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The appointment of Marco Rubio as the new United States (US) Secretary of State has added a new layer of complexity to China-US relations. Rubio is well-known for his strong views vis-à-vis China during his tenure as a US senator. On many occasions, he severely criticised China's human rights situation, economic policies and its behaviour in international affairs. Within China, Rubio is particularly disliked and referred to as the “anti-China pioneer”. He has been included in China’s sanctions list twice, and the sanctions have not been lifted to date.
Ever since his inauguration as the US Secretary of State, questions have been doing rounds within Chinese strategic circles—will China now consider lifting its sanctions on Rubio to repair Sino-US relations? Since President Trump hinted at visiting China soon, will Rubio be accompanying him? Will his status as US Secretary of State exempt him from sanctions? Will the issue become an obstacle in Trump’s visit, causing further tension in China-US relations?
Within China, Rubio is particularly disliked and referred to as the “anti-China pioneer”. He has been included in China’s sanctions list twice, and the sanctions have not been lifted to date.
China has officially skirted around the topic, arguing that “China will firmly safeguard its national interests, …at the same time it is necessary for high-level officials from China and the United States to maintain contact in an appropriate manner.” However, in an intriguing move, shortly after Rubio took office, China officially adjusted the Chinese translation of his name from “卢比奥” to “鲁比奥”, which many believe is a gesture of goodwill, paving the way for a lifting of sanctions against him.
However, China’s domestic public opinion seems strongly against lifting sanctions against Rubio. They argue that even though he was sanctioned by China twice, he does not seem to repent or mend his ways but has been making trouble for China since he took office as the new US Secretary of State.
For example, at the Senate nomination hearing on 16 January, Rubio made comments, claiming that China "cheated to obtain superpower status" at the expense of the United States, and stressed that the US must help Taiwan implement the "porcupine strategy" to foil China's effort to attack Taiwan. Then, on 21 January, a day after taking office, he met with top diplomats from Japan, India, and Australia, demonstrating his focus on Asia, especially on issues relating to China. Again, on 22 January, Rubio had his first phone call with Philippine Foreign Minister Enrique Manalo, supporting the Philippines in “condemning” China’s actions in the South China Sea. Also, he travelled to Panama in early February, his first trip abroad since taking office, following which the Panamanian president announced his withdrawal from China's Belt and Road Initiative. As Rubio had a phone call with Vietnamese Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Bui Thanh Son, the Chinese strategic community was furious, accusing the US of sowing discord between China and Vietnam.
Trump has nominated Rubio to the office, and the Senate approved his appointment because the US wanted to provoke and embarrass China.
Referring to Secretary Rubio’s actions so far, Chinese observers argue that lifting sanctions against him will make China appear weak and will lead to Chinese sanctions not being taken seriously. Trump has nominated Rubio to the office, and the Senate approved his appointment because the US wanted to provoke and embarrass China. Therefore, China should not fall for popular discourses like “giving the United States face, so China can win the substance (给美国面子，我们赢里子)” and step back on the issue easily.
Given the circumstances, China’s coping strategy seems to be three-fold.
First, by embracing a new model for future Sino-US interactions where “sanctions and dialogue” coexist. That is, without lifting sanctions on the US secretary of state, the two sides continue to communicate through telephone, video conferences, etc., and even hold in-person talks with the help of third-party countries. For example, on 24 January, 2025, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi did have a telephone conversation with Secretary Rubio, where among other things, he issued a strong warning, asking him to behave himself (“好自為之”).
Secondly, by focusing on President Trump. Chinese scholars like Zheng Yongnian think that the purpose behind Trump nominating China-hawks like Rubio is to put extreme pressure on China and blackmail or negotiate with China from a position of strength. However, he will not let power fall into their hands, and decision-making power will firmly be with him. No matter how “anti-China” these politicians are, they cannot make decisions on their own and still have to obey Trump if they do not want to face the fate of Mike Pompeo and others. Therefore, as long as China keeps President Trump pleased, it does not have to worry much about his deputies.
No matter how “anti-China” these politicians are, they cannot make decisions on their own and still have to obey Trump if they do not want to face the fate of Mike Pompeo and others.
Thirdly, China would like to place its hope on the popular discourse in Washington that Rubio would not last long in this key position and would either be sidelined or forced to step down due to factionalism and internal churn within Team Trump. According to Chinese scholar Jin Canrong, a professor at Renmin University, this remains quite a possibility, given the lack of MAGA (Make America Great Again) support for Rubio and his equation with President Trump.
The Rubio episode seems to have emerged as one of the first serious hurdles as the US and China explore prospects of a “negotiated reset” in bilateral ties under Trump 2.0. How both sides work around the issue is worth watching, as this will surely mark the trajectory of US-China relations in the next four years.
Antara Ghosal Singh is a Fellow with the Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation
The views expressed above belong to the author(s). ORF research and analyses now available on Telegram! Click here to access our curated content — blogs, longforms and interviews.
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