Notwithstanding the demonstrable effects of battlefield technologies, the Iran war shows that differing ways of war remain critical in the conduct of war and in decisive outcomes
The ongoing US-Israel-led military operation against Iran has expanded significantly both in terms of the scope of battlefield operations and strategic objectives of the war. What began as a short-term, decisive, high-intensity operation by the Trump administration has now lasted for three weeks. The conflict has observed the use of a diverse set of military capabilities, predominantly modern technology, adding a degree of sophistication to conventional military power. However, military power is an aspect of military strategy characterised by an interplay of means, ways, and ends. To secure the ends, it is important to get both means (capabilities) and ways (organised application) right. The Iran war shows that the ‘way of war’ is critical for determining and subsequently framing the engagement in relation to the nature of the adversary. The US military’s Operation Epic Fury and Iran’s subsequent response demonstrate that technological superiority alone does not guarantee strategic victory. But how states organise capabilities and employ military power as a subset of military strategy helps determine decisive victory (beyond the battlefield).
The US-Israel front, as part of an ongoing military contestation, has observed demonstrations of costlier and more sophisticated technological systems on the battlefield. On the other hand, Iran, drawing lessons from the 12-Day War, has framed a relatively time-sensitive and asymmetric counter-response. Iran has translated the lessons to use military technologies for attrition and tilt the overall cost economics of war against the US interests.
The Iranian drone element carries an element of precision mass to cater to the changing character of warfare.
On the battlefield, drones have been central to the debate over their effects, tilting the balance of power in favour of the aggressor. There is a clear shift in the use of drones from the ‘War on Terror’ era, thanks to lessons learnt from the Ukraine war. The US deployed the Low-Cost Uncrewed Combat Attack System (LUCAS) as a solution; however, it remains a short-term measure against the cost-effective and scalable Shahed drones. Iran has developed the ecosystem of Shahed drones and cluster munitions to traffic as well as infiltrate the US and Israeli air defence mechanisms. Specifically, a Shahed-136 costs a fraction of a cruise missile or ballistic missile, between US$20,000 and US$50,000 per unit, has a range of up to 2,000 kilometres, and has precision guidance. The Iranian drone element carries an element of precision mass to cater to the changing character of warfare. Through targeted drone attacks, the Iranian military has reduced the cost of offence for maintaining its campaign cost while simultaneously raising the cost of defence for the US and Israel (led partners). Even though most of the drones have been intercepted at a decent rate of 80-85 percent, Iran’s use of drones with a few ballistic missiles has been able to strain the resources as well as hit targets in Israel, the US military and its allies in the region. The cost of interception for the US-Israel front through the use of costlier Patriot-like systems multiplies exponentially against cheap Shahed drones and relatively inexpensive ballistic missiles based targeting by Iran. Washington, in other words, despite its lead in developing and deploying sophisticated capabilities, lacks low-cost, increasingly autonomous drones for surveillance and short- and long-range strikes.
Figure 1: The extensive US and Israeli strikes on Iranian Retaliatory Capabilities
The US and Israel have hit targets, including those inside Iran, with both precision and depth. It has degraded Iranian capabilities to a substantial extent but has not eliminated its bases of power. On the other hand, the US military's long-range vector power, along with the associated cost elements (as shown in Figure 2 below) and industrial base production capabilities to scale products, has emerged as a serious limitation.
Figure 2: Estimated Munitions Usage (figures in USD millions)
Source: CSIS
Finally, Iran has relied on the Chinese BeiDou network for real-time military targeting. The US military, through its cyber operations and the deployment of AI, has enabled real-time targeting and prioritisation across a range of assets. Primarily, the US military has been using AI to support decision-making purposes. This element has remained the key advantage of the US military, not just in capabilities but also in how it has adopted and integrated AI into its doctrinal and warfighting philosophy.
The way of war is determined by how military power is organised and employed to achievethe objectives in a conflict. The US-Israel and Iranian ways of war differ in several ways. First, the US-Israel war against Iran is centred not on Iran’s intentions but its potential to enhance its ballistic missiles and nuclear capabilities. To this end, the conflict has showcased the decapitation strikes against the apex leadership and precision-based targeting of missile facilities across the geographical expanse of Iran. Iran, however, is not Venezuela and is in a war for (regime) survival against the US-Israel-led united front. Unlike the 12-Day War, Iran framed a quick response and so far, has relied on vertical as well as horizontal escalation-based response against the US and Israel-led military front.
