PM Modi’s recent visit to Russia sparked debates in China about shifting global geopolitics involving China-Russia-US, China-Russia-India, and China-US-India dynamics
Indian PM Narendra Modi's recent visit to Russia garnered much attention worldwide. While international media has largely focused on the reactions from the West, what is missing from the current discourse is how the visit was perceived in Beijing, supposedly Russia's closest partner in today's geopolitics.
China’s strategic community closely followed the meeting. Even as the Chinese side relished the ringside view of how the visit brought the rift between India and the United States (US) out in the open, however, the key debates and discussions within China were focused somewhere else.
In Chinese discourse, the visit was mostly analysed in the context of Prime Minister Modi’s absence from the SCO Summit in Astana, which was held on 3–4 July, just days before the said visit. Chinese observers were rather aggravated that while the leaders of all the eight countries attended the SCO summit, PM Modi was the only one who did not attend. Chinese internet is rife with rumours that Kazakhstan had also requested PM Modi to at least attend the meeting online, however, the request was turned down, and instead, External Affairs Minister, Dr S. Jaishankar was sent to attend the summit.
In Chinese discourse, the visit was mostly analysed in the context of Prime Minister Modi’s absence from the SCO Summit in Astana, which was held on 3–4 July, just days before the said visit.
What further upset the Chinese side was that while PM Modi could not attend the SCO Summit, he could very well to go Italy to attend the G7 Summit, of which it is not even a member. And right after giving the SCO summit a miss, PM Modi headed straight for a private meeting with President Putin. The inference drawn by Beijing is that India is deliberately snubbing China, and China-headed multilateral forums, but is ready to appease Russia.
Given the fact that India held the SCO in a virtual format last year, and this year it downgraded its attendance not just at the SCO summit but also at the BRICS Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, there were many discussions in the Chinese interest if India’s absence or limited presence in these forums will now be more regularised and how it might impact the functioning of these organisations. Chinese observers were especially curious about what India’s response will be when Beijing hosts the SCO summit next year.
Accordingly, commentaries in the Chinese media came down heavily on India, accusing it of playing a negative role by “internally destabilising or hollowing out” the SCO, which China envisages as a counterweight to NATO. Some even demanded India’s expulsion from the grouping.
Interestingly, Chinese observers heaped equally strong criticism on Russia for not just introducing India to the forum, despite Chinese objection, but also for being too busy with the Russia-Ukraine war and being little bothered about the functioning of the SCO, as long as it maintains good bilateral ties with India.
Chinese observers heaped equally strong criticism on Russia for not just introducing India to the forum, despite Chinese objection, but also for being too busy with the Russia-Ukraine war and being little bothered about the functioning of the SCO.
Meanwhile, others wondered if intensifying competition between Russia and China over Central Asia could be one of the reasons behind Russia’s growing ambivalence at these forums. After all, China has big plans for platforms like SCO, particularly in terms of extending its BRI in Central Asia, including setting up a CSTO-like security apparatus in the region under China’s leadership, most of which is expected to come at Russia’s expense.
For example, it didn’t go unnoticed in Beijing as Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov publicly announced on 25 June that the BRICS would suspend accepting new member states, only to be publicly countered by President Xi Jinping who supported Kazakhstan's joining the BRICS at a press conference in Kazakhstan on 3 July.
It is in this context that there were many discussions in the Chinese media about SCO reforms, about gradually transitioning to an alternate mechanism of functioning, where the minority will have to obey the majority’s decisions. Pan Guang, Director and Professor at Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, suggested a “China-Central Asia 1+5” core group within SCO to do away with the supposed laggards, that is, both India and Russia.
The other interesting narrative that has gained traction in the Chinese media following PM Modi’s Russia visit is that of a possible Russia-India-China trilateral talks.
The other interesting narrative that has gained traction in the Chinese media following PM Modi’s Russia visit is that of a possible Russia-India-China trilateral talks.
Just before the visit, on 26 June, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov stated at the 10th “Primakov Readings” International Forum that Russia has new plans to convene a trilateral meeting between Russia, India, and China. He added that although the West hopes that the “troika” will never unite, however, Russia has interest in reviving the same. While the issue went largely unnoticed in India, however, in China, it generated much discussions among the Chinese strategic circles.
The development needs to be put into perspective. A careful reading of the Chinese literature reveals how the prospect of a political change in Washington and claims from former president Donald Trump of stopping the conflict between Russia and Ukraine within 24 hours of his election is causing subtle adjustments in China-Russia ties. Terms like “diplomatic flexibility, diversification and balancing” seem to be making a comeback. As a possible consequence, on one hand, we see Putin's visit to North Korea and signing a mutual defence agreement, his agreement with Vietnam to jointly develop marine resources in the South China Sea causing much heartburn in Beijing. The inference drawn by Chinese observers is that Russia is actively seeking to get the attention of the US and the West back to the Asia-Pacific region, at China’s doorstep, so as to reduce the pressure on itself, even as it knows very well that its action will mean greater pressure and provocation for China. On the other hand, China seems to be doing a tit-for-tat by restarting the vice-ministerial level 2+2 dialogue between China and South Korea after nine long years, hosting the President of Poland, Andrzej Duda, the “anti-Russia vanguard of Europe” and more recently, attempting to revive its strained ties with Ukraine. It is in this backdrop, that PM Modi’s Russia visit sounded an alarm bell among Chinese strategic circles, where the primary concern was that India might seek to use its traditional ties with Russia to check and balance China.
The “reassurance” from Russia seems to have come at this critical juncture. It is important to note that China remains deeply sceptical about Russia’s role as a peacemaker between China and India, and often accuses Russia of lobbying for India or having a vested interest in a potential India-China conflict, which can create huge demand for Russia's arms in the Indian market. However, sections within the Chinese strategic community have now started seeing some merit in such a proposition. First, because they believe Russia may now have greater interest in China-India reconciliation, as it will help Russia in terms of breaking through the Western blockade, both economic and diplomatic. Second, some analysis in the Chinese media highlighted that “with the United States and Canada openly supporting the Sikh separatist (Khalistan) movement and there being reports of the CIA lurking in India's Northeastern states to further instigate cessation activities”, this is possibly an opportune moment to re-energise the trilateral format. Third, as Chinese scholars like Lou Chunhao, Executive Director, South Asian Studies Institute, China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations pointed out in the current scenario, when the bilateral channels between China and India have been deadlocked, at the multilateral level, India's enthusiasm to cooperate with China in BRICS/SCO is clearly in decline, China should not completely rule out a trilateral option.
To conclude, PM Modi’s recent visit to Russia is symbolic of complex changes underway in global geopolitics—at the China-Russia-US level, China-Russia-India level as well as China-US-India level. The dynamics can only get clearer with time.
Antara Ghosal Singh is a Fellow with the Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation.
The views expressed above belong to the author(s). ORF research and analyses now available on Telegram! Click here to access our curated content — blogs, longforms and interviews.
Antara Ghosal Singh is a Fellow at the Strategic Studies Programme at Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi. Her area of research includes China-India relations, China-India-US ...
Read More +
PREV
