Political turnover in Bangladesh is unlikely to disrupt relations with Russia, as shared defence, energy, and economic interests continue to anchor the partnership
The transformative elections in Bangladesh on 12 February, which have reshaped the country’s domestic political landscape, are unlikely to significantly alter Dhaka’s foreign policy. The “friends to all, malice to none” approach is expected to retain its relevance despite the change in power. Russia stands out among the countries unlikely to see any substantial policy revisions under the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) government, given its continued importance to Bangladesh’s economic and geostrategic calculations.
The BNP’s victory in the elections came as little surprise to Moscow. Despite its deep-rooted historical ties with the Awami League, Russia was quick to adapt to the new domestic realities that emerged in Bangladesh following the 2024 July Uprising. Throughout 2024 and 2025, Moscow steadily engaged with the interim government headed by Chief Adviser Muhammad Yunus, while also maintaining dialogue with a range of political forces.
Since arriving in Dhaka in late 2024, the Russian Ambassador to Bangladesh, Alexander Khozin, has met several times with BNP representatives. During these discussions, the Russian side expressed a clear interest in exploring ways to enhance cooperation in trade and energy, as well as in ensuring a smooth post-election transition in the bilateral relationship. At the latest meeting, held just weeks before the elections, Khozin emphasised to BNP chairperson Tarique Rahman that Russia is willing to strengthen bilateral ties “under any political force” that comes to power in Bangladesh. This underscores Moscow’s efforts to move beyond its previously controversial relationship with the BNP during the Awami League’s tenure and to lay the groundwork for continued cooperation in areas of mutual interest.
Apart from patching up past disagreements and establishing new channels with the BNP, Moscow has also maintained contact with the Jamaat-e-Islami, apparently in anticipation of the party playing a more prominent role in Bangladesh’s political landscape.
Apart from patching up past disagreements and establishing new channels with the BNP, Moscow has also maintained contact with the Jamaat-e-Islami, apparently in anticipation of the party playing a more prominent role in Bangladesh’s political landscape. This approach has proven prescient, given the Jamaat’s unprecedented electoral performance and its emergence as the largest opposition force in the country. However, there are clear limitations to Moscow’s ties with the Jamaat. For one, Russia remains wary of the party’s Islamist ideology and its possible links to radical groups. Its sister organisation, Jamaat-e-Islami Pakistan, is designated as a terrorist organisation and is outlawed in Russia. Second, Moscow is likely to continue calibrating its actions in Bangladesh with India’s concerns in mind. Since Jamaat campaigned on an anti-India platform, and given that the Islamisation of Bangladeshi politics could threaten broader stability in South Asia, Moscow is likely to exercise caution in its engagement with the party.
Beyond cultivating wide-ranging political connections, Moscow has developed close ties with Bangladesh’s military, which has wielded considerable sway over the distribution of power since the 2024 uprising and is poised to remain a key player in the country’s politics for years to come.
A vivid illustration of these enduring bilateral defence links was the four-day visit to Moscow by Army Chief Waker-uz-Zaman in April 2025. The agenda extended beyond strictly military and technical matters — such as training exchanges between military institutions and potential arms supplies — to include discussions with Rosatom representatives on finalising the physical security system for the Rooppur nuclear power plant.
The last major defence deal between the two countries, involving the export of Mi-171 armed helicopters, was completed in 2019, two years after it was agreed. Since then, there have been no significant agreements, with the exception of a contract for the supply of two Mi-171A2 multipurpose heavy helicopters, signed in 2021 between Russian Helicopters Holding and Bangladesh’s Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA). The deal, estimated at Tk 428.12 crore (US$50.4 million), reportedly made significant progress: police pilots and technical staff underwent training, 70 percent of the payment was transferred, and representatives of the Home Ministry and the police completed a pre-shipment inspection of the helicopters. However, shortly before the scheduled delivery in January 2025, the MHA decided to withhold acceptance of the helicopters “until further notice” due to US sanctions.
Despite existing complications hindering arms transfers, Russia remains an important source of defence equipment and spare parts for Bangladesh, whose Armed Forces operate MiG-29 fighter jets, Yak-130 combat trainer aircraft, Mi-17 helicopters, BTR-80 armoured vehicles, and various types of Russian-origin missiles.
Despite existing complications hindering arms transfers, Russia remains an important source of defence equipment and spare parts for Bangladesh.
