Amid Trump’s renewed burden-sharing demands, Japan recalibrates its alliance posture—balancing security dependence with growing calls for symmetrical reciprocity.
Image Source: STAN HONDA/staff Getty Images
Since returning to office on 20 January 2025, the United States (US) President Donald Trump has repeatedly criticised the 1960 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security as “one-sided,” arguing that while the US is obligated to defend Japan, Tokyo has no reciprocal duty to protect America. He frames this critique as a lever to pressure Tokyo into increasing its defence contributions and making broader trade concessions. The defence row overlaps with a parallel escalation in trade conflict and is strategically timed to gain bargaining power at the intersection of trade and security policies.
The ongoing strain in the US–Japan alliance, catalysed by President Trump’s renewed insistence on greater burden-sharing, has introduced a phase of recalibration rather than rupture. The moment reflects less about the breakdown of trust and more about the assertion of priorities on both sides. Japan is no longer passively positioned within the US alliance structure; it is actively reconsidering how to translate dependence into resilience. The challenge lies in managing this shift without perturbing the equilibrium that undergirds the Indo-Pacific security architecture.
Japan is no longer passively positioned within the US alliance structure; it is actively reconsidering how to translate dependence into resilience.
Furthermore, recent developments indicate enhanced pressure tactics. In June 2025, senior Pentagon official Elbridge Colby reportedly urged Japan to raise its defence spending to 3.5 percent of the Gross Domestic Product, up from its current ~1 percent and the previous US request of 3 percent. In response, Tokyo cancelled the 1 July 2025 annual security talks between the US and Japanese foreign and defence ministers—also known as the “2+2” meeting—signalling an unprecedented decision that reflects domestic political unease, especially ahead of the 20 July 2025 Upper House elections. Japanese officials perceive this elevated demand as excessive and fear it could erode public support, which is already divided. Trump warned of ramped-up tariffs if Tokyo disagrees to negotiate, including demands for rice imports from the US. These economic pressures stand to intensify distrust and point to a rocky four years for the alliance at best.
Nonetheless, in early July 2025, Tokyo signalled urgency in restarting ministerial-level trade dialogue, arranging talks between Japan’s tariff negotiator, Ryōsei Akazawa, and US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent during his visit to the Osaka World Expo. These meetings aim to address the planned 25 percent tariffs on Japanese goods—set to come into effect from 1 August 2025—and mark the first tariff discussions held in Japan instead of Washington, as was the case with the previous 7 rounds of negotiations. Prime Minister (PM) Ishiba emphasised that these negotiations are critical for securing a ‘mutually beneficial’ outcome ahead of the upper-house elections. While President Trump has indicated openness to delay the new tariffs beyond 1 August, if partners present acceptable offers, Akazawa has made it clear that Japan will not compromise its agricultural sector for the sake of a quick deal and highlighted that any agreement must include a resolution on the 25 percent automobile tariffs, considering their centrality in Japan’s export-driven economy.
Against the backdrop of these bilateral strains, Tokyo is actively diversifying its economic and security partnerships beyond Washington. Under PM Ishiba, Japan is engaging more closely with the European Union (EU), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) states (Malaysia, Indonesia), and Australia/India frameworks such as the Supply Chain Resilience Initiative. Concurrently, Japan is boosting its defence capabilities—deploying long-range missile systems on Kyushu and considering supporting Trump’s proposed ‘Golden Dome’ missile shield. These steps aim to strengthen deterrence and reduce over-reliance on US security guarantees. Japan is also doubling down on defence preparedness. It is investing in domestic defence infrastructure, including a ¥1 trillion (US$6.9 billion) ‘national dockyard’ plan to support the US Navy vessel repairs. Additionally, Tokyo is adopting long-range strike weaponry—such as Tomahawk cruise missiles—and advancing sea-based missile defences via Aegis-equipped vessels. These efforts signal its commitment to modernised deterrence, even as budget debates persist.
