China views the South Caucasus as a gateway to the EU market while strengthening bilateral ties with Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia.
China’s relationship with the South Caucasus is entering a new phase, defined by a greater economic engagement, expanding trade, and a steady elevation of political partnerships with the three regional countries—Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia. The region, once peripheral to Beijing’s Eurasian strategy or its sprawling Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), has now become more vital amid shifting connectivity across the continent and heightened great power competition.
Central to this shift is the growing importance of the so-called Middle Corridor—a trans-Eurasian trade route spanning from the Black Sea to Central Asia—that has gained momentum amid the wars and general instability in Ukraine and the Middle East. When Beijing unveiled the BRI more than a decade ago, the South Caucasus barely figured in its plans. At the time, the Russian route—backed by Soviet-era infrastructure and political reliability—offered a more straightforward path for China towards the European Union (EU).
The Middle Corridor’s fortunes drastically changed when the war in Ukraine broke out in February 2022 and international shipping through Russia was hampered due to an unstable security environment.
The Middle Corridor’s fortunes drastically changed when the war in Ukraine broke out in February 2022 and international shipping through Russia was hampered due to an unstable security environment, as well as the sanctions regime imposed by Western countries on Russia. This pushed Beijing to reassess its reliance on the northern transport corridor and instead increase its engagement with the South Caucasus, which geographically sits at the shortest land bridge between China and the EU. China’s focus on the Middle Corridor is further embossed by the fact that in August 2025, during a meeting between the heads of railways of Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Kazakhstan, it was agreed to include China Railway Container Transport Corp. Ltd. (CRCT) in the Middle Corridor company, which was established in 2023.
More importantly, the corridor through the South Caucasus bypasses both the Russian heartland and the perennially unstable Middle East. The region’s existing infrastructure has certainly eased this transition. The Baku–Tbilisi–Kars railway, coupled with modernised highways and port facilities on the Caspian and Black seas, has created a foundation for alternative trade routes. The Russia-Ukraine war provided Georgia and Azerbaijan the opportunity to position themselves as indispensable partners, strengthening ties with Central Asia and opening their doors to wider cooperation with China.
China’s interest in the region is likely to increase further with the signing of the “Trump Road for Peace and Prosperity” (TRIPP) between Armenia and Azerbaijan on 8 August 2025 in Washington, DC. Set to link Azerbaijan proper with its exclave of Nakhchivan via Armenia’s southernmost territory of Syunik, the TRIPP has the potential to transform security and connectivity in the South Caucasus and beyond. Beijing has not yet openly endorsed the TRIPP, but the emerging new corridor will also allow China to diversify its links to the South Caucasus and Türkiye.
Beijing has not yet openly endorsed the TRIPP, but the emerging new corridor will also allow China to diversify its links to the South Caucasus and Türkiye.
More importantly, the TRIPP will allow China to reach Armenia. The latter, due to the wars over Nagorno-Karabakh, has been cut off from major transit infrastructure ever since the 1990s. Amidst improving relations between Yerevan and Ankara, as well as Yerevan and Baku, this is set to change. Moreover, there have lately been signs that Armenia has grown more open to the idea of fostering more expansive relations with China. For instance, Yerevan officially applied to become a member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). The statement followed Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan's first official visit to China in June 2025.
Peripheral to China, Armenia may also emerge as yet another actor in the region with which China would establish a strategic partnership agreement. This would follow Beijing’s earlier steps to elevate relations with the South Caucasus countries. In 2023, Beijing signed a strategic partnership agreement with Georgia, followed by a similar document with Azerbaijan in 2024. In April 2025, relations with Baku evolved to the level of a comprehensive partnership. These agreements are highly pragmatic: China avoids ideological prescriptions, focusing instead on mutual respect for sovereignty and tangible economic benefits. The contents of the documents reveal that the Middle Corridor consistently features as a centrepiece of cooperation.
China avoids ideological prescriptions, focusing instead on mutual respect for sovereignty and tangible economic benefits.
