Post-Hasina, Bangladesh is at risk of the military being drawn once again into the country’s everyday administration.
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On 17 August 2025, Bangladesh’s Army Chief General Waqar Uz Zaman, in a strongly symbolic message, recapitulated the importance of upholding secularism in Bangladesh and underscored the military’s role in upholding peace and plurality. This development comes amidst a worsening law and order situation and attacks on minorities. In fact, in May 2025, General Zaman had expressed his dissatisfaction by calling for the transfer of power to an elected government. Over the past 15 years, political stability enabled the military to transition into a more professional institution. However, recent events have increased the risk of the military being dragged into the everyday administration of Bangladesh. With the elections now scheduled to be held in February 2026, the military is keenly observing the political space.
Bangladesh, since its creation, has been largely influenced by Pakistan’s culture of military intervention in politics, often under the pretext of promoting stability and sovereignty. Weak democratic institutions and a deeply factionalised military marked by competing ideologies have contributed to political instability and coups in Bangladesh. In the past, the country’s leaders have, at personal risk, designed various mechanisms to control or keep the institution in check.
Weak democratic institutions and a deeply factionalised military marked by competing ideologies have contributed to political instability and coups in Bangladesh.
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the father of the nation, pursued this objective by accommodating freedom fighters in the military and empowering Mujib Bahini, a paramilitary force. In August 1975, he was assassinated by a group of junior officers, partly due to his closeness to India and tensions with the military, leading to the first military intervention in the country. In November 1975, Brigadier General Khaled Mosharraf launched a countercoup to restore order in the military. Accused of being pro-India and pro-Mujib, he was ousted and assassinated by socialist elements within the military.
Amidst the turmoil, General Zia-Ur-Rahman swiftly rose from Chief of Army Staff to President, making him the first military ruler. To further his legitimacy, he founded the Bangladesh National Party (BNP) in 1978. A former Pakistani officer himself, he helped other fellow former Pakistani officers rise to power. His tenure saw multiple coup attempts, to which he responded by orchestrating assassinations of soldiers, suppressing opposition, and attempting to oust socialist elements from the military. Yet, he failed to unify the institution. In 1981, a group of officers claimed his life during a coup attempt.
H.M. Ershad, the Chief of Army Staff, swiftly put down the rebellion. Yet, growing divisions within the ruling party and weakened civilian leadership helped the military play a crucial role in the administration. As differences with civilian leadership grew, Ershad led a coup in 1982, replacing the civilian leadership. To foster legitimacy, he created the Jatiya Party in 1986, but struggled to manage rivalries within the army, especially with Zia loyalists.
Furthermore, increased rivalry between Sheikh Hasina of the Awami League and Khaleda Zia of the BNP promoted healthy political competition, strengthened civilian leadership, and pressured Ershad to restore democracy. International pressure from India and the West further supported this transition. A 1991 constitutional amendment embraced the parliamentary system, reducing the scope for the military to intervene. Elected governments have also institutionalised factionalism within the military for their own benefit. On its part, following 15 years of bloodshed, the military wanted to avoid further involvement in domestic politics, as it had triggered unrest in the country and division within the institution.
After a brief two-year military rule (2007-2009), Hasina returned to power in 2009. The same year, the Bangladesh Rifles (BDR) mutinied, partly over salary and living conditions, and partly due to resentment of Hasina's brand of secular politics and close ties with India. It was believed that BDR’s ranks had "extreme religious views" and maintained an alliance with the extremist organisation Hizb ut-Tahrir. Several cadres from the hardline Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) were recruited into the BDR during the BNP-JI coalition government (2001-2006).
The caretaker government has altered the civil-military equation in two ways. One, division within the military is steadily growing again.
During the mutiny, Hasina chose a political solution over a military one. She met the victims and used forces under the Ministry of Home Affairs (rather than the Defence Ministry) to put down the mutiny. This reduced bloodshed and deep divisions within the army. Similarly, India’s support for Hasina during this crisis emboldened her approach with the army. Following the BDR mutiny, Hasina orchestrated a new equilibrium with the military that lasted for almost 15 years, until her ouster.
Hasina thrived on the divisions within the military, employing a ‘carrot and stick’ policy. Within military ranks, favouritism was at its peak; promotions were granted through "note sheet promotions," bypassing traditional board evaluations. General Zaman, reportedly a relative of Hasina, was appointed army chief. Sheikh Hasina appeased the military by massively expanding it, and ‘spoiled’ the institution with an expanded budget, new equipment, and contracts. The government also turned a blind eye to the army’s trafficking networks and rampant corruption.
