While the resumption of the Yatra signals a thaw in China-India ties, emerging debates within China reveal a deeper contest over religion, sovereignty, and civilisational narratives
The resumption of the Kailash Mansarovar Yatra has been one of the landmark breakthroughs in the China-India normalisation process following the October 2024 Kazan summit. The development has been welcomed by both sides as an important sign of improving bilateral relations.
However, a few months on, the Yatra, often regarded as a symbol of the profound cultural connections between ancient China and India and a continuation of civilisational dialogue, appears to be courting controversy within Chinese strategic circles. It is perhaps not a coincidence that the MEA press release following the recent India-China Strategic Dialogue between Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri and Executive Vice Foreign Minister of the People’s Republic of China Ma Zhaoxu on 10 February 2026 referred to the successful resumption of the Kailash Mansarovar Yatra and conveyed the Indian side’s hope for a continued expansion in its scale, while the Chinese readout remained completely silent on the issue. The reason may well lie in the rising chorus within China’s domestic discourse in recent months against the continuation or expansion of the pilgrimage.
Some commentators have argued that China must make a concerted effort to decisively weaken the site’s association with Hinduism and India, and instead reposition it as a centre of indigenous Chinese cultural traditions such as Taoism.
As the Yatra resumed in June 2025, it triggered an uproar in Chinese online spaces, with many questioning: “Why have China’s sacred mountains and lakes become holy sites for Indian pilgrims?” “Why does the Indian government attach so much importance to the issue of pilgrimage?” and “Is this driven by genuine religious fervour, or by cold geopolitical calculations that could affect China’s sovereignty?”
Chinese state media attempted to allay public concerns by portraying the pilgrimage as a vital bridge for fostering people-to-people exchanges between China and India, and as a constructive signal of easing tensions between the two Asian giants. It further contended that the Yatra not only sustains cultural ties but also generates substantial economic benefits for the Ngari region. Indian pilgrims reportedly spend an average of approximately 12,000 yuan — around 3.7 times the amount spent by mainland Chinese tourists during the same period — and, by some estimates, regional tourism revenue has surged by nearly 300 percent.
In other words, the pilgrimage is portrayed as fostering a positive environment for regional economic integration and as a stepping stone for advancing China’s Western Development strategy. State media also emphasised its value as a platform for China to showcase its religious tolerance and development achievements in the Tibet region to the world.
At the same time, official narratives stressed that there is no need for concern or misunderstanding, as the Chinese government accords high-level attention to the pilgrimage. The number of pilgrims remains strictly limited: only 15 official Indian groups have resumed their pilgrimages to Tibet this year, with 50 people per group, totalling 750 pilgrims. Routes and the duration of visits are tightly regulated, thereby, in Beijing’s view, balancing security considerations with openness in this sensitive border region.
Despite these assurances from state media, a high-pitched campaign has recently dominated Chinese online discourse, accusing Indian pilgrims of being “spies and surveyors,” and “jeopardising China’s cultural security and damaging the local environment,” among other charges.
More concerning is the fact that scepticism about the resumption of the pilgrimage is no longer confined to online public opinion. Liu Zongyi, a senior researcher and Director of the South Asia Research Center at the influential Shanghai Institute for International Studies, who has visited India on multiple occasions and engaged extensively with members of the Indian strategic community, recently argued in the South Asia Studies Newsletter — a publication considered close to the Chinese government — that Indian pilgrims travelling to Mount Kailash and Lake Manasarovar are not merely participating in cultural or religious exchange. According to him, the issue is intertwined with complex domestic electoral considerations (given that India has over one billion Hindus) and reflects India’s unspoken geopolitical ambition to assert “cultural sovereignty” over China’s “sacred mountain and lake.” The article was subsequently republished by major Chinese news portals such as Guancha.com, suggesting that Liu Zongyi’s articulation has takers within Chinese official circles.
