Battle of development narratives: EU-Africa relations in the multipolar world

This article is part of GP-ORF series — From Alpha Century to Viral World: The Raisina Young Fellows Speak.

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As the world has changed from a unipolar hegemony to a multipolar one with competing global powers, the Western development paradigm that seeks to grant assistance to ‘underdeveloped’ nations has openly turned from an allegedly altruistic project into an endeavour of geostrategy. By tracing the roots of its discourse, it is clear how development has always been part of a geopolitical and geoeconomic project. For the European Union (EU), the world’s largest development donor, to set up a new partnership with Africa, one of the largest aid-receiving regions, beyond donor-recipient relations and offer a credible alternative to Chinese influence in the region, it must radically revisit its development narrative. 

Civilising vs. developing the Global South

The modern Western development discourse emerged in the aftermath of the Second World War amid fading colonialism. In his famous 1949 inaugural address, US President Harry Truman said: “We must embark on a bold new program for making the benefits of our scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas”^<1>.

Over 70 years since Truman’s speech, development cooperation is still often seen by Western citizens as an altruistic way to grant assistance and aid to peoples suffering from misery and poverty.

Subsequently, a programme of development assistance came up to bridge the gap between the so-called ‘developed’ and ‘underdeveloped’ nations. As the developed nations had managed to become rich and prosperous, they sought to benevolently assist underdeveloped countries to do the same. Over 70 years since Truman’s speech, development cooperation is still often seen by Western citizens as an altruistic way to grant assistance and aid to peoples suffering from misery and poverty.

What was erased from this development narrative, however, is that colonial plunder and exploitation had pushed underdeveloped nations into a state of “primitive and stagnant” economic life^<2>. It has also been forgotten that “scientific advances and industrial progress” in the developed West could only flourish during the industrial revolution due to the resources extracted from the colonies. The new development discourse, as first expressed by Truman, served to depoliticise global inequality and brushed aside the role that extractive colonialism and Western intervention had played in ‘underdeveloping’ countries in the Global South.

Economic development in Europe and the US has coincided with land grabs, tax evasion, climate costs and rigged trade deals in developing countries, which make it structurally difficult for the latter to develop.

Rather than civilising the savages, as had been the rhetoric during colonial times, the goal of ‘development cooperation’ became to develop the poor and disadvantaged in the Global South by having them adopt a Western style of modernisation. Admittedly, the blatant racism underpinning the colonial project gave way to a belief that all beings should be equal. However, the Eurocentric underpinnings of colonialism remained firmly in place. The technical solution for global inequality was adopting a highly individualised, competitive growth model based on free market politics. The fact that such a model may not be ecologically sustainable or difficult to replicate in another context due to a highly interdependent world was disregarded^<3>.

Indeed, in the globalised world economy, the growth of the West depends on access to cheap labour and resources, generally found in the Global South. Economic development in Europe and the US has coincided with land grabs, tax evasion, climate costs and rigged trade deals in developing countries, which make it structurally difficult for the latter to develop. Economic anthropologist Jason Hickel calculated that for every dollar of development aid that developing countries receive, they lose US$ 24 in net outflows through, for example, payments on debt, intellectual property rights and, most importantly, illicit capital flight^<4>. Bluntly put, this means that countries in the Global South are developing rich countries rather than the other way around^<5>.

The ambitions of development aid are too low, and it is hard to claim that the current Western development model is convincingly working in Africa.

At the same time, despite World Bank rhetoric claiming the opposite, a UN report found that extreme poverty is not being eradicated in recent decades^<6>. Philip Alston, the special UN rapporteur on extreme poverty, argues that the “international community mistakenly gauges progress in eliminating poverty by reference to a standard of miserable subsistence rather than an even minimally adequate standard of living”. In short, the ambitions of development aid are too low, and it is hard to claim that the current Western development model is convincingly working in Africa, for instance.

