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As Bahrain navigates its ties with Iran, Trump’s return could shift the equation—will rapprochement persist, or will US pressure stall progress?
Image Source: Getty
This article is part of the series—Raisina Edit 2025
A concrete rapprochement between Iran and Bahrain would mean the recent regional ‘détente’ with Saudi Arabia would be complete. Indeed, Bahrain is the ‘missing link’ in this rapprochement between the Gulf States and Iran. Although the attack on the Saudi Arabian embassy in Tehran led Bahrain to cut ties with Iran in 2016, Bahrain-Iran relations have challenges of their own.
Between 2007 and 2010, a notable figure was the ambassador of Iran to the Kingdom of Bahrain, Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, who served as the Foreign Minister (FM) of Iran under former President Ebrahim Raisi. In May 2024, both he and Raisi died in a helicopter crash in Iran. Abdollahian was very familiar with Bahrain, considering he was one of the few Iranian ambassadors to Bahrain who did not have to be recalled to Iran during his tenure in the Kingdom. He was also perceived to have close relations with the main opposition group at the time, Al-Wefaq, who were in parliament until 2011 before leaving the institution and starting to operate clandestinely.
Although the attack on the Saudi Arabian embassy in Tehran led Bahrain to cut ties with Iran in 2016, Bahrain-Iran relations have challenges of their own.
Abdollahian’s time as FM did not yield any warming of relations between Iran and Bahrain despite this familiarity with the Kingdom. There were reportedly ‘secret talks’ between Iran and Bahrain in 2022–2023 in light of a ‘détente between Saudi Arabia and Iran. However, the only real indication that this was leading to anything was when an Iranian parliamentary delegation attended a global assembly in Manama in 2023. With the visit came Iranian hopes that “we should further trust the path of diplomacy and take steps in this direction,” per the Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman.
The most tangible hints of these ‘secret talks’ working was when a week before his death, Abdollahian spoke of his keenness to “enter a new phase” with the Gulf, adding, “We welcome the Bahraini government's action in starting the release of political prisoners and evaluate it positively both sides are considering further steps towards the normalisation of relations.” However, this may have only irritated Bahraini authorities as a further sign of interference in its domestic affairs.
Indeed, the Gulf Kingdom remains concerned about Iran’s alleged interference in its internal affairs. This is because of at least two reasons. First, the radicalised opposition groups of Bahrain now largely reside alongside Iranian proxies in Tehran, Lebanon and Iraq – believed to be supported by entities such as the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Second, Bahrain is wary of historic Iranian claims to Bahrain’s territory. For example, the editor of the most hardline Iranian daily, Kayhan, a direct appointee of the Iranian Supreme Leader Khamanei, charged in 2018 that Iran ‘owns’ Bahrain.
The radicalised opposition groups of Bahrain now largely reside alongside Iranian proxies in Tehran, Lebanon and Iraq – believed to be supported by entities such as the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).
Though Bahrain may be able to dismiss the second as empty rhetoric, the allegations of Iranian interference were compounded during and shortly after the unrest that Bahrain witnessed in the last decade. A piece by the Washington Institute in 2017 highlights several examples of a growing network of bomb making facilities and weapons stores that were discovered during those years, all seemingly attributed to Iran. Bahrain has also charged several prisoners of being trained by the IRGC to carry out attacks in Bahrain.
On the charge of hosting the allegedly radicalised opposition, Iran can hardly make a case against it. One figure, Sheikh Isa Qassim, a prominent cleric seen by all sides as the spiritual leader of the dissolved Al-Wefaq political society, lives in Iran after having had his citizenship revoked by Bahrain and regularly speaks against Bahrain. Moreover, the Deputy Secretary-General of Al-Wefaq has been pictured attending state ceremonies in Iran. Also, Murtadha al-Sanadi, a United States (US)-designated figure of the Islamic Wafa Party, is also believed to be residing in Iran. Even when Bahrain updated its terror list in 2025, it appears most Iranian-based individuals and entities remained, with at least one of them even being sanctioned by the US in the previous Trump administration.
The recent escalation between Iran and Israel may have led Bahrain to consider addressing the challenges to prioritise regional security. Bahrain reportedly joined other Gulf countries in promising neutrality during a meeting with Iran in Doha when the tit-for-tat attacks between Israel and Iran were underway last year. Aiding this, Iran today has a new foreign minister and a new government, which has seen successive signs of friendlier relations with Bahrain. The author argues this is possible now with Bahrain talking to diplomatic officials in Iran with no historical qualms with Bahrain.
Even when Bahrain updated its terror list in 2025, it appears most Iranian-based individuals and entities remained, with at least one of them even being sanctioned by the US in the previous Trump administration.
Case in point, when Abbas Araghchi, the first Iranian FM to visit Bahrain in 17 years did so in October 2024, he met with the King of Bahrain Hamad bin Isa Al-Khalifa, who Iranian media quoted as having spoken about good memories of his trip to Tehran in 2002 and meeting with the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, while reportedly expressing ‘hope’ that he would come to Tehran again. Still, this came a few days after Bahrain’s Council of Representatives strongly condemned statements made by Kamal Kharazi, head of Iran’s Strategic Council on Foreign Relations and former FM. Kharazi had mentioned the ‘separation’ of Bahrain from Iran in 1971, describing it as an ‘unforgivable betrayal’ by the former Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, based on what he called a ‘fake referendum’. Likely, this was not a statement forgiven by Bahrain but ignored temporarily due to other priorities.
Moreover, Iran itself holds Bahrain to great significance in regional standards due to Bahrain’s geographical proximity and people-to-people ties but also because Bahrain hosts the US fifth fleet and established normalised relations with Israel as part of the Trump-led Abrahamic Accords.
With Trump’s return comes a risk that Bahrain steers away from the recent prospects of rapprochement in the eyes of Iran. This is especially the case if President Trump seeks to capitalise on Bahrain’s unfixed ties with Iran in favour of supporting his ‘Maximum Pressure’ campaign on the Islamic Republic through pushing Bahrain to increase its participation in US-led security initiatives in the region. Trump will also inherit a Comprehensive Security Integration and Prosperity Agreement (C-SIPA) with Bahrain that President Biden’s administration signed, which it could utilise in this campaign against Iran. The campaign is most recently designed to ‘collapse’ Iran’s economy and slash Iran’s oil exports, per US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent. However, it will likely expand in scope in the coming months.
The campaign is most recently designed to ‘collapse’ Iran’s economy and slash Iran’s oil exports, per US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent.
Yet, it is also possible that Trump seeks to influence Bahrain to use the leverage of rapprochement with Iran as part of his diplomatic ambitions to secure a nuclear deal. Bahrain, like other Gulf countries, is also signaling its want for a more important role in key negotiations on the global and regional scale. Some Gulf countries also resisted the former nuclear deal with Obama for not being involved enough as mediators, with Oman as the only one involved per reports – causing a wave of surprise across the Gulf at the time. Bahrain could decide to strategically park its long-standing points of contention with Iran, which this article has highlighted, to play its small part in aiding US efforts for a nuclear deal and gain credit for this constructive role.
Mahdi Ghuloom is a Junior Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation (ORF) – Middle East.
The views expressed above belong to the author(s). ORF research and analyses now available on Telegram! Click here to access our curated content — blogs, longforms and interviews.
Mahdi Ghuloom is a Junior Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation (ORF) – Middle East. He focuses on the Gulf States, with an eye on ...
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