Author : Abhishek Sharma

Expert Speak Raisina Debates
Published on Jun 21, 2025

Despite the destroyer disaster, Kim Jong Un’s drive to modernise North Korea’s military—land, sea, cyber, and space—remains relentless.

Beyond the Capsize: North Korea’s Broader Military Modernisation Drive

Image Source: Getty

On 21 May 2025, North Korea’s launch of its newest 5,000-tonne destroyer turned from a moment of celebration to disaster as the ship capsized at the Chongjin harbour. The incident caused significant embarrassment for North Korean leader Kim Jong Un and resulted in the arrest of four officials, including Ri Hyong-so, the Vice Department Director of the ruling Workers’ Party’s Munitions Industry Department. While the event raised questions about North Korea’s capacity to launch a ship and manage military vessels, it overlooked a larger trend underway in North Korea under Kim Jong Un’s leadership—primarily his ongoing spree of launching, testing, and inaugurating programmes related to military modernisation.

Kim Jong Un’s Military Modernisation Plan

Since the COVID-19 pandemic, North Korea has accelerated its military modernisation across domains—including land, air, maritime, cyber, and even space. This development has taken place after North Korea achieved a critical objective laid down by Kim Jong Un through his Byungjin policy—to become a nuclear-armed state. After accomplishing this goal, Kim has focused on strengthening its military capabilities and modernising its missile weapons programme. These capabilities include arms and ammunition production, shipbuilding development, research and development, and military education. Investing in the country’s armed forces modernisation also reinforces Kim Jong Un’s narrative portraying South Korea as an enemy state and justifies the need to strengthen the country’s military.

Given North Korea's challenge concerning its ageing military equipment across domains, Kim has particularly emphasised its military modernisation and upgradation. 

Two reasons underpin this renewed focus on doubling down on military modernisation. First, Kim Jong Un sees little prospect of an agreement with the United States (US), particularly after the Trump-Kim diplomatic debacle, which resulted in a huge embarrassment for him. In its aftermath, he also dismissed former US President Joe Biden’s offer of diplomatic engagement as a ‘façade’, and even overtures made recently by Trump.  Second, given the changing nature of modern warfare, North Korea’s weak conventional capabilities, and geographical vulnerability, Kim believes it is critical to modernise its military forces and train them for a constant state of combat readiness.

Addressing the importance of adapting to modern warfare, Kim emphasised that “[g]iven the new aspects of modern warfare and the enemies’ war tactics …. we should develop our defence capability more aggressively and limitlessly while promoting technological modernisation of our army and equipping it with a larger number of powerful means.” At the 2024 Military Hardware Exhibition Defence Development ceremony, Kim said the party views strengthening defence capabilities as “the supreme expression of their patriotism and consciousness of the revolution.” In December 2023, while addressing the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK), Kim “set forth the militant tasks for the People’s Army and the munitions industry, nuclear weapons, and civil defence sectors to further accelerate war preparations.”

Military Modernisation Efforts

Facing a persistent challenge of ageing military equipment across domains, Kim has particularly emphasised his military modernisation and upgradation. For instance, he has called for a “second revolution in the armoured forces,” stressing the replacement of old armoured weapons with the latest ones. Furthermore, he has also highlighted the need for building large-scale capacities to upgrade its overall armoured ecosystem. Similarly, during a recent inspection of the Flying Group of Guards First’s Air Wing, he also emphasised the importance of air drills “for making pilots experienced in modern air combat methods.” His numerous inspection visits—listed in Table 1—underline the emphasis of military modernisation for Kim.

Table 1: Kim Jong Un’s recent military inspection visits

Date Kim Jong Un Visits
13 September, 2024 Visited the Uranium enrichment facility and called for more centrifuges to boost the nuclear weapons arsenal
10 January, 2025 Visited the Arms factory and inspected the mobile short-range missile launch vehicle
29 January, 2025 Inspected the nuclear material production facility and emphasised boosting its nuclear arsenal
8 March, 2025 Inspected the Nuclear Power submarine construction site and reviewed the progress of the nuclear-powered strategic missile submarine.
21 March, 2025 Supervised the military dockyard and stressed on increasing the country’s shipbuilding capacity
4 May, 2025 Visited the Tank Factory and appreciated the progress in the core technology of Korean tanks
7 May, 2025 Inspected the munition and machine factory and emphasised boosting the production of artillery shells
15 May, 2025 Kim Jong Un Attended Live Fire Drills
17 May, 2025 Kim Jong Un oversaw large-scale Air Force drills and ordered the military to maintain a constant state of readiness