Second, Trump-led American military thinking is premised on hitting hard to deliver a decisive blow against the adversary. This thinking also stems from an overreliance on technological superiority, however, this approach to warfare faces a challenge with the threat of attrition to the US military. Iran, on the other hand, has, since day one, adopted calibrated retaliation to spiral escalation against its adversaries.
Tehran has led a war of attrition by widening and deepening the conflict by targeting Israel as well as the US military assets in the Middle East region.
Third, apart from the use of force backed by technological capabilities, the US could not secure clear support from its partners in the Middle East and the Western Hemisphere. This takes the form of higher costs on the battlefield and beyond, as fissures emerge in political support for the US-led military operations. To this end, Tehran has led a war of attrition by widening and deepening the conflict by targeting Israel as well as the US military assets in the Middle East region. Fourth, against a multi-domain US military-led operation against the political regime, Iran, in the aftermath of the death of Ayatollah Khamenei, made a swift transition from a ‘unity of command’ to a ‘unity-of-effort’ led model. This model created multiple yet simultaneous decision-making centres, enabling the IRGC to continue warfighting while divesting resources and diluting the focus of its adversaries. Fifth, the US had to ensure there was no geographical spillover of the conflict, as it would hurt the interests of its partners and allies in the region and beyond. To this end, the Iranian blockade of the Strait of Hormuz was an ultimate test of resolve, pressuring the US to the point of reaching out to its European allies without any credible commitments in return. Sixth, the determined use of military power by the US amid its maximalist, shifting strategic goalposts, over time, has made it difficult to claim a decisive victory against Iran. On the other hand, Tehran has so far maintained internal cohesion, which has supported its resilience and will to fight the US-Israel-led military alliance. For Iran, in a war of survival, prolonging the military conflict and denying the US victory through ‘regime change’ becomes no less than a strategic victory for Iran.
The above factors reveal that, while rapidly evolving military technology offers advantages, it has encountered limitations in achieving strategic objectives due to differing ‘ways of warfare’. Iran is fighting for regime survival and its significance in an emerging regional order in the Middle East. Military technology has not enabled the surrender of the adversary or a decisive victory for the US military.
The expansion of territorial and political limits of war has led the European and Indo-Pacific allies to lend support to the Trump administration-led conflict against Iran.
Notwithstanding the potential and demonstrable effects of battlefield technologies, the Iran war shows that differing ways of war remain critical in the conduct of war and in decisive outcomes. This war is yet to push Iran to surrender and present a decisive victory to its adversaries. Herein, the limitations of military technology and power are reflected against the lack of a way of war towards the strategic endgame. Iran has targeted the US military assets with an expanding targeting list to bring a second-order coercion to bear on the US’s allies and partners in the Middle East. The expansion of territorial and political limits of war has led the European and Indo-Pacific allies to lend support to the Trump administration-led conflict against Iran. Iran’s staggered use of drones and missiles amid a prolonged war, with some reserve of capabilities, is likely to be meant to gain political momentum in the war. For the US, a decisive end to the conflict seems elusive from the battlefield viewpoint, along with the goal of regime change. However, the sustainment of attrition and the will to fight by either party would become influential factors in concluding the conflict on terms and conditions of their choosing. Whether and to what extent the war against Iran to degrade its nuclear and ballistic missile programmes would put a stop to Tehran’s long-term ambitions remains a dilemma for the Western technology-fueled military power. The drivers of real change on the battlefield to yield strategic outcomes lie more in doctrine, warfighting culture, and operational concepts, not in tech gadgets. The bottom line is that technology remains only an enabler and cannot, by itself, become the way of warfare.
Rahul Rawat is a Research Assistant with the Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation.
The views expressed above belong to the author(s). ORF research and analyses now available on Telegram! Click here to access our curated content — blogs, longforms and interviews.
Rahul Rawat is a Research Assistant with ORF’s Strategic Studies Programme (SSP). He also coordinates the SSP activities. His work focuses on strategic issues in the ...
Read More +
PREV
