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While global attention remains fixed on Gaza and Ukraine, Africa is confronting its deadliest conflicts in decades, calling for peace and governance reform.
As global attention remains focused on the Russia-Ukraine war, the crisis in Gaza, and the recent stand-off between Israel and Iran, Africa is witnessing its most severe wave of conflicts and humanitarian suffering since 1946. The African continent accounts for about 48 percent (28) of state-based conflicts and 46 percent (38.8 million) of internally displaced people (IDPs). The Sahel region, spanning western and North-central Africa, is a hotbed of Islamist violence, accounting for nearly half of the continent’s related fatalities in 2024. Al Shabab in Somalia and Boko Haram in the Lake Chad region are responsible for most of the remaining deaths linked to Islamist violence across Africa.
The humanitarian fallout is staggering. Africa hosts the world’s highest number of internally displaced persons, most of whom have fled conflict and violence, while nearly 5.7 million people have been uprooted by disasters intensified by natural Disasters. In Sudan, displacement camps in regions such as Darfur and South Kordofan remain under constant threat of attack, with reports of sexual violence against women. In the DRC, 6.2 million people have been displaced due to conflict, with natural disasters such as floods in the eastern provinces further complicating humanitarian responses. Similar patterns in Nigeria, Somalia, and Ethiopia reveal how conflict, disasters, and weak state responses perpetuate cycles of secondary displacement and vulnerability.
Africa is witnessing its most severe wave of conflicts and humanitarian suffering since 1946.
In 2019, after ousting President Omar al-Bashir from Sudan, a power vacuum was created, which quickly turned into a battleground for rival military generals, plunging the country into one of the deadliest civil wars in recent times. Sudan’s war between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) is a consequence of decades of authoritarian governance and the deliberate militarisation of internal politics. Governance institutions, including parliament and courts, which could have mediated these disputes, have deliberately weakened over the decades.
A similar pattern has been observed in Ethiopia, where the war between the federal government and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) erupted due to systemic exclusion, contested arrangements, and the weakening of democratic checks on power. The death toll, estimated between 162,000 and 378,000, is one of the most devastating tragedies of recent years. In both Sudan and Ethiopia, governance failure is the connective tissue—from the collapse of political dialogue and inclusive institutions to the militarisation of domestic disputes. In Sudan, after 2019, negotiations between key political groups stalled, eroding trust in peaceful dialogue. Additionally, the exclusion of the TPLF from post-2018 reforms in Ethiopia marked/highlighted a lack of inclusivity.
Furthermore, the conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has led to 6 million deaths since its beginning in 1996. President Mobutu Sese, during his 32-year rule, undermined state institutions and enriched the elites. The weakened state struggled to manage the consequences of the Rwandan Genocide. This vulnerability created an environment in which armed groups could thrive, and neighbouring countries intervened repeatedly. Among these groups, the M23 rebel movement, reportedly supported by Rwanda, has emerged as the most significant force, destabilising the eastern provinces and further escalating tensions between Kinshasa and Kigali.
Governance failure is the connective tissue—from the collapse of political dialogue and inclusive institutions to the militarisation of domestic disputes.
The situation in Africa, however, continues to worsen due to foreign powers using the governance vacuum to advance their geopolitical interests. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) has extended military and financial assistance to the RSF in Sudan, whereas Egypt supports the SAF through training and air support. Libya continues to be in turmoil, with foreign entities such as Türkiye, Saudi Arabia, Russia, and Egypt supporting rival factions. Rather than mediating for peace, these external powers have prolonged violence and emboldened warlords, making peace an even distant dream.
Islamic militant organisations and military generals have exploited the governance vacuum created in the Sahel region. Rampant corruption, weak institutions, failure to deliver basic amenities and marginalisation of local communities have led to resentment against the state. For instance, in Mali and Burkina Faso, Jihadist groups are recruiting locals by offering them security and basic services which the state has failed to deliver. More so, in Niger, the marginalisation of local communities in Tillaberi and Diffa has enabled militant groups to recruit locals by offering them food and dispute resolutions. Meanwhile, repeated military coups are driven by frustration over civilian governments’ inability to address insecurity and poverty, but often end up reinforcing authoritarianism and militarisation without solving the underlying structural problems.
The intensification of conflicts and subsequent humanitarian crises reflects a wider governance collapse characterised by elite power conflicts, failure to build inclusive and accountable institutions, and an inability to provide basic amenities to the people. It has created fertile grounds for the rise of non-state actors, power capture by military generals from civilian governments, and international intervention, which have further intensified and prolonged the conflicts in Africa.
Rather than mediating for peace, these external powers have prolonged violence and emboldened warlords, making peace an even distant dream.
Given the complexity of African conflicts, lack of will by political elites to resolve the conflicts, reputational issues of the United Nations (UN)-led peacekeeping missions and intervention by foreign powers, regional organisations such as the African Union, Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and Southern African Development Community (SADC) must enhance their efforts. They must assume greater responsibility in conflict resolution and peace enforcement in line with the principle of “African solutions to African problems”. Despite its premature exit, the intervention by SADC in response to rapidly escalating violence in Mozambique in 2021 led to a sixfold decline in deaths linked to violent extremist activities. Moreover, in 2016, the long-term ruler of Gambia, Yahya Jammeh, refused to step down after losing the election until diplomatic pressure and deployment of forces around Gambia by ECOWAS forced him to concede defeat. These interventions demonstrate the ability of regional organisations to manage conflicts and facilitate the peaceful transfer of power. Regional organisations must demilitarise and protect the humanitarian corridors, and treat obstruction of aid as a war crime and act accordingly. These regional organisations must collaborate to resist the military and financial interventions of foreign powers that perpetuate instability in fragile states for their strategic or economic advantage.
If governance failure is the cause of the African problem, then governance reform must be the cure.
The international community also needs to shift its approach from merely reactive aid to countries experiencing devastating conflicts to proactive institution-building. This involves investing not just in food and shelter, but also in institutions, legitimacy, and accountability. In Ghana, external actors such as USAID, UN Development Programme (UNDP), and the European Union (EU) helped it take key governance reforms like judiciary modernisation, decentralisation of power, and strengthening of the election commission. The outcome of these proactive measures is reflected in Ghana being one of the most stable democracies in Africa and having experienced a peaceful transition of power. Given the scale of displacement and acute food insecurity, the international community must continue providing immediate humanitarian aid alongside long-term efforts. Cuts in funding, such as the US freeze on Sudan, risk worsening already dire conditions. Reactive support—food, shelter, medical aid—remains essential to saving lives. These measures must not be seen as optional, but as urgent moral and strategic necessities. Sustained aid is critical even as institution-building progresses. If governance failure is the cause of the African problem, then governance reform must be the cure. Without restoring governance institutions and protecting citizens, no amount of external aid or military intervention will bring lasting peace to Africa.
Umer John is a Research Intern at the Observer Research Foundation.
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