China’s National Security White Paper and South Asia’s Absence

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On 12 May 2025, China’s State Council Information Office released a first-of-its-kind white paper titled “China’s National Security in the New Era”. While this document has been explored by many, the question of China’s intentions in South Asia remains strangely absent. The document, modelled on a United States (US)-style national security white paper, reflects Beijing’s growing confidence in articulating its global security vision. China seems comfortable sharing the idea of playing an important role in shaping an alternative multipolar global order, distinct from the West-led governance frameworks. The document is important to be engaged in the policy circles of New Delhi, primarily because it converges the strategic concepts of both domestic and foreign security concerns from a comprehensive umbrella of Xi Jinping's flagship concept of the Global Security Initiative. While the document clearly states Asia Pacific as a focal point of great power competitions, particularly portraying the US as a direct threat in this theme, the mention of India and other South Asian players in the region is significantly absent in the document, except from a mention concerning border-related talks, which are in motion. This lack of attention could be a case of deliberate ambiguity or a possible recalibration of Chinese intentions. Ultimately, it poses a fundamental question: how does China look at South Asia from a security point of view?

China seems comfortable sharing the idea of playing an important role in shaping an alternative multipolar global order, distinct from the West-led governance frameworks.

Mentions of Security Concerns in Asia-Pacific

The white paper remains specific in its concerns over the strategic importance of the larger Asia-Pacific region—portraying it as a ‘stable plate’ in the international order. Beijing is categorical in identifying the US and its ‘exclusive small group’ as the only irritant to regional stability, accusing them of clinging to ‘Cold War legacy issues’ and fostering conditions that make the resolution of territorial and maritime disputes improbable. This white paper is thus a deliberate attempt to showcase China as the reformer, seeking to reshape the global norms of security and suit its expanding ambitions, while using the ‘Global South’ rhetoric to portray itself as the more legitimate advocate of multilateralism.

While positioning the US as the troublemaker in the region, the white paper’s core agenda was to highlight China’s Global Security Initiative (GSI)—a flagship initiative of the Xi regime in 2022.  It notes that the external security pressure, i.e foreign interference, has increased, which has tried to constrain and suppress China through various sabotaging activities. These ‘forces’ have interfered in China’s ‘neighbouring’ affairs, causing trouble on issues related to Xinjiang, Tibet, and Hong Kong. It labelled overseas separatist movements—especially the ones related to Tibetan independence—as external threats to China’s sovereignty.

Beijing is categorical in identifying the US and its ‘exclusive small group’ as the only irritant to regional stability, accusing them of clinging to ‘Cold War legacy issues’ and fostering conditions that make the resolution of territorial and maritime disputes improbable.

Beijing seems interested in winning over the regional and multilateral organisations' support and to be considered a peacemaker—highlighting China’s GSI as a proponent of a ‘common, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security concept’ in line with the United Nations (UN) Charter.. How this will affect South Asia remains particularly absent from the recent analysis that has emerged from this document.

How does China see South Asia?

China’s main tool of influence in South Asia is economics. This trend has deepened after the Belt Road Initiative (BRI) launch in 2013, which signifies Chinese intent. Carnegie Endowment’s Project titled China’s Impact on Strategic Regions provides some interesting observations in exploring how Beijing strategically leverages specific vulnerabilities in South Asian countries—especially Bangladesh, the Maldives, Nepal, and Sri Lanka while ensuring engagements that serve its own interests appear beneficial for the host country.

In the case of the Maldives and Sri Lanka, China remains the backbone for infrastructure projects ranging from ports, airports, to energy facilities. However, Bangladesh presents a different dynamic. A 2020 report by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute states that Bangladesh is China’s second-largest buyer of military hardware globally.

The political ideologies of the regimes in these countries in the past decade have also exhibited pro-Chinese tendencies, the recent shift being Bangladesh. Muhammad Yunus—the chief adviser of Bangladesh’s interim government—has been open about Dhaka’s need to pledge allegiance to China, which remains obvious from his state visit to Beijing, where his desperate enthusiasm met Chinese investment in infrastructure support, cross-border river data sharing, and military cooperation.

