Relations of China with the five Central Asian states—Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan—have witnessed impressive growth over the thirty years since Central Asia attained independence from the Soviet Union in 1991.
During the Soviet period, borders of Kazakh, Kyrgyz and Tajik Soviet Socialist Republics with China were unsettled and the cause of tense relations between Beijing and Moscow. Soon after the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the independence of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, China moved quickly to settle its borders with these three Central Asian states, as also with the Russian Federation. The Shanghai Five was established in 1996 when this task was completed to promote greater cooperation between these countries. This was transformed to the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) with the inclusion of Uzbekistan in 2002.
A significant reason for China’s eagerness to demarcate its borders with the Central Asian countries was to ensure peace in East Turkistan, christened by it as Xinjiang (New Territory). This region was annexed by China with the help of the Soviet Union in 1949 when the People’s Republic of China was established.
In addition to maintaining law and order in East Turkistan, China is also keen to invest in and import fossil fuels including oil, gas and uranium, and other minerals from Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Several oil and gas pipelines have been established over the last two decades to meet the insatiable thirst of China for energy.
The launch of the One Belt One Road (OBOR), project which was later designated as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has
further enhanced the significance of Central Asia for China by connecting it with Europe and the Middle East.
The launch of the One Belt One Road (OBOR), project which was later designated as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has further enhanced the significance of Central Asia for China by connecting it with Europe and the Middle East.
Kazakhstan, Central Asia’s largest and most prosperous economy, has enthusiastically embraced its partnership with China, projecting itself as the “buckle” in the BRI project to economically and financially benefit from the new investment and connectivity opportunities provided by Beijing.
The last few years have, however, witnessed increased tension at the level of citizens of some of these countries (if not by the governments and elites) with China. It is possible that going forward, governments of countries like Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan could be forced to pushback against the growing dominance of China.
The growing footprint of China—politically, economically and militarily—in Central Asia, a region which has traditionally been considered by Russia as its backyard could result in contestation between the two for influence in the coming years. Although outwardly both China and Russia appear to be collaborating without many friction points thus far, the coming years could see this change.
China’s growing control of mineral resources of the region
Growing domestic energy demand, predicated on its robust economy, and expanding external markets for finished goods are critical reasons for China to increase its presence in the region. China’s thirst for energy has grown steeply after the 1990s. Its daily consumption of oil saw a rise from 4.2 million barrels in 1998 to 13.5 million barrels in 2018. Its consumption of natural gas is projected to increase by nearly 190 percent from 2020 to 2050.
Central Asian countries, with abundant reserves of hydrocarbon fuels and minerals, have emerged as vitally important for diversifying China’s domestic energy mix as also its transportation route. With proven oil reserves estimated at 40 billion barrels and natural gas reserves in excess of 500 trillion cubic feet (with Turkmenistan accounting for 350 trillion cubic feet), the Central Asian Republics (CARs) can help China reduce its dependence on West Asia for its energy needs. Central Asia is also richly endowed with uranium deposits. Kazakhstan has the world’s second largest reserves, after Australia, of this precious mineral. In recent years it has emerged as the largest producer of this ore. Uzbekistan also has significant deposits of uranium. Central Asia is,
hence, vital for China’s energy security.
Central Asian states need financial investments for technological and infrastructure buildup of their energy sectors. China, holding over US $4 trillion foreign exchange reserves in addition to having the technological expertise, has emerged as a significant source of foreign direct investment.
Central Asian states need financial investments for technological and infrastructure buildup of their energy sectors. China, holding over US $4 trillion foreign exchange reserves in addition to having the technological expertise, has emerged as a significant source of foreign direct investment.
The recent rivalry witnessed in the South China Sea with Malaysia, Vietnam, Indonesia and the Philippines, as also with the USA, has increased the significance of oil and gas resources of Central Asia. More than fifty percent of China’s supplies that come from West Asia are vulnerable to geopolitical threats. Central Asian resources are more proximate and easier to transport to the Western regions of China than from countries in the Middle East.
Maintaining security in Xinjiang (East Turkistan)
Uyghurs, members of the Turkic-speaking ethnic community living in the western region of China, launched anti-China agitations in 1980, 1981, 1985 and 1987. Prior to these agitations, their aspirations for independence, which they declared in 1924 and 1944, were brutally suppressed, on the latter occasion by the newly created People’s Republic of China. Over the last four years, China has established concentration camps which it euphemistically terms as “education centers’’ to brainwash, torture and homogenise the Uyghur population to
adopt the ideology of the Chinese Communist Party.
Several ethnic Kazakh and Kyrgyz origin people, who were long-term residents of East Turkistan, have also been incarcerated in these concentration camps. Tales of systematic torture, forced sterilisations, and forced labour to which they are subjected have reached these countries through relatives of people imprisoned in Xinjiang or through others who managed to escape these camps. While large-scale public protests and demonstrations have been held periodically in these countries exhorting their governments to take up the matter forcefully with China, they have had little impact on these governments.
Anti-China protests
Anti-Chinese protests in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have been witnessed in the past. Back in 2009 and 2016, there were large-scale protests focused on reports that the Kazakh government was about to permit China to lease out large swathes of land for agricultural purposes. In 2011, brawls erupted between oil workers and the Kazakh law-enforcement authorities in Zhanaozen, leading to a number of casualties. A Chinese company CITIC was
among the investors and was under the scanner for discriminatory pay to the Kazakh workers. More recently in 2020, the Chinese embassy in Nur-Sultan
engaged in a public squabble on the alleged appearance of a more virulent strain of COVID-19 in several cities of Kazakhstan. This was apparently done to shift the blame for the Wuhan virus to some other country except China. This report by the Chinese embassy was immediately rejected by the Kazakh health minister.