The West, not the only kid on the block

A key exception and a relative success story of development has been China. Interestingly, this has been thanks to China’s state-led development strategies, in defiance of the free-market model pushed for by Western powers. Economists like Ha-Joon Chang have argued that “only protection can build developing countries”^<7>. Similar to the way in which now rich countries like the US and UK once developed, he argues that developing countries should insulate themselves temporarily from global competition to prepare their industries for international competition.

Not having been a colonial power itself in Africa, China has the advantage of pursuing a form of South-South cooperation, which provides a more balanced starting point for foreign aid.

As it developed economically, China became an important foreign aid, trade and investment partner in Africa. While having been engaged in foreign aid since the 1950s, China has stepped up its efforts since the mid-90s. It has also increasingly shifted from charity to a model of ‘common’ rather than one-way development through, for example, concessional loans. Not having been a colonial power itself in Africa, China has the advantage of pursuing a form of South-South cooperation, which provides a more balanced starting point for foreign aid. The narrative surrounding Chinese aid, as also embodied in the country’s 1964 Eight Principles to foreign aid, is one of solidarity, win-win, no intervention and mutual respect^<8>. There is no conditionality involved.

Chinese aid has attracted plenty of criticism. Some argue that China is pursuing an imperial agenda through debt traps rather than increasing the well-being of African nations. There is also scepticism about the effectiveness of Chinese development support or the fact that a lack of conditionality may increase the likelihood of capture by local political elites^<9>. Experts on Chinese foreign aid, however, warn that there is a major lack of nuance and knowledge about China’s role in Africa among biased Western critics^<10>. Whether China’s claim about pursuing a win-win relationship with Africa actually holds true probably depends on the sector in which Chinese investment takes place. But what is interesting, is that the more ‘equal’ and reciprocal Chinese development narrative is generally well received among African citizens^<11>.

Whether China’s claim about pursuing a win-win relationship with Africa actually holds true probably depends on the sector in which Chinese investment takes place.

Europe’s response

In reaction to this changing geopolitical reality, the EU has put the historic partnership with Africa high on the political agenda. The EU recently voiced its ambition, via a roadmap for a new 2020 Africa Strategy, for a “partnership of equals” beyond donor-recipient relations^<12>. Paradoxically, this roadmap has been largely unilaterally drafted, disregarding some key priorities for Africa (such as poverty, health, access to the internet)^<13>. Moreover, this paper commitment to an equal partnership is far from new. The Lomé Convention of 1975, which determined the relations between the European Community (predecessor of EU) and Africa, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries, already stated: “Anxious to establish, on the basis of complete equality between partners, close and continuing co-operation, in a spirit of international solidarity”^<14>.

The Lomé Convention is a predecessor of the 2000 Cotonou Agreement, which is currently under renegotiation. These international treaties have settled post-colonial relations between Europe and former colonies in the ACP regions, yet economic relations inherited from the colonial era have largely been kept intact^<15>. The EU still trades manufactured goods in return for primary goods, in what is often seen as a hierarchical and unbalanced centre-periphery trade relation. Consequently, the Cotonou deal has been charged with being “an unwieldy and ineffectual relic of the past” to even being a manifestation of “imperial power Europe”^<16>.

The EU still trades manufactured goods in return for primary goods, in what is often seen as a hierarchical and unbalanced centre-periphery trade relation.

One contested aspect of the Cotonou pact has been the introduction of the economic partnership agreements (EPAs) with four different regional blocs in Africa. These EPAs were criticised for undermining regional integration in Africa through ‘divide and rule’ tactics, even when it is widely recognised that intra-ACP trade is key to move away from the export of raw materials towards the export of intermediate and finished goods^<17>. While the EU has made modifications to these EPAs in 2014 (through, for example, the introduction of an asymmetrical tariff agreement and a promise to include a development package), there is evidence that these concessions have not been sufficient and the anticipated developmental and poverty-eliminating outcomes have not been achieved^<18>.