At the same time, Hasina disempowered the military. In 2011, the government passed the 15th constitutional amendment, which nullified the provision for a caretaker government, citing the 2007 emergency when a military-backed caretaker administration had taken control of the electoral process. It also formed a tribunal in 2013, which sentenced hundreds of soldiers and former officers to death and life imprisonment for their role in the 2009 BDR mutiny. By banning or clamping down on Islamist parties and reducing cooperation with Pakistan, she also attempted to deter extremists from influencing the military.
This was reinforced through her government’s zero-tolerance for terrorism policy and the introduction of the Anti-Terrorism Law of 2009 and its subsequent amendments. Hasina also deployed the Rapid Action Battalion, under the Ministry of Home Affairs, to clamp down on opposition and dissent. This minimised the role of the military in domestic politics and helped the institution focus on defence and security.
As the 2024 nationwide protests began, the military carried out crackdowns against students and the general public. But as the popularity of the movement increased, it declined to support the government, fearing that further unrest and bloodshed could damage its image and entangle it in domestic politics. By convincing Hasina to step down and pushing for an interim government, the military was keen to avoid further instability and direct involvement in domestic politics.
Second, the military is now involved in domestic politics and maintaining law and order, leading to visible frustration.
However, the caretaker government has altered the civil-military equation in two ways. One, division within the military is steadily growing again. Media reports suggest that several officers with hardline Islamist leanings are being promoted to higher levels. Nearly 300 mutineers convicted of the 2009 mutiny were released. General Zaman has also announced that forces involved in disappearances, murder, and torture under Hasina’s regime will be investigated. Similarly, some personnel still supporting the Awami League have been apprehended for promoting unrest in the country. There is also the growing security and defence cooperation with Pakistan, which will likely embolden Islamists and anti-India officers. That said, the limited authority and lack of electoral legitimacy of the caretaker government have limited the extent of these changes.
Second, the military is now involved in domestic politics and maintaining law and order, leading to visible frustration. While the government has struggled to restore law and order on its own, it has also taken security-related decisions that have clashed with the military establishment, such as reported plans to establish a “humanitarian corridor” linking Chittagong with Myanmar’s Rakhine State. Islamists have also been emboldened, and clashes between students and political parties, as well as atrocities against minorities, have increased. Civil servants, teachers, and political activists are protesting against the government. The progress of reforms has been slow, and political parties differ on the nature and extent of reforms. Expressing his unhappiness, General Zaman asserted that “the army is meant for defending the nation, not for policing” and asked the government to conduct elections by the end of the year.
The country’s post-election future does not look bright either. The civilian leadership is as weakened as it was before the 1990s — with Sheikh Hasina and the Awami League out of the equation, and the ill-health of BNP’s chair, Khaleda Zia.
The country’s post-election future does not look bright either. The civilian leadership is as weakened as it was before the 1990s — with Sheikh Hasina and the Awami League out of the equation, and the ill-health of BNP’s chair, Khaleda Zia. Zia’s son and acting chair of BNP, Tarique Rahman, continues to reside in London with little relevance in the contemporary political setting. Other parties, including the National Citizen Party and JI, are too new or small, and lack the capacity or experience to fill the political vacuum. Their links to Islamist groups and extremists, and increasing mob violence in the country, risk setting a dangerous precedent.
Over the past 15 years, political stability enabled the military to transition into a more professional institution. But Hasina’s ouster has left a serious dent in the civil-military equation. While the military is focused on a smooth transition and returning to barracks, recent events have once again drawn it into the political sphere. Furthermore, increasing violence and unrest, the expanding presence of extremists, weak civilian leadership, and divisions within the army have heightened the risk of dragging the military into the everyday affairs of the country. How the military’s calculus changes in the coming days will largely depend on the outcome of the elections and the incoming government’s ability to promote stability and security.
Aditya Gowdara Shivamurthy is an Associate Fellow with the Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation.
Madhurima Pramanik was a Research Intern with the Observer Research Foundation.
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Aditya Gowdara Shivamurthy is an Associate Fellow with the Strategic Studies Programme’s Neighbourhood Studies Initiative. He focuses on strategic and security-related developments in the South Asian ...
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Madhurima Pramanik is an intern with ORF’s Strategic Studies Programme. Her works focus on political, strategic and security related developments in South Asia , with a ...
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