-
CENTRES
Progammes & Centres
Location
China’s move towards a nuclear aircraft carrier marks a critical shift in PLAN’s ambitions—extending endurance, reach, and power projection beyond its near seas
Image Source: Getty Images
This is the 188th in the ‘China Chronicles’ series.
China’s reported move to construct a nuclear aircraft carrier signals that the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is reaching an inflexion point in its carrier development programme, where endurance, reach, and permanence have become crucial elements. Although PLAN’s newest commissioned carrier, CNS Fujian, marks a substantial leap in aviation and carrier technology, it is conventionally powered, propelled by fossil fuel that limits its on-station endurance to two to three weeks, keeping it tethered to a vulnerable logistical tail. Consequently, these carriers will face constraints if PLAN extends its operations beyond China’s near seas and even to parts of the Western Pacific.
China’s reported move to construct a nuclear aircraft carrier signals that the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is reaching an inflexion point in its carrier development programme.
For Beijing’s ‘far seas protection’ objective—especially to operate in the Indian Ocean and beyond—the nuclear carriers are an essential capability. Therefore, two questions emerge here that will shape this discourse: How quickly can China integrate nuclear propulsion, the electromagnetic launch system (EMALS), and carrier aviation into a coherent naval strategy? How should regional navies, especially the Indian Navy, prepare for this eventuality?
Picture 1: Existing carriers of China
Source: National Security Journal
Picture 2: Xi Jinping at Fujian Commissioning
Source: China Military Online
China commissioned its latest carrier, Fujian, on 5 November 2025 in a high-profile ceremony attended by President Xi Jinping. This carrier is equipped with EMALS and can operate J-35 stealth fighters, J-15T heavy strike fighters, and the KJ-600 airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) aircraft, along with helicopters, marking a substantial upgrade in the PLAN’s blue water aviation capability. Fujian has already used the EMALS to launch its stealth fighter, setting a record in naval aviation. However, the carrier remains in its early stages of induction and confident, routine operations will require multiple years of testing, training, and integration of naval operational doctrine.
For Beijing’s ‘far seas protection’ objective—especially to operate in the Indian Ocean and beyond—the nuclear carriers are an essential capability.
Nevertheless, this flattop represents a significant advance over China’s two existing ski-jump carriers, Liaoning and Shandong. Both had entered service in 2012 and 2019, respectively, and have primarily functioned as training platforms for raising the PLAN’s first generation of carrier commanders and naval aviators. As these first-generation carrier operators move into senior ranks, the PLAN is beginning to acquire empirical and operational depth in blue water aviation. However, the caution remains the principal operational philosophy, as in the absence of mature institutional knowledge, Beijing has prioritised incremental efficiency and doubled down on risk-averse carrier operations over aggressive experimentation.
Even as CNS Fujian and its sister carriers mark an advance in PLAN’s blue water naval aviation capability, they suffer from a fundamental limitation: a conventional fossil fuel-driven steam turbine propulsion system. The latest US$7 billion warship is propelled by eight boilers that drive four steam turbines, delivering an estimated 280,000 shaft horsepower or over 200 MW to four propeller shafts. This configuration can run Fujian at a maximum speed of 30 knots, a decent feature. However, it is well short of the endurance and sustained speed of nuclear warships.
Moreover, the steam turbine propulsion systems are inherently fuel-intensive, and their consumption rises sharply when the carrier transitions into high-tempo operations. China’s steam-turbine carriers normally embark over 8,000 tonnes of ship fuel and 7,000-8000 tonnes of aviation fuel. At an economical cruise speed of 18 knots, the flattop consumes an average of 400 tonnes of fuel per day. During high-speed operations, daily consumption can reach as high as 1,100 tonnes. At this burn rate, the carrier’s in-theatre endurance will remain at around 15-18 days. Since the carrier operates as the core of its battle group, escorted by destroyers, frigates, submarines, and replenishment vessels, the aggregate fuel demand would be formidable.
At this burn rate, the carrier’s in-theatre endurance will remain at around 15-18 days.
For Beijing, therefore, operating in the South China Sea (SCS) and nearby waters, especially around the first and second island chains, remains convenient and relatively safe. China can sustain its carriers through supply ships while keeping them under the protective range of its missiles. The carriers can, for short high-tempo operations, even venture further in the Western Pacific.
However, any move beyond the second island chain or towards the Indian Ocean becomes difficult as the logistical tails lengthen and become vulnerable. Chinese attempts to provide facilities for fuel, rest, repair, and other logistical support remain sketchy in the Indian Ocean. Djibouti is the only credible Chinese base in the region, while access to Chittagong, Hambantota, and Gwadar remains in the pipeline. Therefore, deploying conventionally powered carrier battle groups in the Indian Ocean remains a suboptimal option.
