China’s tightening export curbs on Japan signal a shift toward controlled decoupling, as Beijing links Tokyo’s rightward turn and US–Japan alignment to Taiwan contingencies and East Asia’s evolving order
On 24 February, China expanded its export controls to include 40 Japanese companies and institutions. These entities are related to key industries such as shipbuilding, aero-engines, defence electronics, semiconductor materials, and optical films, and include multiple subsidiaries of Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Kawasaki Heavy Industries, IHI Corporation, NEC Corporation, and Fujitsu, as well as the National Defense Academy of Japan and the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA). Chinese media indicated that the move is intended to advance a longer-term “controlled decoupling” between China and Japan in material and precision manufacturing. This includes China increasing its R&D investment in semiconductor process materials, optical thin films, and speciality chemicals, while Japanese firms are accelerating their ‘China plus one’ strategy by diversifying high-end manufacturing to Southeast Asia and India to mitigate policy risks.
Chinese media indicated that the move is intended to advance a longer-term “controlled decoupling” between China and Japan in material and precision manufacturing.
The development marks the latest in China’s escalating measures against Japan since controversy emerged last November over comments by Japan’s Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi suggesting that a Chinese attack on Taiwan could trigger a military response from Japan. China, which has accused Japan of shifting its China policy from a past model of “economy first, security second (经济为主、安全为辅)” to one prioritising “security first, proactive defence (安全优先、主动防范)”, has already taken a series of retaliatory measures against Japan in recent months, from stopping imports of Japanese seafood and sending warships to tightening rare earth export controls, halting Chinese tourism, cancelling concerts, to even reclaiming its pandas.
It is important to note that Chinese scholars do not view the current downturn in China–Japan ties as merely another cyclical fluctuation in Sino-Japanese relations, but rather as an event of significant symbolic importance with long-term implications, particularly from the macro perspective of the US–China power transition. For China, the current impasse with Japan links three issues together: the final resolution of the Taiwan issue; the reconstruction of the East Asian regional order, with Sino-Japanese relations at its core; and the building of a new stable relationship with the United States following the shift in the balance of power in China’s favour.
Projecting and leveraging its growing influence within the emerging balance of power, China is increasingly seeking to shape narratives and set the agenda around the above-mentioned themes. Accordingly, it organised a grand military parade in September 2025 to commemorate the 80th anniversary of “the victory of the Chinese People’s War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression and the World Anti-Fascist War”, attended by twenty-six foreign heads of state and government. Xi Jinping delivered a speech at the commemorative ceremony, highlighting the need to uphold the “correct historical perspective of World War II”. In his remarks, he emphasised Taiwan’s return to China as both a result of the victory in World War II and a key component of the post-war international order. This framing marked a shift in China’s discourse, placing the Taiwan issue beyond the traditional narrative of domestic affairs and sovereignty and situating it instead within a broader framework that “upholds the international legal and political arrangements established after World War II”—a construct intended to place China on firmer legal and moral ground and to gain wider acceptance from the international community. During a telephone conversation with President Donald Trump on 24 November, Xi reiterated that Taiwan’s return to China forms an important component of the post-war international order. Trump reportedly acknowledged China’s role in World War II and stated that the United States understands the importance of the Taiwan question for China.
Chinese scholars do not view the current downturn in China–Japan ties as merely another cyclical fluctuation in Sino-Japanese relations, but rather as an event of significant symbolic importance with long-term implications
Second, China has advanced the idea that China and the United States should jointly uphold the post-war international order, revisiting the history of the two countries’ wartime cooperation against Japan. In this context, it highlights concerns about Japan’s right wing potentially drawing the US into a conflict with China over Taiwan, while invoking collective self-defence. This, the Chinese side argues, is aimed at helping Japan expand its strategic autonomy, and gradually moving beyond the limitations imposed on it as a “defeated nation” after World War II.
Chinese scholars like Zheng Yongnian, professor at the Chinese University of Hong Kong, have argued that China cannot allow Japan to be “led by the nose by the United States to achieve its own goals, just as Israel has done”. Thus, it demands that if Washington seeks to ease tensions with China, it must restrain Japan’s rightward shift. It is in this context that reports emerged last November suggesting that Donald Trump—at the insistence of Xi Jinping—urged Japan’s PM to tone down rhetoric on Taiwan so as not to disrupt ongoing negotiations with China.
Sanae Takaichi’s landslide victory in the recent snap election has set alarm bells ringing in China. In Beijing’s assessment, surpassing the two-thirds threshold in the House of Representatives makes it more likely and provides more feasible pathways for Japan to increase military spending, pursue constitutional amendments, abandon the “three non-nuclear principles”, and adopt a more hardline stance towards China, virtually without hindrance. The Chinese side, therefore, views this outcome not as an ordinary parliamentary election, but as a strategic shift with implications for the security landscape of East Asia.
What concerns the Chinese side most is the US position on Japan’s political shift. Chinese analysts note that Donald Trump publicly campaigned for Sanae Takaichi on the eve of the election and, after the results were announced, quickly congratulated her, explicitly endorsing her conservative approach and “peace through strength” diplomacy. In Beijing’s view, this signals that the United States, despite Chinese sensitivities, is condoning Japan’s rightward shift to advance its Indo-Pacific strategy. In fact, some Chinese commentators argue that Washington, in its bid to secure greater “burden-sharing” from its allies, is actively encouraging Japan to accelerate its rearmament and assume greater responsibility in the US–China rivalry.
The Chinese side, therefore, views this outcome not as an ordinary parliamentary election, but as a strategic shift with implications for the security landscape of East Asia.
Chinese scholars have summed up the phenomenon with the phrase “Trumpism landing in Japan”, while also suggesting that it may give Trump an additional strategic advantage in dealing with China. Questions about how Japan’s traditional political conservatism might interact with the current wave of global right-wing populism, and what closer political alignment between the two right-wing governments could mean for China’s strategic environment, are increasingly being discussed within the Chinese strategic community.
From that perspective, China is closely watching the prospective US visit by Japan’s prime minister on 19 March. The key question is whether the meeting will remain limited to issues such as military spending, arms exports, counterstrike capabilities etc., or it will induce a “qualitative change” in the US–Japan security alliance—potentially involving moves such as amending Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution, revising the “Three Non-Nuclear Principles”, or signalling a willingness from both sides to intervene directly in the Taiwan Strait.
India must closely monitor developments in East Asia and assess the current deterioration in China–Japan relations from a strategic perspective, rather than dismissing it as a routine fluctuation, expecting that economic and political ties will soon return to normal. These developments could influence China’s decision, in terms of accelerating the process of resolution of the Taiwan issue, as Beijing may seek national reunification before Japan completes its military modernisation and moves beyond existing constraints. India’s China policy should take these possibilities into account and prepare accordingly.
Antara Ghosal Singh is a Fellow with the Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation (ORF).
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Antara Ghosal Singh is a Fellow at the Strategic Studies Programme at Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi. Her area of research includes China-India relations, China-India-US ...
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