The post-Cotonou agreement, which will also include three regional protocols (on Africa, the Pacific and the Caribbean), is now being negotiated at the same time as a new continent-to-continent EU-Africa strategy. While the African Union (AU) has pushed for an EU-AU agreement outside of the outdated EU-ACP structure, some African member states and the EU have been less willing to fundamentally rethink the ACP framework^<19>. While the concerned African member states are reluctant to transfer powers to the AU and wish to hold on to official development assistance (ODA) dependence over the AU’s push for regional integration, the EU and especially the European Commission (Directorate-General for International Partnerships) have been reluctant to give up the existing institutional structures, instead preferring to keep the clientelist relationship with ACP countries.

While the African Union (AU) has pushed for an EU-AU agreement outside of the outdated EU-ACP structure, some African member states and the EU have been less willing to fundamentally rethink the ACP framework.

A new development narrative

However, if the EU wishes to establish an equal partnership with Africa, one that goes beyond a colonial legacy and is a convincing alternative to the Chinese model, it not only needs to radically rethink this ACP framework, but also its development narrative. To adapt to a new world of great powers, a key question will be which development model Africa will follow in the decades to come. This requires a new development narrative that not only goes beyond altruistic or charity-driven support, which is fundamentally imbalanced, but also beyond a purely interest-driven geopolitical project^<20>. Instead, a truly reciprocal partnership should be aimed at, one that safeguards European interests without harming the interests of African states.

Concretely, for this to happen, the EU needs to question the Eurocentric, depoliticised and authoritarian tenets of its current development narrative and model^<21>. While once hegemonic, the Western model of development cannot claim to be morally superior in today’s multipolar world. Rather than claiming such superiority, which can be perceived as a continuation of a colonial civilising mission, the EU should refrain from prescribing interventions in African people’s lives that these people themselves may disapprove of. Not only does this run counter to democratic principles, but it also overestimates the appeal and feasibility of a Western economic growth model that is based on unprecedented exploitation of nature and highly individualised consumerism.

The EU needs to question the Eurocentric, depoliticised and authoritarian tenets of its current development narrative and model.

Negative conditionality, dubious from a point of view of joint ownership and democracy, no longer works at a time when recipient countries have other alternative sources of unconditional support (for instance, aid from China)^<22>. Rather than conditioning development aid to achieve political and economic change, the EU should put forward a convincing external agenda underpinned by its “egalitarian aspiration”^<23>. Fostering socioeconomic equality and dignity — as most European welfare states attempt to do — is a less arrogant and more credible way to build equal partnerships with external partners (elites and civil society alike), yet one that can lead to democracy in the longer term as substantive social equality is a prerequisite for political democracy. Most importantly, such an egalitarian model respects the political and economic sovereignty of third countries or continents — indispensable if one wishes to build an equal partnership — while also contributing to the EU’s own interest in stability in its neighbourhood and beyond.

Table 1: Current development praxis vs. alternative egalitarian model

Model	Development cooperation	External agenda based on egalitarian aspiration
Narrative	Developing the Global South	Achieving global social equality and dignity
Characteristics	Depoliticising: poverty as a technical problem	Politicised: acknowledges power relations between global North and Global South, rooted in (neo-) colonialism
	Eurocentric: Europe as ideal and superior model	Multipolar: adapted to plurality of powers
	Authoritarian: imposes interventions (geared towards free trade and liberal democracy) through aid conditionality	Democratic: without political and economic conditionality yet based on joint commitment to socio-economic equality
Relationship	Donor-recipient relation without reciprocity	Equal partnership based on reciprocity

Source: Author’s own

There are several ways in which the EU can credibly put forward this egalitarian aspiration in its relations with Africa, while dismantling the problematic Eurocentric, depoliticising and authoritarian tenets of its current development narrative. One is taking the global lead in cancelling (not just suspending) Africa’s debt, by assertively pursuing the current commitment for “coordinated international debt relief efforts,” as outlined in the European Council conclusions in June 2020^<24>. As Africa’s debt crisis can be traced to the colonial era when major foreign trade defects, high export dependence and high concentration on a few commodities started to characterise the continent’s economy, the EU has a historical responsibility to help Africa get rid of this suffocating debt trap^<25>. If they want to achieve social equality, African governments should be able to invest in education, health and the economy, rather than having to prioritise debt repayment.

