China’s Global Security Initiative in South Asia: An Assessment

In November 2025, Beijing released a white paper reinforcing the principles of the Global Security Initiative (GSI), signalling a renewed push into global security discourse that would solidify its stance on matters of arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation. The GSI is best understood as a consolidating framework that gathers China’s dispersed security practices abroad into a recognisable template. Nowhere is this dynamic more visible than in South Asia. South Asia’s engagement with the GSI is less about ideological alignment with China’s security worldview and more about consolidating and institutionalising long-standing bilateral defence relationships to challenge Indian dominance. By doing this, the GSI raises concerns about China's security presence in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR), complicating India's efforts to enhance regional leadership and security.

South Asia’s engagement with the GSI is less about ideological alignment with China’s security worldview and more about consolidating and institutionalising long-standing bilateral defence relationships to challenge Indian dominance.

Why South Asia is Engaging with GSI

First articulated by President Xi Jinping in 2022 and elaborated through a 2023 Concept Paper, the GSI represents China’s aspiration to establish a China-led world order. In practice, the initiative is less of a treaty-based framework and more of an umbrella arrangement under which China is consolidating its existing security cooperation. Central to this effort is the expansion of law enforcement, internal security, and policing partnerships, alongside cementing support for its leadership — most visibly through platforms such as the Global Public Security Cooperation Forum (GPSCF). Framed around concepts such as “indivisible security,” opposition to bloc politics, and respect for sovereignty, the initiative presents itself as an alternative to what China depicts as outdated alliance-driven by the interventionist West. The GSI externalises China’s domestic security logic and presents it as a model, and positions itself as a champion of a “win-win” paradigm in a multipolar world.

On their part, other South Asian countries —Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and the Maldives — have been quick to adopt the GSI (see Table 1).  Three factors have largely contributed to this decision:

Table 1: South Asian Countries’ Stance on GSI 

Source: China Internal Security Diplomacy Dataset, Harvard Dataverse

First, South Asian countries are in dire need of defence and security reforms and cooperation, as the Indian Ocean evolves to be the heart of the ongoing geopolitical churn. In this regard, they believe that China's rise is inevitable. Beijing’s material capabilities in industrial defence production, arms exports, and advancements in “emerging fields” of Artificial Intelligence (AI), cyberspace, and outer space have made it an attractive partner for countries seeking rapid capacity enhancement without outright political conditionalities that the West often imposes. For Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and the Maldives, Beijing offers a rare combination of economies of scale and speed. For Pakistan, however, Chinese arms and defence cooperation are seen as a primary guarantee against India.

South Asian countries are in dire need of defence and security reforms and cooperation, as the Indian Ocean evolves to be the heart of the ongoing geopolitical churn.

Second, South Asia’s engagement with the GSI enables strategic diversification and hedges against India’s overwhelming presence. Historically, India has been a dominant power and a net-security provider in the region. This has often compelled South Asian countries to seek diversification. Regional countries recognise that enhancing regional security through cooperation with India is essential. However, they believe that China’s security engagement, especially under the GSI, will reduce their dependence on Delhi and provide them with additional bargaining space and agency.

Third, domestic necessities and politics also shape these external alignments. Defence and security cooperation with India has invited complications and fuelled political challenges, including accusations that New Delhi infringes on the sovereignty of South Asian states. The Maldives’ ‘India Out’ campaign and recent criticism of Sri Lanka’s defence pact exemplify how security cooperation is politicised in the region. Consequently, national security postures are largely shaped by the regime in power. In fact, the Maldives and Bangladesh joined the GSI only after the change in their respective governments. Furthermore, in the case of Sri Lanka, economic difficulties gave it little bargaining agency vis-à-vis China.

Building on Embedded Security And Defence Ties

For China, the GSI is seen as a natural progression to institutionalise its increasing security and defence partnership. This also helps it carve out and seek legitimacy for its leadership, provide an alternative to India’s regional security architecture, and challenge India. As such, it has claimed that Bhutan and Nepal have endorsed the GSI, despite no such official statements from either country.

