China, Japan, and the Taiwan Threshold

Since Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s 7 November parliamentary assertion that a Chinese use of force against Taiwan could amount to a “survival-threatening situation” — a legal prerequisite for Japan exercising its right to collective self-defence — Tokyo and Beijing have been locked in one of their fiercest diplomatic rows in years. Beijing has lodged formal protests, accused Tokyo of distorting its Taiwan policy, and rolled out political, economic, and symbolic counter-measures. Despite Tokyo’s insistence that its position on Taiwan remains unchanged, the incident demonstrates how a single exchange in the Diet can escalate into a multi-layered crisis across capitals.

Why History Still Shapes Beijing’s Strategic Reflexes

The primary motivations for China’s angry response to Takaichi’s stance, which security scholars interpret as Tokyo’s unwritten default position in the event of a Taiwan contingency, are rooted in history. Imperial Japan colonised Taiwan, prising it away from Qing-era China in the late 19th century before subsequently invading China in the 20th century. This period is referred to in China’s political discourse as the ‘Century of National Humiliation’, when foreign powers gained a foothold on the mainland.

The primary motivations for China’s angry response to Takaichi’s stance, which security scholars interpret as Tokyo’s unwritten default position in the event of a Taiwan contingency, are rooted in history.

The Communist Party of China’s (CPC) narrative regarding this era is that a Manchu-ruled Qing was responsible for the enfeebling of the Chinese Empire, and that under the party’s stewardship, the nation is becoming stronger. This sentiment has also been a key element of the CPC's regime legitimacy — that the onus is on the CPC to restore China to its former glory. Second, the notion of ‘national humiliation’ is a key element of the patriotic-education campaign in the educational syllabi, which weaponises memories of that period. Taiwan has been described by the Chinese government as a ‘core interest’ and a matter of the nation’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Since 2014, December 13 has been earmarked to commemorate those killed in Japanese atrocities and the Japan-China conflict. A state-sponsored project to compile and archive memories of Japanese atrocities reinforces these narratives for the current generation. This messaging has led to anti-Tokyo sentiment flaring up from time to time in China, and the reopening of territorial disputes with its neighbours — notably India, Japan, and Taiwan.

Under Chinese President Xi Jinping, the mission to “reunify” Taiwan has gained new momentum. During the 20th National Congress of the CPC, a key meeting of the Party elite that charts the nation’s policy direction, Xi asserted that Taiwan’s “reunification” would be achieved by military force, if necessary.

Beijing’s strategic posture towards Taipei has also been shaped by Washington’s strategic outlook under US President Donald Trump. Trump proposed the ‘G2’ construct, which entails delineating individual spheres of influence, before his October meeting with Xi in South Korea. Trump 2.0’s National Security Strategy 2025 nods to Taipei’s salience as a hub for semiconductor production and its geostrategic location in the ‘first island’ chain, noting that the waters around Taiwan are critical as they straddle major maritime trading routes. The NSS emphasises that military deterrence is not the sole remit of the US, and that its allies and partners should also step up by spending more on defensive capabilities and allowing the US military access to ports and other facilities.

A state-sponsored project to compile and archive memories of Japanese atrocities reinforces these narratives for the current generation. This messaging has led to anti-Tokyo sentiment flaring up from time to time in China, and the reopening of territorial disputes with its neighbours — notably India, Japan, and Taiwan.

Jin Canrong of Renmin University of China (RUC) perceives “Taiwan independence forces”, aided and backed by nations such as Japan, as becoming increasingly aggressive and bent on intervening in China’s internal affairs. He points to the US NSS 2025 as explicitly opposing China’s efforts to achieve “reunification” and predicts that this will remain a source of tension that could lead to confrontation in the future.

Scholars such as Wu Jinan, a senior researcher at the Shanghai Institute for International Studies, argue that right-wing elements in Japan are using the pretext of the ‘China threat theory’ (中国威胁论) to revise the pacifist constitution and develop nuclear capabilities. Wu places Takaichi’s position on Taiwan in the context of her domestic constituency, arguing that it is aimed at consolidating her standing among conservative elements of Japanese polity and society amid the emergence of new right-wing political parties. Wu assesses Takaichi’s remarks in relation to the NSS 2025, which states that not every “region or nation” deserves the US’ attention, and that the raison d’être of US foreign policy is to safeguard its own national interests. He argues that Takaichi hopes to benefit from stoking regional tensions, as this could prompt Trump to focus more on the region and increase attention on Northeast Asia. The Chinese strategist also posits that Taiwan holds sentimental value in the ‘strategic mindset’ of Japan’s conservative right, as it was the ascendant Japanese empire’s first colonial conquest. Now, following Japan’s post-war resurgence, he argues that Tokyo increasingly regards Taiwan as part of its strategic backyard.

