China’s efforts to bridge the disparities in its cyber and space capabilities by restructuring its military serve to widen the gap between China and India, with long-lasting implications for the latter
The People’s Liberation Army Strategic Support (PLASSF) has been disbanded. In late 2015, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) under President Xi Jinping announced the creation of the PLASSF along with Peoples Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF), which were two new services. The PLARF which was the erstwhile Second Artillery Force (SAF), in the latest shake-up, has not been dissolved and still retains command authority. In addition to these two new services, with now only the PLARF surviving, five Theatre Commands (TCs) were also set up in 2015-16. The PLASSF was a unified service that integrated the Chinese military’s space, cyber, electronic, and psychological warfare capabilities and its replacement is the Information Support Force (ISF). Xi said that the new force would be “…a brand-new strategic arm of the PLA and a key underpinning of coordinated development and application of the network information system”, which he added would help the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) “…fight and win in modern warfare.”
What brought about the dissolution of the PLASSF and its replacement—the Information Support Force (ISF)? Three general explanations are proffered. First is that the PLASSF was a strategic force that needed to be brought under greater oversight and control of the Central Military Commission (CMC)—the top political and military decision-making body in the PRC led by President Xi Jinping. A second factor and a corollary to this bureaucratic impediment was the inherent rigidity of the PLASSF to the extent that Theatre Commands (TCs) had to secure its approval for resources or assets which the PLASSF could block or delay because it enjoyed co-equal command status and authority with the TCs. In a nutshell, the shift is also due to the need for limiting excessive control. A third and final reason is the experience of the ongoing war between Russia and Ukraine, which has visibly demonstrated to the Chinese that flexibility in the release and the use of cyber-, electronic-, and space-borne resources more efficiently was a necessity, acting as compelling drivers behind the change for operational effectiveness in the battlespace.
The People's Liberation Army Cyberspace Force and Aerospace Force have been created, bringing the number of forces to four, which includes the People’s Liberation Army Logistics Support Force (PLALSF) whose establishment predates the current transformation.
Whatever the ostensible reasons for the PLASFF’s axing, the constituent elements of the newly established ISF are network information systems and communications support supplemented by potential network defence. ISF is primarily geared toward protecting and defending Chinese networks against external intrusions and attacks. Additionally, the People's Liberation Army Cyberspace Force and Aerospace Force have been created, bringing the number of forces to four, which includes the People’s Liberation Army Logistics Support Force (PLALSF) whose establishment predates the current transformation. Now the TCs, which are crucial for the defence of Chinese territory and offensive operations including overseas missions, can avail the services of each of the arms more smoothly and efficiently. What is not evident is whether additional divisions have been instituted such as the separation of Cyber Warfare and Electronic Warfare (EW) and presumably the Cyber Force will be the new arm that oversees and pursues integrated CW-EW missions and whose resources the TCs can avail. The combined applications of CW-EW are likely to be more pronounced, especially in the context of what the Chinese call “intelligicised warfare” which will involve greater use of Artificial Intelligence (AI) and automation in warfare.
The changes that we see today relate mostly to Command and Control (C2), and the TCs’ easier access to the capabilities and resources which the erstwhile PLASFF controlled. If anything, the reshuffle is an effort to leverage cyber, EW, Space and counterspace capabilities for their effective application in multi-domain operations. Even prior to the latest rejig, the Chinese invested heavily in cyber and space capabilities as the 2024 Chinese defence budget demonstrates, which witnessed an increase of 7.2 percent despite low Chinese economic growth. India should now be even more alert and prepared simply because the capabilities of the Chinese relevant to cyber weapons, EW, space and counterspace systems have received a significant amount of investment for the pursuit of joint operations and the dissolution of the PLASSF has nothing to do with Chinese capabilities in the space, cyber, and EW areas per se. They are not just geared for an invasion of Taiwan, the PRC’s cyber, EW, space and counterspace capabilities can be used in a military contingency against India. Indeed, the Chinese quest to match and redress the gaps in their cyber and space capabilities against the Americans for a Taiwan invasion can easily be shifted to service the People’s Liberation Army’s Western Theatre Command (WTC) military operations for offensive and defensive missions vis-à-vis India, due to the “fungibility” of cyber, EW, space and counterspace assets. China’s aim to match or even surpass the United States (US) has opened up a significant gap between China and India in the space and cyber domains.
India defeated the intrusion, but the lack of adequate Indian space assets was evident and it was able to defeat it because the US extended its superior space surveillance assets.
One of the most visible manifestations of this was the American assistance to India when Chinese forces attacked Yangtse in the Tawang sector of Arunachal Pradesh in December 2022. India defeated the intrusion, but the lack of adequate Indian space assets was evident and it was able to defeat it because the US extended its superior space surveillance assets. In the space domain, at a minimum, the space power differential is significant between India and China and reveals the extent to which Chinese space military assets are substitutable.
The establishment of the ISF as well as a separate Cyber and Space force has other implications for India in that the TCs, especially the WTC, which is responsible for ground and air operations along the Sino-Indian boundary, can now access the newly established ISF, Cyber force and Aerospace force’s resources more easily. To be sure, the WTC would have some organic cyber and EW assets, but the erstwhile PLASSF was too rigid in extending assistance to the TCs, which was one of the primary precipitants for the recent reorganisation. A further implication of the PRC’s decision to subdivide the former PLASSF into separate forces is that it provides greater flexibility, demonstrating to Indian military planners that they need to consider how they deploy discrete assets connected to space, cyber, EW and psychological operations; where they overlap; and where they serve as enablers and force multipliers for conventional military operations.
The Xi-led leadership’s decision to disband the PLASFF should not be considered definitive, it could revive itself in another guise with possibly some of its functions amalgamated into a new service in the future.
AI is another area where India will need to pay greater attention given the Chinese commitment to “intelligicised warfare”. AI can augment and render Chinese intelligence collection and cyberwarfare capabilities more effective. Last but not least, the Xi-led leadership’s decision to disband the PLASFF should not be considered definitive, it could revive itself in another guise with possibly some of its functions amalgamated into a new service in the future. What is and should be instructive for Indian military planners and strategists in regard to the organisational changes implemented by the Chinese leadership is that it underlines the importance of experimentation, flexibility, and even adaptation, given what the PRC has witnessed through the recent military experience of others such as the Russians and Ukrainians in their ongoing war.
Kartik Bommakanti is a Senior Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation
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Kartik Bommakanti is a Senior Fellow with the Strategic Studies Programme. Kartik specialises in space military issues and his research is primarily centred on the ...
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