It highlights the fragile foundations on which the current reset in China-India ties rests. Even relatively low-hanging fruits, such as cultural or people-to-people exchanges, remain mired in controversy and difficult to sustain.
The overwhelming public support for the article was equally telling. Many commentators warned that India was attempting to create a fait accompli for China, arguing that it would only be a matter of time before Indians began demanding their “divinely ordained promised land.” They also contend that China has limited options for retaliation, as it cannot realistically demand reciprocal pilgrimage arrangements in India. For instance, since China wants to project itself as a global leader in Buddhism, it has little interest in sending Chinese pilgrims to Indian Buddhist centres such as Varanasi, Sarnath, Gaya, or Sanchi, thereby promoting these sites and endorsing India’s Buddhist heritage. Nor can Beijing press for reciprocal pilgrimage rights to Tawang in Arunachal Pradesh, as doing so would implicitly acknowledge India’s sovereignty over the region.
Consequently, sections of Chinese public opinion have urged the government to adopt restrictive measures: limiting the number of Indian pilgrims, tightening political vetting procedures, imposing higher fees, enforcing stricter regulations, and even levying punitive fines to discourage visits. Most notably, some commentators have argued that China must make a concerted effort to decisively weaken the site’s association with Hinduism and India, and instead reposition it as a centre of indigenous Chinese cultural traditions such as Taoism.
Accordingly, some Chinese scholars are attempting to construct a narrative that Indian pilgrimages to Tibet lack legitimacy and carry a distinct colonial undertone. They argue that references to “Kailash” in historical Hindu traditions point to multiple locations spread across a vast region west of the Himalayas and east of the Pamirs. For centuries, they claim, Hindus regarded Kedarnath in Uttarakhand as the abode of Lord Shiva, and that it was only in the 19th century—following British colonial expansion—that Hindus began identifying Mount Kailash as “Kailash,” the divine abode of Shiva.
Building on this line of reasoning, certain Chinese researchers are advancing an alternative historical narrative. They contend that China’s “sacred mountain and holy lake” are originally associated with the Bon religion, the indigenous faith of Tibet. According to this view, the sites do not correspond to the “Great Snow Mountain” and “Anavatapta Lake” described in Buddhist scriptures that originated in India and later spread to Tibet, nor do they align with the “Kailash” and “Lake Mansarovar” referenced in India’s Sanskrit religious traditions.
Two inferences may be drawn from the above discussion. First, it highlights the fragile foundations on which the current reset in China-India ties rests. Even relatively low-hanging fruits, such as cultural or people-to-people exchanges, remain mired in controversy and difficult to sustain. This serves as a sobering reality check for those who anticipate deeper China-India collaboration in addressing an increasingly unstable global order.
The emerging Chinese discourse on Kailash Mansarovar, as outlined above, is particularly telling. It suggests that China is quietly attempting to redefine the contours not only of Buddhism, but also of other Indic faiths such as Hinduism and Jainism.
Second, Kailash Mansarovar has rarely figured prominently in discussions within the Indian strategic community on the politics of religion vis-à-vis China, where the primary focus has remained on reclaiming and foregrounding India’s Buddhist heritage. Viewed from that perspective, the emerging Chinese discourse on Kailash Mansarovar, as outlined above, is particularly telling. It suggests that China is quietly attempting to redefine the contours not only of Buddhism, but also of other Indic faiths such as Hinduism and Jainism.
This should serve as a wake-up call and prompt more sustained debate within Indian strategic circles about the future of what is regarded by a vast majority of Indians as the ultimate pilgrimage destination. It also raises important questions about the options available to the Indian state to safeguard the religious and spiritual interests of its people beyond national borders.
Antara Ghosal Singh is a Fellow with the Strategic Studies Programme at Observer Research Foundation.
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Antara Ghosal Singh is a Fellow at the Strategic Studies Programme at Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi. Her area of research includes China-India relations, China-India-US ...
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