The recent law passed by the IEA shows the growing importance of the Vice and Virtue Ministry and reflects its need to showcase the extent of control it has over its populace
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On 31 July 2024, the official gazette of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA) published a 114-page document with 35 articles. This was the first attempt to codify the directives of the Ministry for the Promotion of Virtue, Prevention of Vice and the Hearing of Complaints (MPVPV) and outline the duties of the ministry’s members. While the directives and orders mentioned in the law have already been in force over the last three years, the codified law was released after receiving ratification from the Supreme Leader, Hibatullah Akhundzada. Questions about the future of women in Afghanistan and the daily grievances of the Afghan people have been pushed to the background since the eruption of conflicts in other parts of the world and the growing fatigue in the international community after the end of the 20-year Western presence in the country. However, inside Afghanistan, the Taliban’s gradual transition from an insurgent group to a formal state machinery and the institutionalisation of its policies are still important developments that warrant our attention.
Inside Afghanistan, the Taliban’s gradual transition from an insurgent group to a formal state machinery and the institutionalisation of its policies are still important developments that warrant our attention.
The law stipulates the ideal conduct for the Muhtasibs i.e. the inspectors or the enforcers of the decrees of MPVPV as well as the Afghan people with a list of normative behaviours that they must follow. The preface establishes the aim of the law: to formalise the working of MPVPV, and define the scope of responsibilities for those tasked with enforcing the decree. There are four chapters—the first explains the conditions and principles under which an enforcer can act against the common Afghans; the second chapter describes the duties of the enforcers vis-à-vis different aspects of life; the third outlines the punishments that would meted out to the violators; the final chapter deals with miscellaneous issues—majorly seeking to explain the accountability and feedback mechanism in place for the enforcers.
The law enables the MPVPV officials to discipline both those who commit crimes and those who refrain from doing the right thing. For women, Article 13 enforces mandatory face covering to not to tempt others, prohibits tight or short clothing and public speaking by women, which the Taliban deem as ‘intimate’ and thus, not suitable for the public. They have been forbidden to look at men not related to them through blood or marriage and to have a mahram accompany them if they venture outside. Under Article 17, the law also objects to the production and reproduction of images, on either a phone or a computer, thus paralysing the dissemination of information by media channels or other organisations. This complements the pre-existing restrictions on media that the group has been implementing gradually. The ban on music, eradication of drug addiction, intermingling between men and women, the need for men to keep a beard, ban on western-style haircuts, gambling, adultery, obligation to attend congregational prayers, etc. have all been enforced through the law.
The ban on music, eradication of drug addiction, intermingling between men and women, the need for men to keep a beard, ban on western-style haircuts, gambling, adultery, obligation to attend congregational prayers, etc. have all been enforced through the law.
On 7 September 2024, it will be three years since the formation of the IEA’s interim cabinet. One of the most significant developments in the Cabinet was the discontinuation of the Ministry of Women Affairs and the re-inclusion of the MPVPV, with Mawlawi Sheikh Mohammad Khalid Hanafi as its minister. The Ministry took over the premises of the erstwhile women's affairs ministry, initiating what would be, both a physical and a symbolic toppling of the rights and freedom of women, an endeavour which the group has proactively worked on in these three years. It considers its role as the scaffolding that has kept the ‘Islamic system’ in place and regards its responsibilities as the most important vis-à-vis other government ministries.
The Ministry has been at the forefront of regulating all forms of social behaviour, operating under the principle that the individuals should hold each other accountable i.e. by promoting virtue and discouraging vice to prevent chaos or the dismantling of the ‘social order.’
Beginning with the IEA’s decision to ban girls from attending secondary schools, the list of directives and orders passed to restrict, impede, obstruct or control the movement of women has reached cosmic proportions. In the immediate aftermath of the group’s return, there was some signalling from certain members that everyone’s rights would be secured in the country. These false claims led to a growing discourse of a modern, relatively moderate Taliban 2.0. But while certain group leaders may have shown that inclination to gain international legitimacy, there has been a simmering discord between Akhundzada in Kandahar and the leaders in Kabul, with the former gradually concentrating power in his own hands and backtracking on all of the initial commitments made by the Taliban. This power struggle and the consequent ascendancy of the Kandahar clique trickled down to an expanded mandate for the MPVPV. Till 2022, it had issued the greatest number of directives. The Ministry perceives itself as the gatekeeper of the actions of men and women in Afghanistan.
The Ministry took over the premises of the erstwhile women's affairs ministry, initiating what would be, both a physical and a symbolic toppling of the rights and freedom of women, an endeavour which the group has proactively worked on in these three years.