For Beijing, greater engagement with the South Caucasus also has a strategic dimension. By expanding its footprint in the region, China gains a vantage point over the Black Sea, a theatre of competition between Russia and the West and a critical link in global food and energy supplies. The South Caucasus also aligns with China’s vision of a natural extension of Central Asia, where Beijing has been increasingly active through investments in railways, ports, and other infrastructure. For example, the ongoing construction of the China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan railway dovetails with projects on the western Caspian and Black Sea shores, including interest in Georgia’s long-discussed Anaklia deep-sea port, creating one single commercial and infrastructure corridor.
China’s push to increase its profile in the South Caucasus is also part of Beijing’s westward pivot—an effort to limit dependence on sea trade, which has increasingly become unstable. Indeed, intermittent security threats emanating from the Houthis in Yemen, coupled with the uncertainties around the war in Ukraine, make the South Caucasus an attractive geography. Moreover, the exacerbating competition between the United States (US) and China is pushing the latter to seek new commercial routes where American influence is less palpable – the Malacca Strait dilemma still remains a challenge for Chinese policymakers.
The growing engagement of China with the South Caucasus also comes at a time when there are multiple uncertainties around longer-term Western or Russian influence in the region. Neither Moscow nor the EU nor the US can exclusively dominate the region. Russia is bogged down in Ukraine, while the US is more interested in the Middle East and is overall trying to recalibrate its foreign policy toward the Indo-Pacific region. The EU, too, has so far failed to offer a regional perspective on how it plans to engage the region. Additionally, the South Caucasus countries are actively seeking to diversify their foreign policy. The concept of multi-vectorism, or reducing reliance on any single major power, is increasingly evident in how Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia manage their foreign relations. Their growing engagement with China should be seen from this perspective.
The South Caucasus now represents not only a transit hub but also a strategic opportunity for China to deepen its presence in one of Eurasia’s most contested spaces.
China’s interests in the region are not confined to transit and multi-vectorism of local countries. The expansion of green energy and electric vehicles (EVs) is increasingly on Beijing’s radar. Azerbaijan has emerged as a major importer of Chinese hybrid and electric cars, with nearly 15,500 units brought in during 2024 alone—signalling an impressive jump from the previous year (2023). Even in Georgia, Chinese cars are gradually becoming dominant. In the first half of 2025, 3,616 EVs were imported into the country, marking a nearly 88 percent increase from 1,922 recorded in 2024. China has now become Georgia’s second-largest supplier of EVs after the US. Moreover, Georgia’s strategic position on the Black Sea makes it particularly well-suited for re-exports of Chinese vehicles to the EU. Talks have even surfaced about the possibility of Chinese car production in Kutaisi, a city in Western Georgia, though no firm commitments have materialised yet.
Beijing’s approach to the South Caucasus is thus built on the idea of developing an uninterrupted corridor running from China’s westernmost province—Xinjiang—through Central Asia to the Black Sea. The South Caucasus now represents not only a transit hub but also a strategic opportunity for China to deepen its presence in one of Eurasia’s most contested spaces – the wider Black Sea region where Russian, Turkish, and Western interests collide over trade and security. The future of China's position in the region largely hinges on the outcome of the war in Ukraine. If Russia emerges victorious, the northern Eurasian corridor will likely regain its appeal, overshadowing the Middle Corridor. This could lead to a decrease in China's interest in the South Caucasus. Yet, the longer-term consequences of Beijing’s active engagement with Tbilisi, Baku, and Yerevan are already clear – in a multi-polar South Caucasus, China has emerged as a new player with which others, the more traditional (Russia, the US, and Iran) ones have to contend.
Emil Avdaliani is a Professor of International Relations at the European University in Tbilisi, Georgia, and a scholar of Silk Roads.
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Emil Avdaliani is a professor of international relations at the European University in Tbilisi, Georgia, and a scholar of Silk Roads. ...
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