The political ideologies of the regimes in these countries in the past decade have also exhibited pro-Chinese tendencies, the recent shift being Bangladesh.

In Nepal’s case, its military ties have not been the strongest attribute of cooperation with China. However, projects such as the Pokhara International Regional Airport, Upper Marsyangdi Hydropower Station, and Kerung Kathmandu cross-border railway projects are strong Chinese infrastructural tentacles to improve the perception of China in the region as a friendly neighbour.

Pakistan—arguably China’s most strategic ally or ‘client’ in South Asia—is marked by intense military and economic dependency. This reliance has been observed quite starkly with Chinese missiles and defence systems being used in the recent India-Pakistan escalation after the Pahalgam terror attacks. While China behaved as a neutral, peaceful observer, calling for restraint in this escalation, its diplomatic tendencies remained highly distrustful in reality.

India’s challenge?

While China is a new entrant in South Asia in terms of economic and political footprint, it has utilised the fragile states and institutions of the region to spread its dominance through military or, in some cases, developmental support. This pattern runs consistently in the case of the Maldives, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, and Bangladesh. Although India remains a strong actor in the subcontinent and the world, the situation in South Asia demands attention. The recent white paper clearly articulates Chinese discomfort with building strategic partnerships that are supposedly ‘anti-China’. Diplomatically, these partnerships are South Asia’s lifeline. India needs to institutionally build resilient engagement with players such as the US, Japan, Australia, and France to successfully balance Chinese tendencies in the region. While China tries to mask its real intentions by presenting itself as peace-loving and norm-abiding, India must build strategic clarity—not just through military development—but also through economics.

Bangladesh’s latest plans to revive the British era Lalmonirhat base with Chinese help, and Yunus’s mention of India’s strategic chicken neck, in his talks with Xi Jinping, China’s economic projects are also strategically aimed at India and are centred around India’s sovereignty.

Since Pakistan used Chinese weaponry against India during its recent Operation Sindoor retaliation against terrorist infrastructure, it is pertinent for India to understand the projection China is attempting through this white paper. 81 percent of Pakistan’s weapons come from China. Bangladesh’s latest plans to revive the British era Lalmonirhat base with Chinese help, and Yunus’s mention of India’s strategic chicken neck, in his talks with Xi Jinping, China’s economic projects are also strategically aimed at India and are centred around India’s sovereignty. Similarly, Nepal has lately started using the Chinese term ‘Xizang’ in its official documents for Tibet, aligning with China’s preferred terminology. This shift was notably evident in a joint statement issued after Nepalese Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli visited Beijing in December 2024, where Nepal referred to the Tibet Autonomous Region as ‘Xizang’, reiterating that “Xizang affairs are internal affairs of China”, and that it would not allow separatist activities against China on its soil. This raises concerns for India because China also claims India’s sovereign territory of Arunachal Pradesh as Southern Tibet or ‘Zangnan’. The moment ‘Xizang’ becomes normalised as the terminology for Tibet, roughly translating to ‘Western treasure trove’, China’s attempts to claim Arunachal Pradesh as Southern Tibet—lying just below the Western treasure trove or ‘Xizang’—become subtly normalised. It is a very pertinent aspect of the psychological warfare China uses. Thus, considering the security-loaded overtures in the new white paper, India must read between the lines carefully to be better prepared.

Sriparna Pathak is a Professor of China Studies at the Jindal School of International Affairs, at O.P. Jindal Global University.

Upamanyu Basu is an Assistant Professor at the Department of Social and Political Studies, School of Behavioral and Social Sciences, Manav Rachna International Institute of Research and Studies.

• International Affairs
• China
• India
• south Asia
• china and south asia
• china foreign policy
• china south asia policy
• chinese ambitions in south asia
• chinese influence in south asia
• global security initiative china

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