While the political leadership is cautious about matching budgetary increases to arbitrary GDP ratios—especially under electoral scrutiny—it is concurrently expanding the scope of its security posture.
Despite strained dialogue, operational integration continues: the US Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth recently announced the establishment of a ‘war-fighting’ US force command in Japan, designed to deepen coordination with the Japan Self-Defence Forces (JSDF). Meanwhile, Japan has formed its Joint Operations Command (JJOC), reinforcing interoperability just as the US commitment is being reaffirmed. Thus far, the alliance remains functionally robust despite political disagreements. The move aims to streamline joint military operations and strengthen Japan's readiness to respond swiftly to security contingencies, including those related to Taiwan and other regional flashpoints. It reflects the assessment in Tokyo that Japan is now operating in the most complex and severe security environment since World War II, driven by evolving geopolitical threats. The establishment of the JJOC is a critical step in Japan’s broader defence modernisation efforts, especially as it prepares for potential multi-domain challenges in an increasingly volatile Indo-Pacific.
Tokyo’s response to American pressure has not been one of uniform resistance, but rather a layered and calibrated approach. While the political leadership is cautious about matching budgetary increases to arbitrary GDP ratios—especially under electoral scrutiny—it is concurrently expanding the scope of its security posture. This includes elevating jointness within its Self-Defence Forces, investing in asymmetric and emerging technologies, and deepening defence-industrial cooperation with actors beyond the US. In that sense, Japan is not rejecting the burden-sharing premise, but redefining it on terms that better align with its domestic political constraints and strategic outlook.
The intensifying call in Japan for ‘symmetrical reciprocity’ in the alliance is not simply a reaction to Trump’s rhetoric; it is an outcome of sustained internal debate about Japan’s role in regional security.
In the lead-up to the 20 July 2025 House of Councillors election, Japan’s major political parties are emphasising the need to strengthen national defence. However, their positions differ on how much to increase defence spending. The government has outlined plans to allocate approximately ¥43 trillion (US$296 billion) between FY 2023 and 2027 to bolster Japan’s defence capabilities. This push is occurring alongside a broader objective to increase defence spending to 2 percent of GDP by FY 2027. Currently, defence outlays account for 1.8 percent of GDP in FY 2025, with the budget standing at a record-high ¥8.7 trillion (US$60 billion). Given the increasingly complex security environment in the Indo-Pacific, defence spending is expected to continue rising in the coming years. Nonetheless, political consensus on the scale and scope of these increases remains fragmented.
This signals a growing convergence between Japan’s national defence policy and broader Indo-Pacific stabilisation goals—one that is being pursued with a sense of ownership. The intensifying call in Japan for ‘symmetrical reciprocity’ in the alliance is not simply a reaction to Trump’s rhetoric; it is an outcome of sustained internal debate about Japan’s role in regional security. The cumulative impact of North Korea’s missile provocations, Chinese maritime assertiveness, and doubts about the consistency of US commitments has made diversification not a strategic luxury but a necessity.
While Japan may not immediately meet Washington’s numerical expectations, it is absorbing a larger share of regional security responsibility in more diffuse, networked ways.
Trump’s second term has thrust the US–Japan alliance into a complex strategic negotiation zone—trade tariffs, burden-sharing demands, which risks conflating financial contributions with strategic alignment. While Japan may not immediately meet Washington’s numerical expectations, it is absorbing a larger share of regional security responsibility in more diffuse, networked ways. By narrowing the metric of alliance value to dollars and percentages, Washington could undermine the very strategic coherence it seeks to reinforce.
The US–Japan partnership is being remade—not in the shadow of transactionalism—but in the contours of a multipolar Indo-Pacific, where shared interests must accommodate sovereign choices. The coming months will test how flexible the alliance architecture can be in absorbing this recalibration without eroding its strategic foundation.
Pratnashree Basu is an Associate Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation.
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Pratnashree Basu is an Associate Fellow with the Strategic Studies Programme. She covers the Indo-Pacific region, with a focus on Japan’s role in the region. ...
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