Similar demonstrations have taken place periodically in Kyrgyzstan too. Most recently, Chinese businesses in the country were threatened by protesters in the aftermath of the subsequently annulled Parliamentary election on 4 October 2020. China came in for sustained criticism in Kyrgyzstan in early 2018 when a thermal power plant renovated by it at a cost of US$ 386 million suddenly stopped working during the extremely low winter temperatures. Several questions were raised including corrupt and pollutive behavior of Chinese companies working in the region.
Central Asian citizens have watched from the side-lines as Chinese finances, goods, workers, and authority have transformed the regional economic geography with the enthusiastic support and encouragement of their governments. There appears to be widespread anxiety with respect to China’s rapidly expanding footprint in the economic, social, political, strategic, cultural and military fields of these countries.
Central Asian citizens have watched from the side-lines as Chinese finances, goods, workers, and authority have transformed the regional economic geography with the enthusiastic support and encouragement of their governments. There appears to be widespread anxiety with respect to China’s rapidly expanding footprint in the economic, social, political, strategic, cultural and military fields of these countries.
Such protests and demonstrations hardly make any difference to Beijing. Uzbekistan, which was once closed to Chinese investment and influence under Islam Karimov, is the most visible evidence of this. After the advent of Shavkat Mirziyoyev as President in 2016, inflow of Chinese investment is openly welcomed.
Chinese foray in security sector in Central Asia
China pays increasing attention to expanding its security footprint in the region. Accounts of growing Chinese security presence appear in conjunction with more open exhibition of power through construction of bases, conduct of joint training exercises and supply of military equipment for Tajik forces along the Chinese border with Afghanistan. In 2019, there were reports of joint training exercises with Tajik, Kyrgyz, and Uzbek forces. China today accounts for about 18 percent of the total military purchases by Central Asia as compared to about 1 percent at the beginning of the last decade.
In Tajikistan, which shares a 1,300-km southern border with Afghanistan, Beijing has a small but growing security presence. Several reports appeared in 2019 to suggest that Beijing has obtained rights “to refurbish or build up to 30 to 40 guard posts on the Tajik side of the country’s border with Afghanistan,” the
report said.
Benefits of Chinese presence
There are, of course, some positive aspects of China’s growing influence in the region. Local people might freely air conspiracy theories about China’s long-term projections in the region, but they also acknowledge that the Chinese-built infrastructure has changed their lives for the better. Chinese companies are
often seen to be more credible and reliable than local builders and contractors. Also, while Confucius Institutes are often criticised in the public domain as agencies to brainwash the local youth, several young people visit them regularly to take advantage of the opportunities that the growing economy of China offers.
China’s rapid advance into Central Asia through Belt and Road-linked investment projects has made Central Asia emerge as a new vanguard for global trade and connectivity.
Russia and China in Central Asia
Russia has traditionally seen Central Asia as its ‘near abroad’ and part of its sphere of influence, but Beijing’s emergence as the pre-eminent economic power has significantly altered the equations in the region, giving rise to a new era of recalibration.
China’s rapidly growing presence in the area has been watched with wariness and mistrust by the Kremlin, despite a broad convergence of positions between Russia and China. Moscow had initially responded to Beijing’s expanding pre-eminence with a pushback, trying to maintain its perceived role as the region’s main economic power through new energy projects, diminishing Chinese-led initiatives, and establishment of its own economic bloc: The Eurasian Economic Union. But ever piling sanctions and the growing chasm between it and the West, starting with Russia’s annexation/accession of Crimea and the outbreak of war in eastern Ukraine in 2014, hit the brakes on the Eurasian Economic Union and compelled Moscow to seek a more realistic relationship with Beijing; 2014 can be considered to be the turning point in Sino-Russian bilateral ties.
Moscow had initially responded to Beijing’s expanding pre-eminence with a pushback, trying to maintain its perceived role as the region’s main economic power through new energy projects, diminishing Chinese-led initiatives, and establishment of its own economic bloc: The Eurasian Economic Union
In Central Asia, it would appear that the
Kremlin has come to acknowledge China’s economic supremacy, but has tried to secure its own relevance and hold over the region. While China could be the leading economic force, Russia will continue to shape the region through its political, security and military ties, such as through the Collective Security Treaty Organisation.
Conclusion
While China is keen to expand its economic presence in Central Asia, the feeling is not necessarily shared by all countries in the region. A 2020 study by Central Asia Barometer suggests that Central Asians are
increasingly becoming uncomfortable with Chinese presence in the region. In Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, where tensions over Chinese investors have been building for some time, only seven and nine per cent of populations respectively, expressed “strong support” for Chinese energy and infrastructure projects in their countries.
In Uzbekistan, which – unlike Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan—does not directly border China, locals have a somewhat more enthusiastic outlook towards Chinese investments, but even there, skepticism has been growing. While 65 percent of Uzbeks expressed “strong support” for Chinese investment in 2019, only 48 percent did in 2020.
People of Central Asia are not overly concerned about the broader strategic and security challenges posed by growing Chinese presence in these countries. Instead, they are keen to navigate their way through the challenges of daily existence and partake of the economic boom that they witness. China’s natural borders with Central Asia imply that it will always have a dominant interest and influence over this region.
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