The EU has a historical responsibility to help Africa get rid of this suffocating debt trap.

Second, the EU and its member states need to foster a fairer global economic trading system. The development of Europe has gone hand-in-hand with the underdevelopment of the Global South. Today’s global economy perpetuates this underdevelopment through global supply chains that rely on cheap labour and environmental exploitation. To address these problems, at the very least, concrete proposals that address tax evasion and avoidance by European companies operating in Africa should be included in the EU’s new Africa Strategy. Overall, Africa loses US$ 50 billion a year in illicit financial flows, which is much higher than the ODA flowing to the continent^<26>. If they want to build fairer societies and eradicate poverty, African governments need to be able to collect taxes from foreign companies.

Thirdly, as today’s world consists of a multiplicity of regional powers, there is an urgent need to democratise the major institutions of global governance — the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, the World Trade Organisation (WTO) — so they become less Eurocentric^<27>. In fact, such reforms are a prerequisite for a real multilateralism that the EU seeks to foster. For the IMF and World Bank, this would require reallocating voting power beyond the 2016 voting reforms (because now, middle- and low-income countries, which together constitute some 85 percent of the world’s population, have only about 40 percent of the vote^<28>); for the WTO this requires levelling the playing field for all members through, for example, more transparency^<29>. With the historic agreement being that the IMF and World Bank are ruled by a European and US national respectively, the EU and its member states should play a role in making global economic governance more democratic. For African societies to pursue the egalitarian aspiration, they need to be able to have an equal say about the conditions and conditionalities attached to development support by international financial institutions.

While the EU generally hides behind the fact that only seven member states used to have colonies, which in fact erases from the story that European integration in itself was deeply embedded in colonial history, it will have to address the colonial tenets of its development practice if it wishes to compete with China.

Finally, a fundamental rethinking of the EU’s development practice and narrative is timelier and more necessary amid the Black Lives Matter (BLM) protests. While the EU has, at last, started to address the problem of ‘Brussels so white’ by pledging to hire more people from racial minorities in the institutions, there has so far not been an open discussion about the impact of BLM on the EU’s external action and attitudes towards Africa, let alone about colonial reparations^<30>. While the EU generally hides behind the fact that only seven member states used to have colonies, which in fact erases from the story that European integration in itself was deeply embedded in colonial history^<31>, it will have to address the colonial tenets of its development practice if it wishes to compete with China. While China can sell its own success story as a developmental model, the EU will first need to acknowledge that its own development only took place thanks to the exploitation of former colonies. Until it fully acknowledges this fact and adapts its development narrative accordingly, the EU will be unable to develop a partnership of equals with Africa.

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Endnotes

^<1> Harry Truman, “Inaugural Address” (speech, Washington DC, 20 January 1949), Avalon Project, Yale Law School.

^<2> Truman, “Inaugural Address”

^<3> Aram Ziai, Development discourse and global history: From colonialism to the sustainable development goals (New York: Routledge, 2016), pp. 27-35.

^<4> Jason Hickel, The divide: A brief guide to global inequality and its solutions (London: Windmill Books, 2017), pp. 30.

^<5> Walter Rodney, How Europe underdeveloped Africa (UK: Bogle-L’Ouverture Publications, 1972).

^<6> Philip Alston, The parlous state of poverty eradication, Human Rights Council (44th session), 2 July 2020: 3-9.

^<7> Ha-Joon Chang, “Only Protection Can Build Developing Economies,” Global Policy Forum, August 2003.

