Maritime security in the Indian Ocean needs to be conceptualised. Thus, a rethink about injecting momentum into collective regional cooperation via IORA is required.
The Indian Ocean maritime geography has evolved as a crucial strategic theatre in global geopolitics. A shift in strategic approach appears to be underway among countries which have increasingly identified stakes in this region. Geopolitical and geoeconomic compulsions of various countries continue to guide their strategic outlook towards the Indian Ocean region. A vast maritime expanse, the Indian Ocean is located strategically bordering Africa and West Asia towards its west; Southeast Asia, and Australia on its east; the polar cap of Antarctica on the south; and the Indian subcontinent on its north. Growing maritime traffic due to increasing sea-borne trade and energy and resource security through the evolving notion of blue economy are some variables which have positioned the Indian Ocean as a crucial strategic theatre.
The evolution of the Indo-Pacific concept, as an integrated maritime expanse comprising the Indian and Pacific oceans appears to have been instrumental in enhancing the strategic value of the Indian Ocean.
Moreover, the evolution of the Indo-Pacific concept, as an integrated maritime expanse comprising the Indian and Pacific oceans appears to have been instrumental in enhancing the strategic value of the Indian Ocean. While it is natural for resident players of the Indian Ocean, namely littoral and island countries located in this geography, to place critical emphasis on the region, increasingly several non-resident powers have enhanced their presence in the Indian Ocean as well. This is a result of some crucial factors.
First, the Indo-Pacific as an integrated maritime theatre has prompted various countries that have an active presence in the Pacific to approach the Indian Ocean more strategically. Second, several key geographies jutting out into the Indian Ocean have emerged as critical sites of geostrategic competition between China and other like-minded democratic countries pursuing a rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific. Island countries like Sri Lanka, Maldives, as well as the African littoral states, are a few examples of the same. Third, the Indian Ocean houses several important maritime passages that have become crucial for the free flow of trade, security energy and resource interests of powers in Europe and the West. Fourth, several non-resident powers in the Indian Ocean are actively enhancing their presence in the region by way of bolstering diplomatic and security aid. Notably, an important characteristic of the Indian Ocean geography pertains to significant power and capabilities asymmetry. Aid in the form of assistance to enhance the capabilities of small island countries to secure their interests has emerged as a crucial method of strategic engagement.
However, despite the wide range of challenges that continue to characterise the Indian Ocean maritime geography, the state of integration within the region appears to be dismal. It is important to note that the very nature of the geographies of Indian Ocean littorals tends to shape their security interests and challenges. Therefore, in a sense, security interests and challenges at sea are important points of commonality between them. Despite this, efforts to bolster cooperation among these countries have not been sufficient. In this context, the role of the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) is noteworthy. Established in 1997, IORA remains the only pan-Indian Ocean multilateral grouping. Common maritime geography is a key variable of commonality within the IORA grouping.
The Indian Ocean houses several important maritime passages that have become crucial for the free flow of trade, security energy and resource interests of powers in Europe and the West.
IORA was established with joint efforts by regional countries to advance cooperation and collaboration in the region. Primarily, IORA has been operational as a diplomatic forum, with its apex body being the Council of Ministers, comprising foreign ministers of various member countries. With 23 full members, IORA’s realm of operation involves all Indian Ocean countries, symbolizing an Indian Ocean identity. Defining its scope of operation, IORA has outlined six key priority areas: Maritime Safety and Security; Trade and Investment Facilitation; Fisheries Management; Disaster Risk Management; Tourism and Cultural Exchanges; Academic, Science and Technology.
While IORA has come under a great degree of scrutiny for being ineffective in fulfilling its objective, the specific scope of advancing efforts to work towards the Maritime Safety and Security objective appears to have merit. With the growing global focus on the Indian Ocean, the need to secure the region will naturally follow. The present maritime security architecture in the Indian Ocean region appears to be fragmented at best. This is evident from the various sub-regional groupings that have emerged. Several countries in the region have turned to minilateral initiatives that focus on specific geographical sub-regions within the broader Indian Ocean. However, this may not be effective in the long run. The very nature of maritime security challenges, in a broad sense, as well as in the Indian Ocean in particular are highly dynamic. The region continues to witness naval aggressions from China in the form of naval confrontations and sustained presence through spy vessels. Additionally, the Indian Ocean is highly prone to non-traditional maritime security challenges. This includes ecological crises prompted by climate change. Moreover, piracy and maritime terrorism appear to have resurfaced in the region.
Several countries in the region have turned to minilateral initiatives that focus on specific geographical sub-regions within the broader Indian Ocean.
It would be helpful to repeat that the Indian Ocean region comprises critical power and capabilities asymmetry. Due to this, several small regional countries continue to rely on external powers to aid their core security interests. Recently, Chinese involvement with such countries has been under scrutiny due to the long-term effects of Beijing’s strategy of engagement. It has been increasingly observed that even though small island and littoral countries in the Indian Ocean have received significant economic and capabilities assistance from Beijing, in the long run, it has disturbed the domestic dynamics of such countries. A case in point for this is Sri Lanka, which engaged with China extensively, but later found itself in domestic turmoil owing to an acute economic crisis.
In this context, a rethink with regard to injecting momentum into collective regional cooperation is required, especially on issues of maritime security. Unlike terrestrial spaces, geopolitics in the maritime domain is relatively more dynamic because of its spatial nature. This makes it more important for small developing countries on the seas to enhance capabilities and preparedness for securing their interests. IORA’s role in this light can be significant. Because of the regional nature of the grouping with an active forum for negotiations and engagement, IORA appears to be an appropriate avenue to advance efforts to strengthen the overall maritime security architecture in the Indian Ocean. Small and developing countries in the Indian Ocean stand to benefit from this given their reliance on external powers to secure their wide-ranging interests. This further stands to increase their stakes and agency to negotiate, as unlike a client-patron nature of engagement, a regional grouping provides space for negotiations and inclusive diplomacy.
Small and developing countries in the Indian Ocean stand to benefit from this given their reliance on external powers to secure their wide-ranging interests.
However, for this to fructify, a broader churn in the way maritime security in the Indian Ocean is conceptualised needs to be set in motion. Towards this end, major powers within the IORA framework need to do the heavy lifting at first, while being cautious of not bringing back the similar client-patron dynamic into the nature of engagement. Towards this end, India’s SAGAR (Security and Growth for All in the Region) serves as an exemplary framework to add momentum to maritime security efforts in the region. This would also be important given that Chinese efforts to construct a similar grouping in the Indian Ocean, namely the China-Indian Ocean Forum, are underway. For this, the maritime security agenda of IORA needs urgent attention first.
Sayantan Haldar is a Research Assistant with the Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation
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Sayantan Haldar is a Research Assistant at ORF’s Strategic Studies Programme. At ORF, Sayantan’s research focuses on Maritime Studies. He is interested in questions of ...
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