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Since Trump has been re-elected to the White House, a lot has changed worldwide, be it the United States’ (US) opposition to the Ukraine-Russia war or support for Israel's attack on Iran, the weakening of the global multilateral governance institutions such as the World Trade Organisation, or the violation of international rules for mining in the deep sea. While all these changes have directly impacted the US's perception globally, their impact among its Indo-Pacific allies and partners has been interesting, given the contradictions. Furthermore, with Trump redefining the US’s alliances and partnerships and privileging its trade and security interests, it has become more challenging for others to continue to engage with the US as they did previously. Given this shift, it is critical to examine the effects of changing perception and what it means for the US.
A better assessment of the public mood is as critical by looking at the surveys or opinion polls, including those focusing on foreign policy. Even though these perceptions are not accurate, they reflect a figment of reality, for instance, how successful one’s public diplomacy or actions are perceived in other parts of the world. This gives diplomats and foreign policy institutions opportunities to focus and even course-correct. Simultaneously, this changing perception acts as a heuristic device of the views towards the US’s foreign policy among its allies and partners, showcasing its reliability and attractiveness.
President Trump has announced several policy decisions on the economic, security, and technological front, against allies, partners, and adversaries alike.
Since entering the White House on 20th January this year, President Trump has announced several policy decisions on the economic, security, and technological front, against allies, partners, and adversaries alike. His administration started by disclosing tariff rates against all countries on 2 April, followed by a brief tariff rate escalation with China. While many allies and friends expected a smooth ride during Trump 2.0, their experience with it has been far more turbulent than expected, notably impacting Trump’s favourability among his friends.
Among the US’s major allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific, including South Korea, Japan, and India, the favourability of President Trump remains high despite the recent tariff actions. Trump's favourability stands at 38, 52, and 33 percent in Japan, India, and South Korea, as shown in Figure 1. When it comes to confidence in US and Chinese leaders to do the right thing on global affairs, there was only a one-percentage-point difference between President Trump and President Xi.
Figure 1: Favorability of Trump Vs Xi among US allies, partners, and friends
Source: Pew Survey
Countries with more trust in Trump than Xi see the US as the preferred economic partner. Japan, South Korea, and India (78, 81, and 60 percent) prefer the US over China as economic partners. Conversely, in Australia and Indonesia, the opposite stands true, where 69 and 53 percent see China as the preferred economic partner.
In the Oceania region (Australia and New Zealand), we have seen a remarkable change in perception given Trump’s recent actions. Trust in the US has drastically decreased in Australia by 20 points, and in New Zealand, it has decreased by 5 points from 38 to 33 percent (Figure 2). Similarly, within ASEAN, a stark difference between the US and China becomes visible, with some of its members viewing China (at 56.4 percent) as the preferred economic partner over the US (at 15.4 percent). However, with China’s increasing military influence, most countries also welcome the US role as a key strategic and political actor in the region.
Figure 2: How much do you trust the US to act responsibly worldwide (Negative Perceptions %)?
Sources: Lowy Institute Poll and Perceptions of Asia Survey
Besides the Indo-Pacific surveys, the Pew Research survey covering other regions emphasised that these sentiments were widely shared. For instance, favourable opinions towards the US have dropped to 35 percent, while for China, it has decreased to 32 percent. This shows that the favourability gap is decreasing, making it difficult for people to trust either to do the right thing.
Contextualising the country's specific perspectives with their response to the US-China competition helps to understand the allies' and partners’ standpoint on how they view the geopolitical and geoeconomic realities of the region. Furthermore, the respective difference emphasises the level of threat perception when it comes to increasing dependencies with China. Based on these threat perceptions, the categorisation of the US’s allies and partners can be broadly divided into two:
Contextualising the country's specific perspectives with their response to the US-China competition helps to understand the allies' and partners’ standpoint on how they view the geopolitical and geoeconomic realities of the region.