Bilateral naval cooperation has recently gained renewed momentum, with Russian vessels making friendly port calls in Chittagong as part of their visits to Bangladesh. During the most recent visit in April 2025, described by the Russian Ministry of Defence as “a business call programme”, the two navies conducted bilateral PASSEX drills in the Indian Ocean. Although these exercises have been cited as evidence of Russia’s “strengthening military presence” in the Indian Ocean, such assessments may be somewhat overstated. The three visiting vessels — a Russian Pacific Fleet detachment comprising two corvettes and a tanker, which had also participated in the ‘Maritime Security Belt’ drills with China and Iran and in the ‘Indra Navy’ exercise with India in March-April 2025 — can hardly be seen as signalling any substantial regional presence. The growing regularity of port calls and the latest drills, however, point to a rekindled naval diplomacy between Moscow and Dhaka after a considerable hiatus of several decades.
In September 2025, Bangladesh took part in the Russia-Belarus ‘Zapad’ exercises. Despite raising concerns in several European countries due to their proximity to NATO borders, the international phase of the drills, involving 37 army personnel from Bangladesh, took place on Russian territory in the Nizhny Novgorod region.
Russia occupies an important position as a partner for Bangladesh in key economic sectors, primarily energy and agriculture. The Rooppur Nuclear Power Plant (RNPP), constructed by the Russian state-owned company Rosatom and financed through a Russian loan of US$11.38 billion, is a flagship project that binds the two countries together. As the plant is expected to generate up to 10 percent of Bangladesh’s electricity needs, it will play a critical role in strengthening the country’s energy security.
Rosatom has already completed construction of the first unit of the RNPP, which is currently undergoing commissioning. Fuel loading is expected to be completed soon, with an initial 350 MW of electricity projected to enter the national grid by the end of March 2026.
Another Russian state-owned company, Gazprom, has been engaged in exploring gas reserves in Bangladesh in cooperation with Bangladesh Petroleum Exploration and Production Company (BAPEX), a subsidiary of Petrobangla. In 2023, Gazprom International identified five new wells for further exploration in the Bhola gas field. In its engagements with the interim government, Moscow sought to secure continuity of Gazprom’s operations in Bangladesh. Given its long-standing presence in the country, Gazprom is likely to retain its role in exploration projects under the BNP government.
The BNP’s rise to power is unlikely to alter Russia’s ties with Bangladesh. With Tarique Rahman’s government expected to prioritise economic stabilisation, Moscow has ample reason to anticipate continued cooperation in key areas of bilateral relations.
Russia also remains a key supplier of agricultural products, particularly grain, to Bangladesh. By some estimates, Russian wheat accounted for nearly 60 percent of Bangladesh’s total wheat imports in the 2024-25 agricultural season, although shipments have trended downward over the past year. While 2.3 million tonnes of Russian wheat reached Bangladesh between July and December 2024, this figure dropped to 1.8 million tonnes in the same period in 2025. Imports from Russia, albeit attractive due to their relatively low price, have increasingly faced competition from alternative suppliers. For example, under the Memorandum of Understanding signed with the United States in July 2025, Bangladesh agreed to purchase 700,000 metric tonnes of US wheat annually over the next five years. Despite intensifying competition, Russia is likely to retain its leading position among Bangladesh’s top three wheat suppliers, alongside Canada and Ukraine.
Heightened labour migration is a relatively new phenomenon in Bangladesh-Russia ties. The number of Bangladeshi workers travelling to Russia has steadily increased, rising from 2,800 in 2024 to 9,300 in 2025. This influx comes at a time when the Russian economy is facing a severe manpower shortage. Similar to workers from other South Asian countries, Bangladeshi workers are employed in such as construction, warehousing, textiles, and agriculture. However, in some cases, Bangladeshi citizens have reportedly been deceived by recruitment agencies and, upon arrival in Russia, either dismissed from their jobs or forced to fight in Ukraine.
The BNP’s rise to power is unlikely to alter Russia’s ties with Bangladesh. With Tarique Rahman’s government expected to prioritise economic stabilisation, Moscow has ample reason to anticipate continued cooperation in key areas of bilateral relations. At the same time, the limits of this partnership are evident, given Dhaka’s close economic ties with Western powers and its careful adherence to US sanctions against Russia. These factors are likely to constrain any significant expansion of Bangladesh-Russia cooperation in the future.
Aleksei Zakharov is a Fellow, Russia & Eurasia, with the Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation.
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Aleksei Zakharov is a Fellow with ORF’s Strategic Studies Programme. His research focuses on the geopolitics and geo-economics of Eurasia and the Indo-Pacific, with particular ...
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