According to the latest report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the global temperature has risen by around 1.1°C since the Industrial Revolution. Between 2000 and 2020, CO₂ emissions from fossil fuels increased by 37.9 percent. Having already reached high levels, global greenhouse gas emissions continue to rise, making a further rise in average temperature very likely. There is certainly no lack of highly ambitious goals for climate protection in international politics. Indeed, political promises are plentiful aiming to keep global warming below the threshold of 1.5°C. Yet, taking a sober view of global politics and international governance, the belief that these promises will be fulfilled could be expressed as “climate naivety”.

If policymakers pledge climate protection on the international stage, they have little incentive to implement concrete and costly measures at the national level to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.

Climate protection as a global public good

We distinguish two types of climate naivety. Climate naivety of the first degree is neglecting the fact that climate protection is a global public good. Even if policymakers pledge climate protection on the international stage, they have little incentive to implement concrete and costly measures at the national level to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. At least five cost-benefit considerations are relevant.

1. Free riding: Those countries that reduce their emissions bear the costs of climate protection. As climate protection is a global public good, the benefits of their reductions are effective worldwide, i.e., especially others will benefit.
2. Myopia: The reduction of emissions leads to immediate costs, but most of its benefits only accrue in the future since the global climate is rather inert. Political decision-makers and citizens usually prefer the opposite: They prefer benefits today and a transfer of the costs to the future.
3. Uncertainty: The costs of climate protection are directly visible and certain. The benefits of climate protection, on the other hand, are not immediately visible and are uncertain. The benefits only come about by reducing the probability of climate-related damage somewhere in the world and sometime in the future.
4. Inequality: As we learn more about the potential consequences of global warming, it becomes clearer that effects will be unequally distributed. There are likely to be big and small losers from climate change, but some may also profit. The latter have little self-interest in climate protection.
5. Price mechanisms: Any significant reduction of greenhouse gas emissions usually needs to be related to a reduction in the use of fossil fuels. However, if some countries consume fewer fossil fuels to protect the climate, prices at the international level will fall. This allows others that do not engage in climate protection to extend their consumption of fossil fuels such that the net effect of climate protection can be nil.

These cost-benefit considerations give rise to the typical tragedy of public goods which is amplified in the case of climate change as a global public good: If a large part of the world does not participate in climate protection, then national efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions lead to virtually no benefits but substantial costs only. Thus, a country’s solitary effort in climate protection can be considered climate naivety of the first degree.

Lack of interest in citizens’ welfare

Climate naivety of the first degree could be overcome by concluding binding international treaties. The rationale behind such treaties would be that they enable the necessary cooperation between countries to prevent the tragedy of the public good of climate protection from emerging. In other words, the laudable governance idea behind international climate treaties is one of conditional cooperation: If others cooperate to protect the climate, we will also cooperate. Evidently, climate treaties only make sense if many countries join them and if they really engage in climate protection by reducing greenhouse gas emissions.

If a large part of the world does not participate in climate protection, then national efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions lead to virtually no benefits but substantial costs only.

International climate treaties, such as the Paris Agreement, are concluded by an impressive number of countries. However, among them, many have governments that put little value on democracy, the rule of law, or human rights within their borders. Some even treat their own citizens like subjects, they eliminate critical media professionals; imprison entire ethnic groups; or even wage wars of aggression against their neighbours. The belief that precisely these governments that have signed climate treaties but exploit their own citizens would engage in climate protection for the good of the earth’s future citizens is the foundation of climate naivety of the second degree. One might argue that it would already be a partial success if political leaders of autocratic countries were a little more oriented towards the welfare of future global citizens. However, it seems more likely that these leaders at least partly cover up their oppressive and exploitative tendencies towards their own citizens by their signatures on climate treaties. Apart from that, signing a treaty could increase their export opportunities for so-called “green” products, be it solar panels, batteries, or natural gas, which are considered by the European Union as green transition technologies.

Realism instead of climate naivety

Given climate naivety of the first degree, it would be foolish to hope that countries will invest sufficiently in climate protection on their own. Whilst binding international treaties could be a solution, there is a risk that the international approach will fail because of climate naivety of the second degree. What follows from this for good governance?

Storm damage can be reduced by adequate construction, dikes can be made to protect against higher sea levels, more robust tree species can be planted to preserve forests, and eco-friendly air conditioning systems can help protect against heat.

To safeguard the interests of the citizens of free, democratic countries, it would be necessary to move away from climate naivety toward more realism in climate protection. Adaptation to the expected global warming and its accompanying dangers should become more important. In contrast to climate protection as a global public good, the benefits of climate adaptation at the national, local, and even individual levels can be realised independently of what other countries are doing. Storm damage can be reduced by adequate construction, dikes can be made to protect against higher sea levels, more robust tree species can be planted to preserve forests, and eco-friendly air conditioning systems can help protect against heat. Because citizens benefit directly from adaptation, they are willing to contribute to financing it. This incentivises companies to quickly develop low-cost adaptation technologies. Good national governance can help to reduce the costs of adaptation. Adapting to climate change corresponds to an investment in resilience. Those who have adapted have less to fear from climate change. Those who have less to fear can behave differently on the global stage. If those well-governed and adapted countries would nevertheless be willing to engage in efficient climate protection out of altruistic motives, then their behaviour should not be seen as climate naive.

• Climate Change
• America
• Bhutan
• The Pacific
• East and Southeast Asia
• East Asia
• Climate change
• Climate protection
• democratic
• emissions
• fossil fuels
• greenhouse
• IPCC

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