The latest white paper makes clear that Hong Kong is no longer treated as a semi-autonomous exception, but as an integrated part of China’s centralised national security state
China’s recent white paper on Hong Kong, titled “Safeguarding China’s National Security Under the Framework of ‘One Country, Two Systems’ is not merely a policy clarification but rather a doctrinal consolidation. Read alongside the 2021 white paper, it reflects a sweeping change since the 2020 National Security Law (NSL). This document signals China's intention to formalise and institutionalise a new political equilibrium in Hong Kong, where autonomy is interpreted through the lens of centralised sovereignty, and national security becomes the organising principle of governance. Through the critical perspective, these white papers serve four interconnected purposes: consolidating security control, redefining “One Country, Two Systems", shaping domestic and global narratives, and strategically aligning Hong Kong’s economy with mainland priorities. Hong Kong is transitioning from a semi-autonomous buffer space into a tightly integrated node within China’s national security state under the Communist Party of China (CPC) with Xi Jinping as its core.
The subsequent Safeguarding National Security Ordinance (Article 23), passed in 2024, has expanded the legal architecture to criminalise a broad range of political activities under the categories of treason, sedition, espionage, and collusion.
The latest white paper emphasises Beijing’s “comprehensive jurisdiction” over Hong Kong. Although this same language has appeared earlier in the 2014 White Paper and in the 2021 document, its reiteration serves to normalise a transformed constitutional order. Under the 2020 Hong Kong National Security Law, a parallel enforcement structure has already been introduced, including mainland security organs operating in the city. The subsequent Safeguarding National Security Ordinance (Article 23), passed in 2024, has expanded the legal architecture to criminalise a broad range of political activities under the categories of treason, sedition, espionage, and collusion. This primarily aims to remove the anti-China forces from the political system and minimise the likelihood of another colour revolution, thus consolidating its power over Hong Kong. The 2026 White Paper presents them as a legal shield against what Beijing describes as anti-China agitators and foreign interference. By doing so, it revises the national security policy from a reactionary to a proactive governing framework. Critically, this move redefines the relationship between Hong Kong and the central government, where Beijing positions itself as a primary architect and guarantor of the island's stability under the centrally commanded security architecture of the 1984 Sino-British Joint Declaration of high autonomy over internal affairs status. So, this shift is not simply legal but a strategic structural shift by which Hong Kong’s judicial independence, political pluralism, and liberal norms will operate under the scrutiny of national security laws.
China follows “One Country, Two Systems (一国两制)” with Hong Kong. This constitutional formula was first proposed by Deng Xiaoping in the late 1970s, following the “reform and opening up”, and was given legal recognition under Article 31 of the PRC constitution, which allowed the creation of “special administrative regions (SARs)” in 1982. Initially, it was designed to reassure Hong Kong that capitalism and civil liberties would remain intact, with a strategic balance between sovereignty and autonomy, after reunification. However, the current interpretation is decisively inclined toward ‘One Country’, neglecting the ‘Two Systems’. The doctrine of “overall jurisdiction (全面管治權)” stresses that all power exercised by Hong Kong derives from the Central government authority, where autonomy is conditional and not inherent, and places the “two systems" approach in such a way that it doesn’t challenge the primacy and control of the Chinese government over national security and sovereignty. For those who are not aligned with this system (pro-democracy), the Chinese government, through the electoral reforms since 2021, has effectively excluded them from participation in governance and established a compatriot governing Hong Kong as a necessary safeguard to prevent subversion. Consequently, this marks a transition from a competitive semi-democratic plural system to managed political participation where loyalty to the state has become quintessential for political legitimacy; in this sense, the white paper has shifted its focus from ‘One Country, Two Systems’ to ‘One Country, One System’.
The doctrine of “overall jurisdiction" stresses that all power exercised by Hong Kong derives from the Central government authority, where autonomy is conditional and not inherent, and places the “two systems" approach in such a way that it doesn’t challenge the primacy and control of the Chinese government over national security and sovereignty.