Moreover, by eliminating the need for carrying ship fuel, along with space for combustion air and exhaust systems, nuclear propulsion significantly increases the available internal volume. This space can be used for storing additional weapons, aircraft, aviation fuel, stores, substantially improving the endurance, reach, and permanence of PLAN’s presence. Therefore, Beijing considers nuclear carriers essential for its sustained far-seas operations.
Beijing has, through CNS Fujian, already demonstrated a credible EMALS launch capability and the operational maturity to deploy a three-carrier naval formation. The third and most technologically demanding pillar, nuclear propulsion for large flattops, remains a work in progress.
China launched naval nuclear reactor development in 1958 at the China Institute of Atomic Energy under Programme 09 [i]. By 1970, Chinese engineers had produced a working prototype reactor that entered operational service on the Han-class nuclear attack submarine (SSN) starting in 1974. Chinese engineers studied the Pressurised Water Reactor (PWR) aboard German commercial vessel Otto Hahn and the Soviet icebreaker Lenin, adopting the latter as inspiration for its simplicity and robustness.
The first two Han-class SSNs carried reactors rated at 48 MWt, while the later boats received uprated 58 MWt plants producing about 11 MWe for submerged speed of about 24 knots. Subsequent generations of submarines, Type 93 and 94, were equipped with two 75 MWt reactors, producing a combined output of 22 MWe to sustain speeds at 28-30 knots.
The latest Type 95 and 96 boats are assessed to carry a single reactor from the Russian OK-650 reactor lineage, producing power at 200 MWt and 33 MWe to sustain speed at 32 knots. However, even this reactor falls short of the required power for a 100,000-tonne nuclear aircraft carrier with high sortie generation rates, catapults, sensors, ship-service power load and growth margins. Therefore, the PLAN must develop better reactors with higher power density.
Widely discussed ACP 100 small modular reactors (SMRs) or Linglong 1, which generate 385 MWt and 125 MWe, are one option to prevent operational and technological constraints. However, Linglong 1 reactors use low-enriched uranium (3 percent) and have a refuelling cycle of 24 months, which is sub-optimal for a carrier operation. Instead, as per reports, China is building a prototype naval reactor for carrier aviation in Leshan, Sichuan Province, under the Longwei or Dragon Might project. This project is expected to combine technologies from the Linglong 1 SMR and the latest submarine reactors.
Picture 3: Comparison of Fujian with Next Carrier
Source: Sohu.com
China’s announcement that the future carrier will be nuclear-powered, therefore, must be seen in the broader strategic and industrial context. Western media have reported telltale signs of Beijing constructing its future nuclear carrier at Dalian Shipyard, yet no clarity has emerged from China about its propulsion architecture or reactor design. Chinese engineers may be trying to navalise an SMR or may be further refining a submarine lineage reactor for flattop propulsion.
The prospect of a future Chinese nuclear carrier battle group operating in the Indian Ocean would mark an ominous shift for the regional maritime balance.
Both require intensive land-based testing, integration with ship-based systems, and prolonged trials under maritime operational conditions. The absence of a credible carrier-rated reactor indicates that China’s nuclear carrier programme remains under development. Therefore, even if all political and industrial stars align for the PLAN, its nuclear aircraft carrier will take at least another decade to mature.
Nevertheless, the prospect of a future Chinese nuclear carrier battle group operating in the Indian Ocean would mark an ominous shift for the regional maritime balance. China’s surface warships, submarines, and intelligence collection ships have already become regular features in this region over the past few years. Invariably, Indian missile test Notice to Air Missions (NOTAMs) experience a Chinese ISR ship positioned closely to collect telemetry and electronic data. China’s nuclear-powered carriers, with their relatively enhanced endurance, reach, and permanence, would increase this challenge for India. The Indian Navy, which considers the Indian Ocean as its home waters, will have to consider inducting larger aircraft carriers and nuclear attack submarines to preserve deterrence and strategic balance while dissuading any Chinese misadventure in the region.
Atul Kumar is a Fellow – National Security and China Studies at the Strategic Studies Programme, Observer Research Foundation.
[i] John W. Lewis and Xue Litai, China’s Strategic Seapower: The Politics of Force Modernization in the Nuclear Age, (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1994), 23.
The views expressed above belong to the author(s). ORF research and analyses now available on Telegram! Click here to access our curated content — blogs, longforms and interviews.
Atul Kumar is a Fellow in Strategic Studies Programme at ORF. His research focuses on national security issues in Asia, China's expeditionary military capabilities, military ...
Read More +
PREV