Timing, Intent, and Domestic Drivers

For Tokyo, the “red lines” are twofold and interlinked: (1) preventing a fait accompli against Taiwan that would alter regional balance, because this would in turn (2) pose a direct threat to Japan’s sovereign territory and citizens, including the Senkaku/Diaoyu area and approaches near Okinawa. Those red lines are not abstract.

Typically, Tokyo’s official position has been one of strategic ambiguity on Taiwan, which encompassed reaffirming the One-China policy, emphasising peaceful resolution, and stopping short of explicit commitments to intervene militarily. Former prime ministers have cautioned that a Taiwan contingency would affect Japan’s security (Shinzo Abe’s “Taiwan crisis is a Japan crisis” formulation, for instance), but have maintained ambiguity regarding its direct implications for Japan. For Beijing, Takaichi’s remarks, therefore, represented a departure in tone and specificity, even if Tokyo later reiterated its adherence to the 1972 Japan–China Joint Communiqué and established policy.

ignalling strategic resolve in the face of China’s accelerating military modernisation and coercive diplomacy around Taiwan — a crescendo reflected in PLA drills and Beijing’s increasingly assertive posture — aims to raise Beijing’s cost calculus for coercion in the Taiwan Strait and for persistent harassment around the Senkaku area. Simultaneously, coordination with Washington embeds Japan’s responses within US treaty guarantees, thereby reducing potential risks.

Takaichi’s statement, which pointed to the use of collective self-defence under existing security legislation, was prompted by a parliamentary question and was not part of an official government statement. This suggests that her remarks were less a planned policy announcement and more an improvised response that rapidly became a diplomatic flashpoint. Tokyo’s motivations reflect a mix of deterrence, alliance politics, and domestic signalling. Signalling strategic resolve in the face of China’s accelerating military modernisation and coercive diplomacy around Taiwan — a crescendo reflected in PLA drills and Beijing’s increasingly assertive posture — aims to raise Beijing’s cost calculus for coercion in the Taiwan Strait and for persistent harassment around the Senkaku area. Simultaneously, coordination with Washington embeds Japan’s responses within US treaty guarantees, thereby reducing potential risks. Takaichi’s position also distinguishes her leadership early in her tenure and resonates with conservative constituencies that favour clearer deterrent signalling toward Beijing.

Japan’s recent joint military exercises with the United States represent a deliberate signalling move, but also serve as a hedge against miscalculation. Over the past fortnight, the US and Japan have staged air and naval manoeuvres, including US bombers flying alongside Japanese fighters and MSDF destroyers exercising with US carrier strike groups, to signal a show of resolve in response to recent Chinese and Russian drills.

Risks and Regional Implications

The risk of an operational mishap in sea or air corridors — such as a radar lock, a close overflight, a contact between coastguard and fishing vessels — that either side interprets as intentional is not unfounded. The combination of new forward deployments on Yonaguni Island and joint operations with the US creates flashpoints where the risk of signalling sliding into kinetic escalation is far from negligible. The radar-lock episode in early December illustrates this danger, and even if intended as a signal, such actions can invite reciprocal escalation.

persistent punitive measures — trade friction, restrictions on people-to-people ties, and the potential end of ‘panda diplomacy’ — lower the political threshold for crisis management and, in turn, shrink the diplomatic space available to defuse incidents.

Finally, the implications for regional stability are twofold. On the one hand, the hardening Japan-China dynamic increases the risk of a crisis that snowballs. On the other hand, persistent punitive measures — trade friction, restrictions on people-to-people ties, and the potential end of ‘panda diplomacy’ — lower the political threshold for crisis management and, in turn, shrink the diplomatic space available to defuse incidents. At the same time, this increases the propensity to militarise disputes. The net effect is a higher baseline risk of a spillover. The coming weeks will test whether moves by either country temper or accelerate the row, and whether coercive posture can be turned into effective crisis management.

Kalpit A. Mankikar is a Fellow with the Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation.

Pratnashree Basu is an Associate Fellow with the Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation.

• International Affairs
• China
• India
• East Asia
• collective self-defence Japan
• CPC nationalism
• deterrence signalling
• historical memory politics
• Japan–China tensions
• Japan–US alliance
• regional escalation risk
• Sanae Takaichi
• Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute
• Taiwan contingency
• Taiwan Strait security
• Xi Jinping Taiwan policy

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