China completed the construction of Bangladesh’s first submarine base in 2023, and the interim government is reportedly working to revive the British-era Lalmonirhat air base with Chinese assistance.

In fact, the operationalisation of the GSI in South Asia occurs through existing defence channels rather than new projects. China’s arms exports to South Asia, along with joint training exercises, as seen in Table 2, indicate its evolving defence ties. Pakistan remains the most integrated partner, with co-production arrangements, joint platforms, and deep interoperability. Over the past few years, Bangladesh has shifted from transactional procurement to infrastructure-linked defence cooperation. China completed the construction of Bangladesh’s first submarine base in 2023, and the interim government is reportedly working to revive the British-era Lalmonirhat air base with Chinese assistance.

The Maldives, under Muizzu, also signed its first military assistance agreement with China,  which provides non-lethal weapons and free training for Maldivian security forces. It has also let Chinese research vessels enter its waters, further institutionalising defence ties. Sri Lanka, despite its efforts to balance relations with Beijing and New Delhi, and banning spy ships from docking in the country, has hosted multiple PLA Navy vessels in 2024, including the hospital ship Peace Ark. More broadly, the dual-use potential of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) infrastructure, ranging from Gwadar and Hambantota to Sonadia, solidifies Beijing’s growing security grip in the region.

Table 2: China’s defence engagements

Source: Lowy Institute Asia Power Index

Implications

The GSI’s gradual entrenchment in South Asia also accelerates the institutionalisation of China’s security presence along key maritime corridors. When combined with the BRI infrastructures, such as ports, logistics hubs, and digital networks, the GSI strengthens the security-commercial nexus underpinning China’s long-term regional strategy. The initiative also blurs the boundary between economic and military engagement. Dual-use technology, maritime surveillance cooperation, ongoing infrastructure projects with countries in the strategic maritime corridor, and port access arrangements enhance China’s operational familiarity with the IOR, even in the absence of formal security agreements.

China’s arms exports also lock countries into long-term relationships by pairing arms delivery with training projects. The GSI gives political coherence to this model, portraying defence-industrial ties as contributions to regional stability rather than instruments of influence. Beyond conventional military cooperation, China has expanded training programmes for police forces and internal security agencies. These initiatives are central to the GSI’s narrative. Sustained engagement fosters familiarity with Chinese security practices and threat perceptions, integrating them into the daily operations of South Asian security institutions.

The GSI gives political coherence to this model, portraying defence-industrial ties as contributions to regional stability rather than instruments of influence.

The GSI also challenges, if not counters, existing regional security architecture such as the India-led Colombo Security Conclave. Nations may increasingly use Chinese weapons and policies in their security outlook and governance, posing new challenges for like-minded regional cooperation. The attendance of South Asian countries at China-hosted security forums, including the GPSCF, serves as a way to understand how aligned or how prone to cooperation the countries in the region are. Afghanistan, the Maldives, and Nepal were new participants at the GPSCF in 2024. Pakistan was a returning participant. This participation normalises China’s role as a convener of security dialogue, and brings it closer to establishing a China-led order. South Asian countries could also leverage Chinese engagement to extract concessions, resources, or reassurance from India, altering the dynamics of regional leadership.

Overall, the GSI risks posing more challenges to India-led architecture in the region. For South Asian states, engagement with the GSI reflects a pragmatic calculation, while China sees this as a natural extension of pre-existing defence cooperation. It allows Beijing to institutionalise its security architecture and consolidate its leadership. Hence, the GSI’s impact will not be measured by declarations or endorsements, but by the quiet deepening of security practices, habits, and cooperation.

Aditya Gowdara Shivamurthy is an Associate Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation.

Uditi Lunawat is a Research Intern at the Observer Research Foundation.

• International Affairs
• China
• India
• south Asia
• china GSI
• china GSI
• china in ior
• china security cooperation
• global public security cooperation forum
• global security initiative
• global security initiative china
• gsi countries
• indian ocean region

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