Cheng Li-wun’s “peace mission” to Beijing signals a renewed KMT-CPC alignment that could reshape cross-Strait dynamics and influence Taiwan’s 2028 presidential race
Image Source: Getty Images
Cheng Li-wun, chairperson of the Kuomintang (KMT) and a leading opposition figure in Taiwan, visited China from 7 to 12 April in an effort to reset cross-Strait dynamics. The visit was significant: it marked the first trip to Beijing by a sitting KMT chair in nearly a decade. The previous such visit took place in 2016, when then KMT chairperson Hung Hsiu-chu travelled to China.
Official interaction between Beijing and Taipei broke down in 2016 after the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP)—an electoral rival of the KMT—came to power. Yet the KMT has sought to maintain its own line of communication with the Communist Party of China (CPC). Then-President Ma Ying-jeou (from the KMT) met Chinese President Xi Jinping in Singapore in 2015, following protests in Taipei over greater economic engagement with Beijing. Ma, who served as Taiwan’s president between 2008 and 2016, met Xi again in China in 2024. KMT Vice Chair Andrew Hsia visited Beijing in 2022 despite China launching military exercises that threatened Taiwan.
In recent years, high-profile engagement between Washington and Taipei has also increased. In 2020, then US Health Secretary Alex Azar visited the island, followed by US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi in 2022. Pelosi’s visit prompted China to launch military drills around Taiwan. Beijing views such contact as Taipei seeking greater international recognition and inching toward “Taiwan independence.”
Cheng Li-wun has billed the initiative as ‘peace mission’, implying that her electoral rivals’ reckless pursuit of “independence” puts the island at risk. Her effort to build peace with Beijing comes as the KMT and its allies in the legislature stall a US$40 billion defence spending proposal put forward by Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te.
At the CPC National Congress in 2022, Xi vowed to pursue the “peaceful reunification” of Taiwan, but underscored that China reserves the right to use force to achieve this goal. He also pledged to accelerate the modernisation of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to ensure it can fight and win regional wars.
Cheng Li-wun has billed the initiative as ‘peace mission’, implying that her electoral rivals’ reckless pursuit of “independence” puts the island at risk. Her effort to build peace with Beijing comes as the KMT and its allies in the legislature stall a US$40 billion defence spending proposal put forward by Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te. After becoming KMT chair in November 2025, Cheng said that Taipei’s security cannot be strengthened merely by increasing defence spending—something Trump has sought from US allies and partners. Instead, she argued that security would be better ensured if the Taiwan administration reaffirmed the 1992 Consensus—a tacit understanding between the KMT and the CPC that there is only “one China,” though subject to differing interpretations. US Senators such as Jim Banks have urged Taiwan’s legislature to greenlight the defence proposal.
During her meeting with Xi, the latter stressed the importance of the CPC and the KMT working together, improving cross-Strait connections, and protecting their “shared homeland”. For her part, Cheng called for greater mutual “political trust” and for expanding exchanges and cooperation across sectors with Beijing. She pledged to uphold the common political foundation of adhering to the 1992 Consensus with the CPC and opposing the notion of Taiwanese “independence”.
Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi sought to highlight the issue of Chinese military coercion and, during a parliamentary discussion in November 2025, asserted that any use of force by China against Taiwan could amount to an existential crisis for Japan. The remark led to a chill in relations between Tokyo and Beijing.
During her mainland tour, Cheng trained her guns on Imperial Tokyo, blaming Japan for dividing the mainland and Taiwan after paying her respects at the Sun Yat-sen Mausoleum in Nanjing, which served as China’s capital during KMT rule. She highlighted Imperial Japan’s annexation of Taiwan following China’s defeat in the First Sino-Japanese War (1894–95), criticising Tokyo for exploiting a period of “national weakness”. The KMT leader argued that the cross-Strait schism was a legacy of that war and that the “wound carved through the Taiwan Strait” had yet to heal.
Cheng has framed her party’s engagement with the mainland as presenting a choice between “war and peace” and between “destruction and prosperity”. This framing echoes Beijing’s message to Taiwanese voters ahead of the 2024 presidential election, urging them to choose between peace and prosperity or conflict and economic decline.
