The interest of Southeast Asian states in BRICS should be viewed from a broader perspective of regional and global institutional flux
Image Source: Getty
The interest among some Southeast Asian states in engaging with the expanding BRICS has attracted much attention. As geopolitical dynamics continue to play out, it will be important to situate them within the broader context of institutional flux in the wider Indo-Pacific region, and the interests of Southeast Asian states as they engage in this shifting geopolitical and geoeconomic landscape.
Shifts in the Indo-Pacific institutional mix are far from new. During the Cold War, amid shifting power balances, United States (US) bilateral alliances coexisted with indigenous multilaterals like the South Asia Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) and non-US minilaterals like the Five Power Defense Arrangements (FPDA) in Southeast Asia. In the post-Cold War period, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) expanded and cemented its role as an Indo-Pacific convenor, but new institutions also formed to foster growth and address crises, be it the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum or the Quad after the Indian Ocean tsunami.
During the Cold War, amid shifting power balances, United States (US) bilateral alliances coexisted with indigenous multilaterals like the South Asia Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) and non-US minilaterals like the Five Power Defense Arrangements (FPDA) in Southeast Asia.
Seen from this perspective, it is not surprising that the 2010s and 2020s have seen another period of institutional flux in the face of Asia’s continued rise as a global growth centre, intensifying US-China competition and rising discontent about the rules-based order (RBO). Developments within the so-called US latticework are notable, be it the Australia-UK-US trilateral security pact (AUKUS) or the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF). But the conclusion of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP)—the world’s largest free trade agreement—along with the rise of non-US minilaterals like the India-Japan-Australia trilateral and China’s new institutions like its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), point to more indigenous efforts by Indo-Pacific states to advance their own interests in a more complex world, amid lingering questions about the future shape of US regional commitment. As India’s External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar has pointed out, broader notions around the Global South speak more to “non-Western” sources of discontent rather than explicitly “anti-Western” groupings.
Within this context, diverse Southeast Asian states are engaging with this shifting institutional context to realise their own geopolitical and geoeconomic interests. The world is also taking notice, given that this is a region of nearly 700 million people that some have projected to become the world’s fourth-largest economy by 2040. Examples abound. Indonesia and Thailand have accelerated efforts to join the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), which officials believe could better position themselves in the race for post-pandemic growth. Vietnam has upgraded a series of bilateral partnerships amid shifting developments in the Mekong subregion. These developments include China’s inroads via its Lancang-Mekong Cooperation mechanism and Cambodia’s withdrawal from a key trilateral economic pact. Singapore is trying to shape standards in the digital realm via its active participation in the Artificial Intelligence (AI) conversation and developing sectoral pacts like the Digital Economic Partnership Agreement. Laos applied to be a partner of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which Myanmar was awarded previously as it engages closer with both Beijing and Moscow amid its post-coup isolation.
Vietnam has upgraded a series of bilateral partnerships amid shifting developments in the Mekong subregion. These developments include China’s inroads via its Lancang-Mekong Cooperation mechanism and Cambodia’s withdrawal from a key trilateral economic pact.
BRICS is the latest manifestation of efforts by Southeast Asian states engaging in this period of evolving institutional flux in the Indo-Pacific region and the wider world. Conversations with Southeast Asian governments with an interest in BRICS reveal that there are few illusions about the risks of engaging with the grouping, including being seen as part of Russian efforts to minimise isolation after the Ukraine war or joint Sino-Russian efforts to harness Global South discontent for an anti-US agenda. But there is also a sense of potential interest convergences and opportunities beyond ties with just Beijing and Moscow. Geoeconomically, interest in BRICS can signal long-held grievances with the current global governance picture. Malaysia’s Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim, who will hold the annually rotating ASEAN chairmanship in 2025 amid the multilateral grouping’s own centrality challenges, has explicitly noted this in his remarks during his India visit, drawing attention as well to BRICS’ inclusivity with an expanding membership accounting for over a quarter of global GDP and nearly half of the world’s population. Geopolitically, it can also be part of an institutional balancing act amid major power competition. Thailand has made this clear with its pursuit of twin OECD-BRICS bids and the connections to its own traditional diplomatic activism despite recent domestic challenges.
The key question moving forward is how Southeast Asian states navigate the risks and opportunities amid their evolving BRICS interest as well as their broader domestic and foreign policy priorities. Dynamics are still unclear on this front. Some of this uncertainty was evidenced by the recent BRICS Summit in Kazan, which was attended by five Southeast Asian states—Indonesia, Laos PDR, Malaysia, Thailand, and Vietnam (Myanmar had also previously expressed interest in BRICS engagement). Malaysia and Indonesia met with the head of the New Development Bank (NDB) on the sidelines of the BRICS Summit. But the NDB investments to date have been modestly valued at just around US$33 billion and will likely require more structure and resources if it is to finance tangible national development priorities at scale. Both Thailand and Vietnam raised legitimate issues like the need for balance in the global geoeconomic architecture and connections to sectoral areas like strategic infrastructure and supply chains. Yet it is unclear at this stage how much BRICS will serve only as an institution to express discontent or one that delivers tangible solutions to address concrete challenges.
Thailand has made this clear with its pursuit of twin OECD-BRICS bids and the connections to its own traditional diplomatic activism despite recent domestic challenges.
These dynamics will take place as BRICS itself evolves along with the wider institutional landscape. BRICS’s expansion over the past year has increased its appeal, and the powerful summit remarks by the attending UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres on bridging North-South divides was a testament to BRICS’s role in conversations around global governance. But officials who engage with the grouping privately note that added inclusivity has also exacerbated concerns in other areas. These include how expansion affects the balance of interests among the grouping’s diverse members as well as the specific value proposition that BRICS is offering relative to other platforms. Recent BRICS summit outcomes do attempt to tie the institutional agenda to tangible sectoral priorities beyond the hype around de-dollarisation, including a platform on rare earths, a group on nuclear medicine, as well as a forum for sharing best practices on special economic zones. However, given that all these issues are also being addressed bilaterally, minilaterally, and multilaterally—both within Southeast Asia and globally— the challenge for BRICS is not only to make inroads but measure how that progress fares relative to other settings and formats in a competitive institutional environment.
Recent BRICS summit outcomes do attempt to tie the institutional agenda to tangible sectoral priorities beyond the hype around de-dollarisation, including a platform on rare earths, a group on nuclear medicine, as well as a forum for sharing best practices on special economic zones.
All this reinforces the need to view the interest of Southeast Asian states in BRICS from a broader perspective of regional and global institutional flux. As one Southeast Asian official put it, the overly narrow China-Russia lens ignores the reality that complex BRICS dynamics are also about “the other letters in the acronym” in the context of expanding membership and diverse viewpoints about global governance gaps amid intensifying great power politics. It also belies a broader and yet unresolved question: To what extent will the BRICS change its expanding membership, and to what extent will expanding membership change the BRICS? Whatever the answer to this question is, the early signs suggest Southeast Asian states will certainly be a part of this conversation within the broader trend of institutional flux in the Indo-Pacific region and beyond.
Prashanth Parameswaran is a Fellow with the Wilson Center and the Founder of the ASEAN Wonk newsletter.
The views expressed above belong to the author(s). ORF research and analyses now available on Telegram! Click here to access our curated content — blogs, longforms and interviews.
Prashanth Parameswaran is a fellow with the Wilson Center and the founder of the ASEAN Wonk newsletter, a publication which produces twice-weekly insights on Southeast ...
Read More +
PREV
