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As fighting resurges along the Thai-Cambodian border, China’s quiet diplomacy reveals a strategy focused less on resolving conflict than on managing instability and shaping the regional balance
The Thai–Cambodian border clashes have intensified since fighting resumed on 8 December 2025, despite a temporary arrangement reached during the ASEAN summit in Kuala Lumpur in October 2025. The Kuala Lumpur Peace Accord was brokered by Malaysia in its role as ASEAN chair, with special mediation support from US President Donald Trump, to halt the border clashes that have been ongoing since July 2025. While both countries did sign the accord, Thailand has had reservations about calling it a peace deal and has made it clear that fighting could resume if Cambodia failed to keep its promise not to attack.
Thailand has since accused Cambodian forces of ambushing a team of Thai engineers on 7 December, injuring two soldiers. Cambodia, in turn, has alleged that Thai Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul is escalating the conflict to bolster his electoral prospects ahead of the general election. Against this backdrop of mutual accusations and deep mistrust, the latest round of fighting has erupted with greater intensity.
The Thai military appears determined this time to continue operations until it believes the Cambodian army no longer poses a threat along the border. Thai officers argue privately that Cambodia will not respect any truce unless it incurs far heavier losses than during the July clashes.
That hard line was reflected on 13 December, when Thai F-16s bombed a Chinese-built bridge over the Me Teuk river in Pursat province, severing a key link along Cambodia's southern border. Airstrikes also hit a multi-storey building near a casino, which Thai authorities claimed was being used as a military command centre.
Beijing's role in the ongoing conflict is best understood not by what it projects on the world stage, but by what it carefully avoids. China's approach has long relied on strategic patience and the tolerance of limited instability as a means of exerting influence.
The situation remains tense. The Thai side is equipped with advanced weaponry that the Cambodian side lacks. On 16 December, the Thai foreign minister's spokesperson demanded that Phnom Penh announce a ceasefire first, that the ceasefire be implemented continuously in practice, and that sincere efforts be made to clear landmines in the border regions.
Amid these developments, China has projected itself as a key external actor seeking to stabilise the situation. Beijing dispatched a special envoy on 18 December to facilitate dialogue and promote what it described as "peace" in the region. As a close neighbour with strong ties to both Thailand and Cambodia, China has positioned itself as a neutral mediator. However, Beijing’s approach appears cautious, prioritising stability over addressing the deeper political and military drivers of the conflict.
During the July conflict, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi met the Secretary-General of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Kao Kim Hourn in Beijing on 25 July. During their talks, Wang portrayed China as a non-colonial problem-solver and described the border dispute as a legacy of Western colonisation. He also urged ASEAN to act as the main mediator in the conflict.
China's Foreign Ministry later confirmed that its special envoy for Asian affairs had visited both Thailand and Cambodia in late July to encourage peace talks, though the envoy was not publicly named at the time. A subsequent visit in September identified the envoy as Deng Xijun. Despite these diplomatic engagements, China's efforts remained understated and received limited international attention.
Chinese President Xi Jinping later told US President Donald Trump during the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in Busan on 30 October that China had assisted both Cambodia and Thailand "in its own way" to resolve the dispute. This statement came shortly after the signing of the peace accord, at a time when Trump's push for a ceasefire had already dominated the diplomatic narrative, effectively sidelining Beijing's mediation role.
Despite this low-profile approach, China retains substantial leverage over both parties. Cambodia is a major recipient of Chinese arms and maintains deep defence ties with Beijing, including joint military exercises and reported Chinese access to the Ream Naval Base. Thailand, a major non-NATO US ally, is also a significant purchaser of Chinese weapons, with China accounting for 43 percent of its total arms imports in 2024, even as Thai forces reportedly deployed US-made F-16 fighter jets during the latest clashes.
China's interest lies not in eliminating tensions altogether, but in ensuring that they remain manageable and externally contained. This approach allows China to reinforce its position as an indispensable external actor.
Beijing's role in the ongoing conflict is best understood not by what it projects on the world stage, but by what it carefully avoids. China's approach has long relied on strategic patience and the tolerance of limited instability as a means of exerting influence. It focuses on managing or shaping the strategic environment rather than directly resolving conflicts.
It is important to note that China does not benefit from outright conflict between Thailand and Cambodia. Both countries are critical to Beijing's long-term vision for continental Southeast Asia, particularly under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), with major infrastructural projects ongoing in the region. A prolonged conflict would continue to threaten BRI infrastructure projects and disrupt trade corridors.
However, China's interest lies not in eliminating tensions altogether, but in ensuring that they remain manageable and externally contained. This approach allows China to reinforce its position as an indispensable external actor. In this context, Deng Xijun was again dispatched on 18 December to encourage restraint among both sides, emphasising China's role as a constructive mediator. A spokesperson for China’s Foreign Ministry also denied accusations that Thai troops had seized Chinese-made anti-tank missiles from Cambodian soldiers during the clashes. Beijing reiterated that its longstanding defence cooperation with both countries is not aimed at third parties and is unrelated to the border conflict.
Amid the escalating tensions, ASEAN has continued to push for ceasefire talks under Malaysia's leadership as the bloc's rotating chair. Although little tangible progress has been made, the Thai and Cambodian foreign ministers agreed to attend the ASEAN Foreign Ministers' Meeting on 22 December, which Kuala Lumpur framed as a platform for dialogue and confidence-building. Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim has repeatedly urged both sides to uphold “dialogue, wisdom, and mutual respect,” calling for a peaceful resolution through ASEAN mechanisms.
However, ASEAN's role remains structurally limited. Its commitment to consensus and non-interference allows it to facilitate dialogue but not enforce outcomes. These constraints, however, also make ASEAN an attractive forum for China. ASEAN-led processes keep crises regionally bounded and resolutions procedurally slow, limiting the scope for decisive intervention by external actors, particularly the United States and its allies.
Bangkok has insisted that the peace talks are not the product of mediation by either the United States or China, but reflect a mutual decision by both parties. It has also stressed that the process is driven not by external pressure, but by conditions deemed appropriate for achieving stability.
The 22 December meeting determined that both countries would meet on 24 December to explore reviving a ceasefire. Thailand has emphasised that it is seeking a "genuine ceasefire" backed by firm commitments, a clear implementation framework, and progress on demining. Thai Foreign Minister Sihasak Phuangketkeow stressed that a ceasefire "cannot simply be declared, but must be negotiated." Notably, Bangkok has insisted that the peace talks are not the product of mediation by either the United States or China, but reflect a mutual decision by both parties. It has also stressed that the process is driven not by external pressure, but by conditions deemed appropriate for achieving stability.
While both sides agreed to reach an immediate ceasefire on 27 December, tensions remain. Thailand has raised concerns over the incursion of 250 unmanned drones from Cambodian territory within 12 hours of the ceasefire taking effect. Although Cambodian authorities described the incident as a “small issue” and said they are investigating it, such instances of mistrust risk further aggravating an already fractured situation if restraint is not maintained. On 31 December, Thailand released 18 Cambodian soldiers as the fragile ceasefire appeared to hold.
The Thai–Cambodian border crisis underscores the limits of mediation in the region. Current efforts by regional organisations, external powers, and the parties themselves continue to point to a conflict that is being managed rather than resolved. For now, stability rests less on trust and more on the careful avoidance of escalation.
Sreeparna Banerjee is an Associate Fellow with the Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation.
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Sreeparna Banerjee is an Associate Fellow in the Strategic Studies Programme. Her work focuses on the geopolitical and strategic affairs concerning two Southeast Asian countries, namely ...
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