The US-Japan-South Korea Summit at Camp David underscores the changing security calibrations in East Asia
The recent summit between the United States (US), South Korea and Japan did not draw as much attention as it merited. The meeting of President Yoon Suk Yeol of South Korea, Prime Minister Fumio Kishida of Japan, hosted by President Joe Biden of the US at Camp David, has perceptibly lowered tensions between the two East Asian neighbours and allies of the US. The three countries agreed to deepen military and economic cooperation and made their strongest joint comment on the “dangerous and aggressive behaviour” by China in the South China Sea.
Even though the political commitments made by the three countries to each other fell short of a formal alliance, in its own way, it is the last piece of the US defence architecture in east Asia, which has seen the evolution of AUKUS, and the upgradation of the Japan-Australia military relationship, and the restoration of the US-Philippines defence ties.
The three countries agreed to deepen military and economic cooperation and made their strongest joint comment on the “dangerous and aggressive behaviour” by China in the South China Sea.
The most important element in the new security architecture in east Asia has been Japan declaring an end to its defence policy of self-restraint, and Japan beginning to emerge as a full-fledged military power on its own account.
Tokyo is now set to systematically increase its defence budget to reach 2 percent of its GDP, an action that would make it the third largest spender in the world on defence after the US and China. Till now, it had maintained a self-imposed limit of 1 percent of its GDP for its defence. Its military, known as the Self Defence Forces (SDF), are some 231,000 strong, while its adversaries—China, North Korea and Russia—are nuclear weapons states with militaries that are millions-strong. Japan has been gradually increasing its defence budgets since Shinzo Abe returned to power in 2012, but what is happening now is a quantum shift.
The Japan-Korea rapprochement was a more difficult enterprise since it had to overcome long memories of Japanese behaviour in the Korean peninsula during World War II. Among the issues of contention was that of compensation for Japanese excesses in World War II.
Paradoxically, the passing of Shinzo Abe in mid-2022 helped eased tensions between South Korea and Japan. He was viewed in South Korea “as a quintessential symbol of Japan’s political right.” People close to President Yoon Suk Yeol of South Korea believe that Abe persuaded many Japanese politicians to adopt an uncompromising approach with South Korea.
Paradoxically, the passing of Shinzo Abe in mid-2022 helped eased tensions between South Korea and Japan.
Relations went from bad to worse after an incident in which a South Korean warship trained a fire-control radar on a Japanese patrol plane over the Sea of Japan in December 2018. South Korea’s refusal to accept culpability led to a freezing of relations between the SDF and South Korean military. The issue took a serious turn in 2019 when the two countries removed each other from their respective white lists of trusted trading partners qualifying for preferential treatment. At the same time, South Korea informed Japan that it was planning to terminate the 2016 General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA), an intelligence sharing agreement. The US, a formal military ally of both, sought to intervene, but to little avail.
In March 2023, there was a thaw when President Yoon Suk Yeol travelled to Tokyo after the announcement of a plan to resolve a dispute over compensation of the South Korean forced labour during Japan’s occupation of the peninsula. South Korea restored Japan’s white list status and later announced that they would resume cooperation on GSOMIA.
There have been three factors pushing for change. 1) the North Korean firing of missiles over Japan, which underscored the threat it posed to South Korea. 2) China’s increasing assertiveness that raised temperatures in South Korea, as they have elsewhere in Asia. 3) The key catalyst was the invasion of Ukraine by Russia, which indicated the ease with which the post Cold War order could give way to conflict. Japan and Russia have yet to sign a formal peace treaty after World War II.
The most consequential impact of these developments has been in Japan, where the government has discarded the post-War language of “self defence” and has begun to undertake more active measures to defend Japan.
The Aegis ships are planned for delivery in 2027 and 2028 and will have an improved version of the Japanese Type 12 surface to surface missiles and have space to incorporate future capabilities like a hypersonic missiles interceptor.
Last week Japan announced its 2024-25 defence budget, which, at US$53 billion, was 13 per higher than US$46 billion of the current fiscal year. The budget is expected to fund the construction of two Aegis equipped destroyers, undertake joint development of the hypersonic missile interceptor with the US, acquire precision-guided missiles, construct a new class of frigates, acquire F-35A and 35B Lightening II joint strike fighters, construct a fleet oil tankers, and acquire ships to transport troops and equipment to situations in its south-west islands.
The Aegis ships are planned for delivery in 2027 and 2028 and will have an improved version of the Japanese Type 12 surface to surface missiles and have space to incorporate future capabilities like a hypersonic missiles interceptor. They will release two older Aegis ships to escort an aircraft carrier group based on the conversion of the two Izumo class carriers operating F-35B fighters.
The planned outlays include money to upgrade missile defence capabilities to counter missile launches by North Korea. The list also contains counter-strike weapons including Tomahawk cruise missiles from the US with the ability to strike China. The ministry of defence is also hoping to set aside US$500 million for a 6th generation fighter jet programme with the UK and Italy. But the largest chunk of money will be used to strengthen the “sustainability and resilience” of the SDF in terms of building up their ammunition stockpiles, fuel tanks, and other facilities. The SDF will also triple its cyber security personnel to 2,410 by the end of the year. Japan will also reorganise its command structure and create a unified air, sea, and land command. Further, Japan and the US will also create a joint headquarters to make the alliance command more effective. .
Japan’s posture was wholly defensive, reliant on anti-ballistic missile capability to shoot down missiles targeting Japanese facilities.
Many of these decisions flow from the new Japanese National Security Strategy (NSS) released at the end of 2022, which said that s that Japan “is facing the most severe and complex security environment since the end of World War II”. In an oblique reference to China and Taiwan, it also noted that there was growing pressure “by those seeking to unilaterally change the status quo by force.” The NSS did not quite yet designate China as a “threat”; its chosen designation was “the greatest strategic challenge that Japan has ever faced.”
The NSS said that, “China has intensified coercive activities around Taiwan, and concerns about peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait are rapidly increasing…” In August, in a bid to coerce Taiwan, five Chinese ballistic missiles landed in the Japanese Exclusive Economic Zone. Perhaps, the most dramatic shift was Tokyo’s decision to create a counter-strike capability based on long-range missiles that could take out enemy bases and command and control nodes. Till now, Japan’s posture was wholly defensive, reliant on anti-ballistic missile capability to shoot down missiles targeting Japanese facilities.
In light of these challenges and developments, the meeting at Camp David has brought about a shift in the strategic calibration in East Asia.
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Manoj Joshi is a Distinguished Fellow at the ORF. He has been a journalist specialising on national and international politics and is a commentator and ...
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