Table 1: US Allies and Partners' Perception towards the US-China Competition
| Countries | Categories | China | US |
| India | Category 2 | Second most important threat (33 percent): Perceives as a strategic threat but would like to cooperate | Important Partner (35 percent): Strategic Partnership |
| South Korea | Category 1 | Second most important threat (33 percent): Does not see it as a strategic threat, but would like to continue working with China | Most Important Ally (89 percent): Would like to continue working with the US for strategic stability |
| Japan | Category 2 | Top-most threat (53 percent): Sees China as its top-most strategic threat, but would like to continue economic cooperation with it, the US | Most Important Ally (78 percent): Perceives the US as a critical strategic ally for the stability of the Indo-Pacific region |
| Australia | Category 2 | Top most threat (52 percent): Sees China as an economic partner but also an emerging threat, and would like to work for regional stability | Important Ally (35 percent): Sees the US as a critical security partner in the Indo-Pacific |
| Philippines (Southeast Asia) | Category 2 | Top most threat (30 percent view China as favourable): View China as the least important political and economic partner for the country | Important Political and Economic Partner (88 percent favourable): View the US as a critical partner for economic and political stability for the country |
Source: Pew Research Centre and National Survey of the Republic of the Philippines, April-May 2025
Irrespective of the nature of the alliance, countries in category 1 continue to prefer a strategic alliance with the US regarding security issues, while showing a degree of strategic flexibility on economic ties. For instance, 53.2 percent of South Koreans still feel that the US will continue to be stronger than China, and 85.8 percent support the US (for security and economics) in the US-China competition. Similarly, in Japan, 47 percent versus 1 percent of people support the US over China, while 42 percent advocate for maintaining an equilibrium. The situation becomes complex for those under category 2, such as India, Australia, and New Zealand, as several factors, such as their economic dependencies, foreign policy posture, threat perception, and legacy issues, colour their perception of the US-China competition. For the US's Southeast Asian ally, like the Philippines, the trust in the US is the highest (66.5 percent), with 52 percent supporting a pro-West foreign policy. The distrust of China (69.4 percent) also remains the highest. All these statistics bring forth two trends: Irrespective of the US’s actions, some allies continue to trust, while others are trying to balance, given their economic dependencies.
To expect frank conversations and criticism of one’s external policies while engaging with foreign governments is not considered a part of diplomatic niceties, particularly when intense negotiations are underway. Therefore, in this context, foreign policy surveys play a critical role in bridging this vital gap, giving essential feedback to mandarins in the US. In the age of multipolarity, if the US wants to continue its strong alliance and partnership with like-minded countries in the region, it would be prudent to pay attention to the changing perception among its allies and partners.
Trump's erratic behaviour has created a lot of anxiety and rethinking among US friends, directly impacting the US’s attractiveness (soft power) and reliability.
It is clear that, despite the economic difficulties, the US allies and partners are adjusting to Trump’s arbitrary policies by engaging in negotiations to strike a deal, which has created a lot of antagonism, particularly against the US leadership. Similarly, China’s threatening behaviour has also contributed to the growing unfavourability toward Xi. Nonetheless, the support for the strategic alliance or partnership with the US remains high or is increasing. This is due to two reasons: increasing threat perception of China due to its actions and continuing robust institutional cooperation, which has shielded the ties from the Trump factor to a degree. However, the changing perceptions reveal one emerging reality: Trump's erratic behaviour has created a lot of anxiety and rethinking among US friends, directly impacting the US’s attractiveness (soft power) and reliability. This is opening up space for China to fill, particularly in the economic domain, which makes the US alliance more vulnerable in the case of a conflict. Therefore, while the changing perception may not affect the alliance's strength, it forces its friends to cooperate with China on economic issues, deepening their dependencies. This in itself should become a considerable concern for the US.
Abhishek Sharma is a Junior Fellow with the Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation.
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Abhishek Sharma is a Junior Fellow with ORF’s Strategic Studies Programme. His research focuses on the Indo-Pacific regional security and geopolitical developments with a special ...
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