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Tensions in the South China Sea (SCS) have now become a regular affair. While the area had become a key maritime flashpoint in the Indo-Pacific in recent years, over the last year in particular, Beijing has stepped up the conflict with Manila. There have been clashes between Chinese and Filipino coast guard and fishermen almost daily. To reinforce public opinion and influence perception in favour of what China believes are the country’s “correct” maritime limits, Beijing has been using its academics to defend, bolster, and legitimise its SCS claims. The process is a sophisticated and coordinated effort that integrates historical research, legal arguments, academic publications, and international engagement. This strategy not only aims to solidify domestic support but also seeks to influence global opinion and shape the international legal and academic discourse in favour of China's maritime ambitions while countering distorted international narratives.
China’s primary reasoning is that historical rights take precedence over legal maritime regimes like UNCLOS. Chinese scholars argue that historical rights, predating UNCLOS, should be considered in determining maritime boundaries and sovereignty. They assert that China's historical use of the SCS entitles it to certain rights over the waters and resources. With ancient Chinese texts, maps, and records that allegedly indicate historical control or usage of the disputed waters and islands, Chinese scholars are urged to use historical narratives to assert China’s claims over the SCS. Academics cite documents like the “Geng Lu Bu” (records of nautical charts written between the Ming and Qing Dynasties), which describe maritime routes and fishing grounds. They argue that these historical records demonstrate longstanding Chinese presence and sovereignty. Maritime expeditions such as those led by Admiral Zheng He during the early 15th century are also evoked as evidence of historical exploration and control. Scholars are also urged to delve into Western naval literature to reinforce the country’s assertions.
Chinese scholars argue that historical rights, predating UNCLOS, should be considered in determining maritime boundaries and sovereignty. They assert that China's historical use of the SCS entitles it to certain rights over the waters and resources.
These efforts are linked to the defence of the controversial “Nine-Dash Line” which is interpreted by Beijing as a historical maritime boundary, despite its lack of clarity and recognition in international law. Academic studies in marine archaeology have also been conducted to find and interpret artefacts in the SCS, supporting claims of historical Chinese activity. Additionally, research on the ecological significance of the SCS and the sustainability of resources has been used to argue for Chinese management and control over these areas to protect the environment.
Chinese scholars aim to influence global academic and policy discourses through their participation in various conferences on geopolitics, international law, and maritime issues. Articles in international journals and op-eds in global media are frequently used to disseminate Chinese viewpoints and counter opposing narratives from other claimant states and Western scholars. China's influence operations are also part of broader soft power efforts to shape international opinion and build a narrative favourable to its claims through Confucius Institutes and cultural diplomacy. The former, located in universities worldwide, hosts events and discussions that subtly promote Chinese perspectives on contentious issues, including the SCS, while programmes under the latter are used to foster goodwill and subtly advocate for China's territorial claims.
Chinese scholars aim to influence global academic and policy discourses through their participation in various conferences on geopolitics, international law, and maritime issues. Articles in international journals and op-eds in global media are frequently used to disseminate Chinese viewpoints and counter opposing narratives from other claimant states and Western scholars.
Contrary to Beijing’s approach, other claimants of the rocks, reefs, shoals, and supplementary geographical features in the SCS which include the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, and even Taiwan, underscore the provisions of international maritime law. But Beijing has consistently refused to acknowledge legal parameters and even disregarded the 2016 ruling by the Hague which supported Manila and its maritime claims in the SCS. With Manila indicating that it may once again approach the International Court of Justice for another ruling, Beijing believes its efforts could receive a blow and strengthen accusations of ‘excessive claims.’
International maritime law has evolved to ensure maritime security and safety, protect trade, manage maritime activities and resources sustainably, and facilitate collaboration and dispute resolution. Led by frameworks such as the UNCLOS, international maritime law today comprises the codified principles and rules governing the use of the world's oceans and seas. If historical rights and titles are accorded priority per China’s logic or if the former is employed as the basis of ‘legal’ claims, then the modern world would look very different from how it does, and architectures of governance would collapse.
International maritime law has evolved to ensure maritime security and safety, protect trade, manage maritime activities and resources sustainably, and facilitate collaboration and dispute resolution. Led by frameworks such as the UNCLOS, international maritime law today comprises the codified principles and rules governing the use of the world's oceans and seas.
Beijing employs a range of measures to proclaim its maritime territorial claims in the SCS which include, but are not limited, to the use of its maritime militia to deter vessels of other countries from plying the waters, the construction of artificial islands and installations on the rock formations and existing islands that dot the area. Official statements and articles also began to sharply increase the use of pinyin (Mandarin) names of disputed islands and reefs to buttress China’s rights. The role of academics in this scheme of things is just a part, albeit one that contributes significantly to the narrative and perception that Beijing wants to promote. Despite these efforts, however, China’s assertions are in direct contravention of international maritime law. Nonetheless, it is interesting to note that countries in the region such as the Philippines are increasingly adopting a more challenging posture and becoming more vocal than they earlier were about their rights. These countries are also strengthening their defence partnerships with other Indo-Pacific nations like Japan, India, and the US. In the wake of these developments, China clearly is feeling the heat. It is no surprise that Beijing, too, has stepped up the deployment of its various modus operandi to advance its claims.
Pratnashree Basu is an Associate Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation.
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