Source: Compiled by Author

A key objective is to strengthen the country’s maritime security capabilities and safeguard its maritime sovereignty. Toward this end, Kim has sanctioned major nuclear and shipbuilding projects to position North Korea as a maritime power. In 2023, the country unveiled its tactical nuclear attack submarine No. 841 Hero Kim Kun Ok. In 2025, photos of a new strategic nuclear submarine—expected to weigh between 5,000 and 8,000 tonnes and much larger than its earlier variant—emerged from Kim Jong Un's visit to an undisclosed location. He has also repeatedly emphasised modernising the country's shipbuilding capacity. Notably, North Korean hackers have reportedly targeted major South Korean shipbuilders to acquire sensitive naval technology and boost the North’s naval capabilities.

Given the application of other military technologies in modern warfare—such as Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), Cyber, and Space—the regime has redoubled efforts to develop domestic capabilities. According to the Korea Central News Agency, Kim said, “[t]he field of unmanned equipment and artificial intelligence should be top-prioritised and developed in modernising the armed forces.” He has also focused on space development, calling it an ‘indispensable project for national development,’ and has simultaneously taken steps toward building cyber hacking technologies to enhance foreign intelligence collection.

The report stated that Russia has exported short-range air defence systems, advanced electronic warfare, jamming equipment, and operational knowledge in exchange of weapons and the deployment of soldiers.

Alongside hardware upgrades, Kim Jong Un has also prioritised training his military for modern warfare. While inspecting Kang Kon Military Academy, a prestigious commanding officer's training centre in the country, he emphasised preparing the military for modern warfare. Kim said, ‘by making them [officers] learn about … the actual experiences in modern battlefields’ and ‘master[ing] the rapidly-developing weapons and … technical equipment’ and ‘acquiring the commanding abilities for modern warfare,’ we can better prepare the military officers for modern warfare. One likely motivation of deploying North Korean troops to the frontlines of the Russian-Ukraine battlefield was to expose its forces to the war experience.

Military Modernisation and Russia’s Support

North Korea’s military modernisation has been supported by Russian assistance in exchange for arms and ammunition exports since 2023, as well as manpower deployment in the fight against Ukraine. A report released by the Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Team (MSMT)—a multilateral mechanism formed in 2024 to monitor the violations of United Nations Security Council (UNSC) sanctions on North Korea—elaborated on the level of defence cooperation between the two countries. According to this report, Russia has exported short-range air defence systems, advanced electronic warfare, jamming equipment, and operational knowledge in exchange for weapons and the deployment of soldiers.  During the recent meeting between Sergei Shoigu, Secretary of the Security Council, and Kim, the two countries reiterated their intention to ‘dynamically expand and develop the DPRK-Russia relations into powerful and comprehensive relations of strategic partnership that fully conform to the national interests of the two countries.’

As per a study by the Friedrich Naumann Foundation, it is estimated that North Korea earned between US$ 1.72-5.52 billion from exporting 6 million rounds of 152 mm, 122 mm munitions and 100KN-23/KN-24 ballistic missiles to Russia.

While Kim’s regular visits, inspections, push for research and development, increased production, and military preparedness are driven by strong national security reasons, there is also an economic rationale behind Kim’s military drive. Kim’s attempt at reinvigorating its defence industry also caters to Russian demand for arms and ammunition, a vital source of funding for its second economy, which, in effect, funds his military modernisation plans. According to a study by the Friedrich Naumann Foundation, North Korea estimatedly earned between US$ 1.72– 5.52 billion from exporting 6 million rounds of 152 mm, 122 mm munitions and 100KN-23/KN-24 ballistic missiles to Russia. Additionally, the deployment of troops reportedly earned the regime US$ 143–572 million.

Conclusion

While the capsizing of North Korea’s new destroyer is proof of the country’s limited capacities, its swift recovery is also a testament to the regime’s persistence and resourcefulness in military modernisation. With continued military, technological, and economic backing—particularly from Russia—Pyongyang’s military modernisation is set to advance further. As such, adversaries would do well not to miss the forest for the trees.


Abhishek Sharma is a Research Assistant at the Strategic Studies Programme, Observer Research Foundation.

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Author

Abhishek Sharma

Abhishek Sharma

Abhishek Sharma is a Junior Fellow with ORF’s Strategic Studies Programme. His research focuses on the Indo-Pacific regional security and geopolitical developments with a special ...

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