping and its pillars address their primary security concerns. For Sri Lanka, the platform helps focus on more pressing external threats and move past its internal focus caused by its civil war. Even for Bangladesh, the CSC helps with its maritime imagination, reinforcing its role as a vital Indian Ocean State.
The preference for mini-lateral cooperation over a bilateral one also assuages concerns of over-dependence on India for defence cooperation.
On the other hand, for India, while much of its conventional threats like terrorism and border conflicts with China and Pakistan emanate from the land, the CSC helps it recognise the evolving threats from the maritime domain. Emerging threats like the increasing presence of external players in the Indo-Pacific, China’s increasing presence in the IOR, threats to critical infrastructure and supply chains, piracy, trafficking, illegal fishing, maritime terrorism, etc., have continued to pose new challenges. Furthermore, with its growing ambitions and capacities, India is increasingly playing the role of net-security provider, and its maritime vision has expanded to the Global South, as exemplified by its MAHASAGAR vision. In this regard, India sees CSC as a critical platform to create its maritime security architecture.
Given the extent of Chinese engagement with various countries in the group, India can balance the question of Beijing’s looming threat to the stability of the Indian Ocean. Especially as South Asian countries have continued to woo China, and Beijing has developed its own security partnerships with them. In fact, the third iteration of the China-Indian Ocean forum, held in December 2024, underscores China’s continued commitment to institutionalising its presence in the region. Bangladesh, Maldives, Sri Lanka, and Pakistan have also joined China’s Global Security initiative—institutionalising Chinese presence and security architecture in the IOR. There has also been an increase in the docking of Chinese warships, submarines, and research vessels in the IOR.
The new government in Bangladesh was absent during the charter signing in 2024, but they were present this year, despite tensions with India.
There is also a push from India to ensure that security in the region is perceived as an issue of mutual responsibility, especially as the CSC remains vulnerable to domestic politics. Shared geography, focus on issues of non-traditional security, and India’s diplomatic manoeuvres have continued to keep the organisation functional. These factors have, at least for now, differentiated the politics of member states from regional security and cooperation. For instance, in 2023, the new government in the Maldives skipped the NSA-level meeting of the CSC. However, the government did take part in subsequent deliberations of the groupings. Similarly, the new government in Bangladesh was absent during the charter signing in 2024, but they were present this year, despite tensions with India.
The CSC offers a much-needed institutional platform for India and its neighbours to enhance security in the Indian Ocean Region. An India-led institution will secure its interests in the maritime neighbourhood by promoting defence and security cooperation, capacity building and sensitising members to Indian concerns and will actively counter China in the IOR. For other members, focus on mutual non-traditional security threats and geographical proximity has continued to mitigate their pressing challenges. Furthermore, fostering mutual responsibility at a time when political cohesion continues to be subject to uncertainty has provided new synergies to the organisation.
Aditya Gowdara Shivamurthy is an Associate Fellow with the Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation.
Sayantan Haldar is an Associate Fellow with ORF’s Strategic Studies Programme.
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Aditya Gowdara Shivamurthy is an Associate Fellow with the Strategic Studies Programme’s Neighbourhood Studies Initiative. He focuses on strategic and security-related developments in the South Asian ...
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Sayantan Haldar is an Associate Fellow with ORF’s Strategic Studies Programme. At ORF, Sayantan’s work is focused on Maritime Studies. He is interested in questions of ...
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