There are major national security trials, anti-graft action against top leaders, and wide international criticism of the control of individual liberty. For example, the sentencing of Jimmy Lai has drawn sustained scrutiny from Western governments and human rights organisations. However, through the sustained action, Beijing is doing narrative management. The narrative strategy operates on two levels; domestically, it reassures the mainland audience that the central government has decisively neutralised the anti-China elements and upheld the supremacy of the CPC. Internationally, it indicates that post-2019 restructuring is irreversible and will not function as a pressure point within the Chinese political system. So, China, by framing the title “high-standard security framework”, is showcasing that this framework is not repression but a prerequisite for economic prosperity. It is, thus, camouflaging the national security under the garb of economic stability. However, this narrative faces tension. Hong Kong’s historical role as a global financial hub was built not only on stability but also on rule-of-law transparency, information flows, and institutional independence. The securitisation of governance risks altering that perception, particularly among multinational corporations and foreign investors.
According to the Recommendations of the CPC Central Committee for Formulating the 15th FYP for National Economic and Social Development (2026-30), Hong Kong should support better integration into the country’s economic development. This language aligns with Beijing’s broader strategy of deepening integration between Hong Kong, Macau, and mainland cities under the Greater Bay Initiative (Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao). While this integration promises economic synergy, it also narrows Hong Kong’s functional autonomy. Hong Kong has historically served as a financial gateway between China and the West for facilitating dollar transactions, capital raising and foreign direct investment (FDI). Most of the FDI after the reforms and opening up came from Hong Kong, which stimulated China’s economic growth and paved the way to reach the second-largest economy in the world. However, the scrutiny of outward-facing capital flows and trade channels is crucially hinged on the US-China competition and sanctions regime. To counter foreign sanctions and resist long-arm jurisdictions, Beijing views Hong Kong as a frontline economic arena in geopolitical rivalry. From the critical standpoint, Beijing knows that Hong Kong is a choke point, so it wants to strategically integrate this city into it through economic realignment and political manoeuvring. Integration, therefore, carries both opportunity and risk: deeper alignment with mainland economic strategy may secure political favour, but it may also dilute Hong Kong’s autonomous institutional brand. China has also sought to underscore its economic interests. The white paper mentions that greater attention should be given to security in unconventional areas such as finance, shipping, trade, and the protection of overseas interests. Intervention and sabotage by hostile external forces must be guarded against, and the systems and mechanisms for countering foreign sanctions, intervention, and long-arm jurisdiction should be further improved. During his inauguration speech, Donald Trump had red-flagged Beijing’s influence on the Panama Canal, saying that “China was operating” the primary shipping link between the Atlantic and Pacific oceans. A Hong Kong-based company, CK Hutchison Holding, via a subsidiary, the Panama Ports Company, has operated two of the five container ports since the 1990s. Following the US-China escalation, CK Hutchison founder Li Ka-shing announced plans to sell the rights to operate ports. In January 2026, Panama's Supreme Court scrapped the contracts that allowed the Hong Kong-based company to operate the Panama Canal’s container ports. Furthermore, the Trump administration’s National Security Strategy unveiled in late 2025 declares that the US seeks to “restore American pre-eminence in the Western Hemisphere”, and to protect access to key geographies throughout the region, and control sea lanes and expand access in “strategically important locations”. Beijing views these developments as undermining its interests.
A Hong Kong-based company, CK Hutchison Holding, via a subsidiary, the Panama Ports Company, has operated two of the five container ports since the 1990s.
The release of the white paper immediately after the sentencing of Jimmy Lai, founder of the Apple Daily newspaper, pro-democracy activist and media tycoon for 20 years under the National Security Law, reflects China’s staunch political control over the city's legal system and vibrant freedom of the press. By formalising comprehensive jurisdiction, redefining ‘One Country, Two Systems’, shaping international narratives, and aligning the city with mainland strategic priorities, Beijing is consolidating a post-2019 order centred on security supremacy. It also reveals a fundamental shift where Hong Kong is no longer treated as a semi-autonomous exception within China’s system but as an integrated component of a centralised national security state.
Kalpit A. Mankikar is a Fellow with the Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation.
Amit Ranjan Alok is a Research Intern at the Observer Research Foundation.
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Kalpit A Mankikar is a Fellow with Strategic Studies programme and is based out of ORFs Delhi centre. His research focusses on China specifically looking ...
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Amit Ranjan Alok is a Research Intern at ORF. He is a second-year PhD candidate in Chinese political economy at the Centre for East Asian ...
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