This line of argument aligns with the CPC’s narrative of the ‘Century of National Humiliation’—a time when colonial powers trampled on China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. The CPC has described Taiwan as a ‘core interest’ and a matter of national sovereignty. Cheng has framed her party’s engagement with the mainland as presenting a choice between “war and peace” and between “destruction and prosperity”. This framing echoes Beijing’s message to Taiwanese voters ahead of the 2024 presidential election, urging them to choose between peace and prosperity or conflict and economic decline. The CPC appealed to the Taiwanese electorate to oppose “independence-minded” political parties—a reference to the DPP and then presidential contender Lai Ching-te, who had described himself as a “pragmatic worker for Taiwanese independence.” In his inaugural address in May 2024, President Lai urged Beijing to come to terms with the existence of the Republic of China (Taiwan’s formal name) and to engage with its elected representatives.
Following the election, Chen Yixin, China’s Minister of State Security, wrote about the need for Beijing to proactively combat separatism and thwart what he described as a conspiracy for “Taiwanese independence”. He proposed a campaign to “promote reunification,” strengthen “patriotic forces” in pursuit of “unity,” build a “deep foundation of public support” for peaceful reunification, and develop a “clandestine front” (yǐnbì zhànxiàn 隐蔽 战线) to advance these goals. Beijing thus views Lai Ching-te as advancing an independence-leaning agenda and appears intent on countering it by working with sympathetic actors within Taiwan’s political system.
Through such Trojan-horse tactics, Xi is signalling to Trump, ahead of their summit next month, that he retains bargaining power on the Taiwan issue.
The mainland’s Taiwan Affairs Office, which manages cross-Strait relations, has proposed a raft of measures to renew engagement. First, it has urged the KMT to join hands with the mainland to oppose “Taiwan independence” and “external interference,” and proposed establishing an institutionalised communication mechanism and exchange programmes between the CPC and the KMT. Second, China has called for the normalisation of flights, permission for residents of Shanghai and Fujian province to visit Taiwan, and the resumption of tourism. Third, it has proposed linking utilities—such as gas, power, and water—between Taiwan’s outlying islands of Kinmen and Matsu and China’s Fujian province. Fourth, Beijing has suggested creating a mechanism to ease inspection standards for Taiwanese agricultural and marine products, contingent on the political foundation of “opposing Taiwan independence.” Fifth, it has offered to facilitate the registration of Taiwanese enterprises in China and support them in opening offices on the mainland. Lastly, Beijing has proposed allowing the broadcast of Taiwanese television series on the mainland and promoting films and television programmes that “showcase cross-Strait bonds,” in a bid to build bridges with Taiwan’s influential entertainment industry.
Taiwanese Premier Cho Jung-tai has rejected China’s overtures as the “same gift basket” sent on many previous occasions. On an earlier occasion, President Lai described China as a “foreign hostile force,” citing its military coercion and societal infiltration as threats to Taiwan’s sovereignty. Taipei has alleged that Beijing uses cross-Strait exchanges as a vehicle to shape public opinion, create the impression that support for peaceful unification is gaining momentum, and spread disinformation about Taiwan’s acquisition of US weapons.
After this high-level engagement, Beijing’s best hope is that Cheng will consolidate her position and pave the way for a KMT victory in 2028. An electoral rebound for the KMT will certainly influence Taiwan’s foreign policy trajectory.
Through such Trojan-horse tactics, Xi is signalling to Trump, ahead of their summit next month, that he retains bargaining power on the Taiwan issue. Second, a section of Taiwanese businesses stands to benefit from China’s proposals, which aim to whittle down support for Lai Ching-te and the DPP. Third, Beijing seeks to portray the DPP as a hindrance to peace, contrasting it with the KMT as the only party capable of working with the mainland and dialling down tensions.
Such messaging is designed to stoke divisions on the island, particularly with key local elections scheduled for November, which will shape the debate ahead of the 2028 presidential election. After this high-level engagement, Beijing’s best hope is that Cheng will consolidate her position and pave the way for a KMT victory in 2028. An electoral rebound for the KMT will certainly influence Taiwan’s foreign policy trajectory.
New Delhi and Taipei have deepened cooperation in semiconductors and are pursuing closer economic integration—gains that could be put at risk. India will therefore need to closely track the undercurrents in Taiwan’s electoral politics and prepare for the possibility of a political transition on the island.
Kalpit A. Mankikar is a Fellow with the Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation.
The views expressed above belong to the author(s). ORF research and analyses now available on Telegram! Click here to access our curated content — blogs, longforms and interviews.
Kalpit A Mankikar is a Fellow with Strategic Studies programme and is based out of ORFs Delhi centre. His research focusses on China specifically looking ...
Read More +
 (1).jpg)
PREV