China’s recent wave of “global initiatives” seeks to challenge the US-led order by rebranding multilateralism, appealing to the Global South, and positioning Beijing as the architect of a new world order.
Chinese President Xi Jinping unveiled a new “global initiative” at the recent Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) Summit in Tianjin, which was framed as a call for nations to come together for a “more just and equitable global governance system”. During his keynote speech, Xi drew parallels with the post-World War II era, calling for a “new page in global governance” as a necessity. He cited Cold War mentalities, hegemonism, and protectionism as forces undermining the cooperative nature of global affairs. At this juncture, China appears to be positioning itself as a defender of peace, security, and a leader shaping the new world order. As a direct critique of how the current US-led world order is reduced to great power insecurities, China appears to be positioning itself as a responsible player willing to present the case of multilateralism while abiding by the United Nations (UN) Charter. In doing so, Beijing also aims to appeal to countries frustrated with the current world order, presenting a more inclusive and balanced global governance alternative, all while challenging US hegemony.
Quoting ‘three deficiencies’ that current international institutions are facing, the Global Governance Initiative was introduced as a solution. These deficiencies are, namely, underrepresentation of the Global South, erosion of the ‘authoritativeness’ of UN bodies such as the Security Council, and lastly, an urgent need for greater effectiveness of multilateral initiatives. In the official concept note, there were mentions of global challenges, such as climate change and the digital divide, that require urgent attention. While claiming to uphold the UN Charter and the broader goal of reforming the global governance architecture, China went on to propose the core concepts in the Global Governance Initiative. Overall, these are interlinked principles which appear totally in line with the larger UN structure: sovereign equality, adherence to international rule of law, multilateralism as the ‘basic pathway of global governance’, and lastly, governance through a people-centred approach.
These global initiatives serve as crucial tools for China to attain global primacy and respond to the evolving demands of the international order.
This seems very familiar to Xi’s speech at the Boao Forum in 2021 under the theme “A World in Change,” where he identified the ‘four deficits’ that humanity faces, namely: governance deficit, trust deficit, development deficit, and peace deficit. In this context, he argued that at a moment when strong leadership was needed, the Western-led governance system had faltered. Four years later, Xi’s 4th Global Initiative signals China’s growing aspiration to lead a global alternative. However, the concept note concludes with a clarification that GGI is only an extension of China’s earlier frameworks, namely the Global Development Initiative (GDI), the Global Security Initiative (GSI), and the Global Civilization Initiative (GCI).
Beijing presents these “global initiatives” as “public goods” that seek to steadily replace the US-led rules-based order. The GSI was introduced amid the Ukraine war, mirroring UN Charter principles while emphasising absolute state sovereignty. In practice, the GSI prioritised regime stability and sought to shield autocratic governments from external scrutiny. The GDI, launched in 2021 and framed as a twin of the GSI, was largely an attempt to securitise the discourse of the global development agenda and place it under the Chinese guardianship. The GCI, launched in March 2023, went further, representing an effort to promote the value system of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) while attempting to strip away concepts like democracy and human rights from the core tenets of the global governance discourse. Its objective is to ultimately push for an international system that views autocratic governments as friends and better alternatives to the US-led system, which seems to falter more often.
In this context, these global initiatives serve as crucial tools for China to attain global primacy and respond to the evolving demands of the international order. Xi’s flagship project, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), announced in 2013, encountered setbacks in several countries but has since been reconfigured under the ambit of the GDI. Much like earlier initiatives, it appears to primarily focus on the recurring themes of “people-centric,” “innovation-driven,” and “results-oriented” development. These repetitions underscore a classic Chinese strategy, namely, to market familiar ideas under new banners while asserting the broader claim that the current US-led order is “unjust and unfair,” and China is the “greatest source of stability”.
By consistently identifying itself as the world's largest developing country, China seeks to foster broad solidarity with the Global South and advance its vision of an alternative world order infused with Chinese characteristics.
In all its "global initiatives," China has refrained from criticising the United Nations and its institutions’ central role in the global order. In fact, it has reiterated multiple times that, as one of the founding members of the organisation, it has long benefited from the liberal international order. However, Beijing does contest Western dominance in the structure, frequently calling for a reformed global order. These initiatives should therefore be viewed through the lens of the larger Chinese playbook to compete for leadership of the Global South. By consistently identifying itself as the world's largest developing country, China seeks to foster broad solidarity with the Global South and advance its vision of an alternative world order infused with Chinese characteristics. Since 2004, when the term ‘Beijing Consensus’ was coined to juxtapose the CCP’s state-led, flexible approach to economic development and overseas investment policies, the effort has been to present China as a better alternative to the West-backed Washington Consensus. In 2017, speaking at the 19th Party Congress, Xi stated that China would emerge as a modern and prosperous nation by 2020 and suggested that other developing countries should adopt the same growth model as China’s. While China’s economic growth rates in 2025 do not indicate any sign of prosperity, the effort remains to portray China as a superior leader, whether in governance, leadership of the Global South, or of the world. China has provided ample indications of its desire to assume leadership of the international order. Amidst US President Donald Trump’s tariff tantrums, in which he treats both friend and foe with disdain, it can be expected that China’s ‘global initiatives’ will only expand to win over neutral states and adversaries alike, unless the US demonstrates its commitment to continue leading the rules-based international order.
Dr Sriparna Pathak is Professor of China Studies and the founding Director of the Centre for Northeast Asian Studies at O.P. Jindal Global University.
Upamanyu Basu is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at the Manav Rachna International Institute of Research and Studies.
The views expressed above belong to the author(s). ORF research and analyses now available on Telegram! Click here to access our curated content — blogs, longforms and interviews.
Dr Sriparna Pathak is Professor of China Studies and the founding Director of the Centre for Northeast Asian Studies at O.P. Jindal Global University (JGU), ...
Read More +
Upamanyu Basu is an Assistant Professor of Politics and International Relations at the Manav Rachna International Institute of Research and Studies. He is currently pursuing ...
Read More +
PREV