^<8> Marina Rudyak, “Chinese aid and South-South cooperation” (interview, In pursuit of development podcast by Dan Banik, 8 July 2020).

^<9> Axel Dreher et al., “Political bias and the economic impact of Chinese aid,” Vox EU, 7 October 2019.

^<10> Lina Benabdallah, “China’s competitive advantage in Africa” (interview, The China in Africa Podcast by Erik Olander and Cobus van Staden, 29 July 2020).

^<11> Mogopodi Lekorwe et al., “China’s growing presence in Africa wins largely positive popular reviews,” Afrobarometer Dispatch n° 122, 24 October 2016.

^<12> European Commission, Joint communication to the EP and the Council: Towards a comprehensive Strategy with Africa, Brussels, European Commission, 9 March 2020.

^<13> Tsion Tadesse Abebe and Hafsa Maalim, “Il faut redéfinir le partenariat Afrique-UE, et le faire sur un pied d’égalité,” Le Monde, 28 July 2020.

^<14> ACP-EEC, Convention of Lomé, ACP-EEC, 28 February 1975.

^<15> Peo Hansen and Stefan Jonsson, Eurafrica: The untold history of European integration and colonialism (London: Bloomsbury, 2016), pp. 256.

^<16> Benjamin Fox, “EU-Africa relations in post-Covid world,” Euractiv, 12 June 2020; Angelos Sepos, "Imperial power Europe? The EU’s relations with the ACP countries," Journal of Political Power 6, no. 2 (2013): 261-287.

^<17> G. Olivier, “From Colonialism to Partnership in Africa–Europe Relations?” The International Spectator, 46(1) (2011): 53-67; Concord, The future of the Cotonou Agreement, Concord, July 2017.

^<18> Antoine Bouët, David Laborde, and Fousseini Traoré, "The European Union–West Africa Economic Partnership Agreement: Small impact and new questions," The Journal of International Trade & Economic Development 27, no. 1 (2018): 25-53.

^<19> Alfonso Medinilla and Jean Bossuyt, “Africa-EU relations post-Cotonou," ECDPM, March 2019.

^<20> Sara Delputte and Simon Lightfoot, “Three ways of looking at the EU’s development policy,” EADI/ISS Blog Series, 13 December 2019.

^<21> Ziai, Development discourse and global history, pp. 54-69

^<22> Steven Blockmans, The Obsolescence of the European Neighbourhood Policy (Brussels: CEPS Paperback, 2017), pp. 25; Xiaojun Li, "Does conditionality still work? China’s development assistance and democracy in Africa," Chinese Political Science Review 2, no. 2 (2017): 201-220.

^<23> Steven Biscop, Make Europe great again: een nieuwe toekomst voor de oude grootmacht (Belgium: Lannoo, 2017).

^<24> Loes Debuysere, “Why the EU should take the global lead in cancelling Africa’s debt,” CEPS Commentary, 16 April 2020; “Africa – Council Conclusions,” Council of the European Union, 30 June 2020.

^<25> J. Shola Omotola and Hassan Saliu, "Foreign aid, debt relief and Africa's development: problems and prospects," South African Journal of International Affairs 16, no. 1 (2009): 87-102.

^<26> Isabelle Brachet and Buba Khan, “EU’s new EU Strategy misses the mark,” EU Observer, 12 March 2020.

^<27> Shashi Tharoor and Samir Saran, The world disorder and the Indian Imperative (New Delhi: Aleph Book Company, 2020).

^<28> Jason Hickel, “The global governance system,” Jason Hickel Blog, 16 October 2019.

^<29> Hickel, The Divide, 262-263

^<30> Andrew Rettman, “Von der Leyen keen to hire more black officials,” EU Observer, 29 July 2020.

^<31> Hansen and Jonsson, Eurafrica, 239-278

• Development
• Development Partnerships
• Africa
• European Union
• African Union
• Chinese investment
• Debt trap
• Eurocentric
• south-south cooperation

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