In a report released in July 2024, the UN Assistance Mission on Afghanistan (UNAMA) explained the expanding role of MPVPV and the existence of a ‘climate of fear’ in Afghanistan. The MPVPV has tasked itself with monitoring the conduct of the people and meting out punishments. Its broad over-arching role ranges from contributing to the formulation of new policies to its implementation and enforcement. The Ministry’s working has three components—a civilian sector that engages with the public and gives guidance, with 10 members stationed in each district at public places, a military sector which oversees the military personnel and a complaints sector. A separate decree on the law of complaints hearing was passed in November 2023 which included registration and resolution of any complaints against the IEA officials. Every month, a three-member delegation visits government offices and military bases to ensure that their actions align with the Emirate's standards. Between 15 August–31 March 2024, UNAMA documented 1,033 instances of the members of the Ministry’s provincial departments using force against alleged infractions.
The acting Vice and Virtue Minister, Hanafi categorised the promulgation of the virtue laws and the promotion of Sharia with their interpretation of Islamic law as the Emirate’s red line. As per the Taliban, their engagement with the world happens within the ‘Islamic framework’. While they have conveyed that they will hear and resolve people’s concerns and that the implementation will be lenient, none of this should be accepted at face value. Even as the international community has decried the law and the UNOHCR has called for its repeal, the UN has still expressed its decision to engage with all stakeholders in Afghanistan. The IEA has refused to cooperate with the UNAMA after its criticism.
In an assessment of the Taliban’s state-making endeavour, Haroun Rahimi specifies how the Emirate, both in the first and the second regime is an ‘underspecified’ and ‘undertheorised’ political system where power has always been difficult to distribute and then eventually institutionalise. This ad hoc nature allows the group to pre-empt the eruption of intra-group differences. In April 2022, the IEA’s Acting Chief Justice, Abdul Hakim Haqqani released a book on the Emirate, with a foreword by the Emir himself. The book categorises states into two groups—one based on taxation and the other on guidance. The IEA is considered the latter a trend which is reflected in the growing importance of the MPVPV.
The Ministry of Information and Culture indirectly asked other sections not to interfere in that mandate, reiterating its position as the sole body to manage media affairs in the country.
The MPVPV has seen a gradual development; it was initially understaffed with many positions unfilled which was one of the reasons why the Ministry couldn’t enforce its orders. In the last Accountability session, the members of the Ministry stated that they currently have an authorised workforce of 7,000 people. The MPVPV’s overreach on the mandate of other ministries has also invited some censures from other Taliban ministries. For instance, the Ministry of Information and Culture indirectly asked other sections not to interfere in that mandate, reiterating its position as the sole body to manage media affairs in the country. In March, when the MPVPV ordered men working in government to wear a cap and sport a beard, many Taliban members raised their objections publicly, post which the enforcement of the order became more flexible.
During their first iteration as well, the Department for enforcement of right Islamic ways and prevention of evils outlined eight articles to regulate social behaviour. They were also framed on similar lines as the current law and the department was responsible for monitoring the behaviour. They had the authority to punish the violators in case of a breach and had informers in the army, hospitals, and other ministries who monitored foreigners and aid agencies. Their mandate expanded even to the hospitals. Drug addiction, ban on images and idolatry, music, and banning women from working outside other than in certain sectors, were all a part of the Taliban’s paraphernalia during their first regime. While the council of ministers was tasked with all administrative and executive decisions at the time, the Supreme Council did exert its influence—which like the present, gave more space to the vice and virtue ministry.
The MPVPV has a long-drawn journey in Afghanistan’s tumultuous history—retained and transformed into one of the most important state institutions of the Emirate. For the IEA, in the current circumstances, presenting an outward picture of compliance is considered very important to show the degree of control that they have over its people. While its earlier attempt at ‘state making’ is also deemed as a failure, even during its insurgency the group had established vice and virtue commissions in areas where it had full control. Three years into power, the Emirate is now relatively better positioned to focus on institutionalising its system in the country, even as some challenges remain. The elaborate law and the detailed instructions, with even the most inane everyday experience brought under the ambit of rules and regulations reflect their need to exert control over the populace.
Shivam Shekhawat is a Junior Fellow with the Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation
The views expressed above belong to the author(s). ORF research and analyses now available on Telegram! Click here to access our curated content — blogs, longforms and interviews.
Shivam Shekhawat is a Junior Fellow with ORF’s Strategic Studies Programme. Her research focuses primarily on India’s neighbourhood- particularly tracking the security, political and economic ...
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