Beijing’s Long Game in the Indian Ocean

This is the 185^th in the ‘China Chronicles’ series. 

One of the key aspects of China’s strategy to project power on a global stage is its growing expansion in the Indo-Pacific. While Beijing neither has a formal nor comprehensive outlook towards the conventional definition of the Indo-Pacific, its presence in the region is significantly shaping its evolving strategic equations. The Indo-Pacific, a joint theatre comprising the Indian and the Pacific oceans, lies at the heart of Beijing’s strategy to project its dominant role in shaping regional geopolitics. In the Pacific, China remains embroiled in a contest with various countries, including the Philippines and Japan, among others, over disputes of sovereignty and territoriality. Notably, Chinese overtures in the South China Sea (SCS) region have prompted physical confrontations between the Chinese coast guard and maritime militia and the coast guard of the Philippines. Interestingly, Beijing’s strategy in the Indian Ocean, the other half of the Indo-Pacific construct, has remained varied from the Pacific.

While China has increasingly found itself enmeshed in the strategic churn in the Indian Ocean, a long game of steady expansion of Beijing’s footprint across the region appears to be underway.

While China has increasingly found itself enmeshed in the strategic churn in the Indian Ocean, a long game of steady expansion of Beijing’s footprint across the region appears to be underway. This long game is unfolding through a threefold strategy that China continues to pursue in the Indian Ocean. First, China has increasingly expanded its footprint across the Indian Ocean through a steady increase in its political influence in the region’s littoral countries. Second, China has sought to incrementally enhance its naval presence in the Indian Ocean by sending research vessels with dual-use capabilities. Third, China is seeking to foster regional cooperation in the Indian Ocean through the convening of the China-Indian Ocean Forum. Arguably, the extent of Chinese engagement in the Indian Ocean, which often remains overlooked, is rapidly emerging as a critical model of regional dominance. It may, therefore, be argued that the Indian Ocean has emerged as a strategic laboratory for China where it is seeking control and influence through novel means to its strategies elsewhere.

The history of Chinese engagement in the Indian Ocean can be traced in two eras. Historically, Chinese interlinks with the Indian Ocean world have been anchored on maritime trade and migration of people. In the modern era, China’s security presence in the Indian Ocean was prompted after the rising instances of piracy off the coast of Somalia in the first decade of the 21st century, during which Beijing had deployed two warships to deal with this challenge. Since then, a steady growth has been visible in the nature and character of Chinese presence in the Indian Ocean. This merits a scrutiny of why China remains interested in the Indian Ocean. Overall, a combination of various factors, including domestic and external interests, appears to be driving Beijing’s outlook towards the region. In terms of domestic factors, China remains heavily dependent on energy imports from the Middle East, which are carried through the Indian Ocean. According to estimates, approximately 80 percent of China’s oil imports are routed through the Indian Ocean. On the other hand, in terms of external factors, the Indian Ocean has emerged as a vital theatre for China to project power and assert its regional influence as the country bolsters efforts to emerge as a global leader. Given these factors, the Indian Ocean has taken on greater significance in Beijing’s strategy for expanding its global influence.

The potential to turn these commercial infrastructure projects into military bases poses a critical challenge in the overall strategic landscape in the Indian Ocean.

How has China sought to pursue its strategy in the Indian Ocean? First, Beijing has made efforts to expand its strategic footprint across the Indian Ocean by increasing its political influence in the region. Importantly, for the Indian Ocean littoral states, developmental priorities have increasingly informed their national interests. In this light, Beijing has emerged as a vital developmental partner for these countries by funding major infrastructure projects, including ports, highways, and airports. The strategic location of these infrastructure projects, including ports, provides China with a critical advantage in cementing its presence in the region. Some of the key Chinese infrastructure projects in the Indian Ocean include Gwadar in Pakistan, Hambantota in Sri Lanka, Sonadia in Bangladesh, and Kyaupkyu in Myanmar. While these ports are intended for commercial use, there exists a pattern of debt-trap diplomacy whereby if a country fails to repay loans accrued by building these infrastructure projects, China can seek operational control of these projects. This has been demonstrated in the case of the Hambantota port. The potential to turn these commercial infrastructure projects into military bases poses a critical challenge in the overall strategic landscape in the Indian Ocean.

Second, China is increasingly investing in efforts to undertake hydrographic studies in the Indian Ocean. As a result, domain awareness has emerged as a critical priority in strengthening maritime security efforts in the Indian Ocean. Multiple Chinese research vessels, including Zhong Shan Da Xue, Beijing’s largest oceanographic research vessel, have entered the Indian Ocean to conduct studies to understand the deep seas in the region. These vessels have also docked at the coasts of Sri Lanka and the Maldives, prompting a security challenge for India. The dual-use nature of these vessels poses a change in intelligence gathering in the Indian Ocean, prompting a long-term view of further worsening security dynamics in the region.

The dual-use nature of these vessels poses a change in intelligence gathering in the Indian Ocean, prompting a long-term view of further worsening security dynamics in the region.

Third, the China-Indian Ocean Forum, an initiative of the China International Development Cooperation Agency (CIDCA), appears to be the latest in China’s playbook in the Indian Ocean region. Through this initiative, Beijing has sought to foster a regional framing in its Indian Ocean strategy. For the Indian Ocean littoral states, developmental priorities are key security interests given their location and capability deficiencies. In this light, China has sought to advance a mechanism to herald a regional forum that focuses on developmental questions related to the blue economy, maritime connectivity, and environmental concerns. Through this initiative, Chinese efforts to embed itself in the regional geopolitical and strategic consciousness in the Indian Ocean appear to be a fundamental priority.

While Beijing has increasingly viewed the Indian Ocean as a key theatre to assert its regional strategic prowess, its strategies increasingly appear to be complex and multifaceted. This three-pronged strategy is seemingly intensifying the strategic architecture in the region. However, this long game reveals a critical understating in Chinese strategic thinking about the priorities and compulsions of the Indian Ocean littoral states. Beijing’s efforts, therefore, appear to be directed at constructing synergies with the Indian Ocean littoral states.

Sayantan Haldar is an Associate Fellow with the Strategic Studies Programme, Observer Research Foundation.

• China Foreign Policy
• Indian Ocean
• China
• china and indo pacific
• china indian ocean forum
• china indian ocean strategy
• china strategy in indian ocean
• chinese engagement in indian ocean
• chinese presence in indian ocean
• indo pacific region

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