India can help Bangladesh overcome its overt dependence on China’s arms exports, while increased defence cooperation with Dhaka would ease New Delhi’s concerns over Beijing’s growing involvement in the region
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As the re-elected governments of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Bangladesh Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina begin their fresh term this year, speculation has been rife over the future of bilateral ties between these two countries that are considered each other’s closest ally in South Asia. The ‘Shared Vision for Future’, published soon after PM Hasina’s second visit to New Delhi in June, put this speculation to rest by clearly delineating purviews that would continue to be at the forefront of their bilateral ventures along with fresher domains in which collaboration would be emphasised. One such sector that will now be a highlight of the India-Bangladesh partnership is ‘defence industrial cooperation’. ‘Defence’ has not been one of the pillars of the India-Bangladesh partnership although New Delhi had been the first to sign a defence agreement with Dhaka in 1972. To understand its future prospects, it is thus essential to review the history of defence ties between the two nations and analyse the conditions that have made it necessary to revive cooperation in this sector.
India's military support to Bangladesh dates back to 1971 when Bangladesh, then East Pakistan, fought a war of liberation against the oppressive West Pakistan regime, to secure its independence. Soon after, in 1972, Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman signed the Treaty of Friendship and Peace with the then-Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. Although inclusive of economic and security issues, it was essentially a defence pact because of the important provisions undertaken in this sector. By it, the two countries agreed to refrain from entering into any military alliance against one another, abstain from mutual aggression, restrict the use of their territory against the other, and jointly deal with a third country that threatened either of their security.
India's military support to Bangladesh dates back to 1971 when Bangladesh, then East Pakistan, fought a war of liberation against the oppressive West Pakistan regime, to secure its independence.
However, the Treaty had been signed in Bangladesh’s moment of crisis, when Mujib faced the challenge of having to reconstruct a war-torn and politically-isolated nation. He thus sought to retain a faction of the Indian army in Bangladesh for help. Unfortunately, the plan backfired as sections of Bangladeshi society became apprehensive of the continued presence of a foreign army on their soil, and its armed forces felt that the Treaty undermined their importance. The Indian Army was thus withdrawn and with the assassination of Mujib in 1975, the dynamics of the India-Bangladesh bilateral transformed. The military regimes that subsequently governed Dhaka were intent on disorienting Bangladesh from India. In 1997 the Treaty collapsed with the end of its 25-year validity.
The Bangladesh Nationalist Party regime that came to power in 2001 further alienated New Delhi. It was not until a decade later, in 2007, that the possibility of a defence partnership was revived with the visit of the Bangladesh military-backed caretaker government leader Gen. Moeen U. Ahmed to India. In the interim years, the Bangladesh Army too had changed, as many of the older cadets with their values inherited from Pakistani training retired and were replaced with nationalistic and indigenously-trained soldiers who were more open to India in their outlook.
The Bangladesh Nationalist Party regime that came to power in 2001 further alienated New Delhi. It was not until a decade later, in 2007, that the possibility of a defence partnership was revived with the visit of the Bangladesh military-backed caretaker government leader Gen. Moeen U. Ahmed to India.
The return of the Awami League to power in 2009 spelt a fresh start for defence cooperation, with PM Hasina committed to addressing India’s long-standing request of countering insurgent groups who had found shelter in Bangladesh and were creating disturbances across the border in India’s Northeastern territories. Dhaka also suffered from terrorist activities. Consequently, her government implemented a ‘Zero Tolerance’ Policy towards terrorism, making multiple arrests and reducing the threat substantially. Counter-terrorism thus formed the bedrock of modern India-Bangladesh defence cooperation and was selected as the purview for joint military exercises between the two countries. Exercise ‘Sampriti’ began in 2011 and its 11th edition was held in 2023.
The amicability that was restored in India-Bangladesh relations with PM Hasina’s return to power led to the settlement of long-standing land and maritime boundary disputes in 2014 and 2015 respectively, paving the way for further defence cooperation. India was intent on securing its defence ties with Dhaka through a structured and institutionalised pact as it was conscious of Bangladesh’s growing rapport with China and its purchase of two Ming-class submarines in 2013. Hence, New Delhi proposed a comprehensive defence partnership agreement during PM Hasina’s 2017 visit. However, the lingering mistrust cultivated by past regimes fuelled apprehensions in Bangladesh that this agreement would restrict its strategic autonomy and be an infringement on its sovereignty. Dhaka also harboured inhibitions that this deal would not augur well with Beijing, its largest defence partner. Thus, a middle path true to Bangladesh’s policy of maintaining a ‘diplomacy of balance’ between India and China was chosen, and five MoUs were signed with India instead of an agreement in 2017. These MoUs were on the framework for defence cooperation; for enhancing cooperation in the field of strategic operational studies; for enhancing cooperation in strategic studies; for extending a line of credit worth US$ 500 million for the purchase of defence equipment; and for cooperation between the coast guards of the two countries. While the MoUs covered an expansive ground, unlike agreements, they were not legally binding. This revealed that while both nations were keen to strengthen defence ties, they were only ready to take small steps.
Recently, however, three factors have converged to create a significant opportunity for India and Bangladesh to strengthen their defence cooperation.
Dents in the Dragon’s armory
Following the signing of the 2002 Bangladeshi-China Defence Cooperation agreement, around 72 per cent of Bangladesh’s military hardware is supplied by Beijing. These include sophisticated corvettes, Short Range Surface Air Missiles (SRSAM), VT5 light tanks, Ming-class submarines, light arms, interceptor jets, radars and frigates. China has also constructed Bangladesh’s first submarine base ‘BNS Sheikh Hasina’ in Cox’s Bazar. However, in recent years, there has been a growing concern in Dhaka over the quality of Chinese arms imports, with the Bangladesh Air Force expressing their dissatisfaction and the Bangladesh Navy facing challenges in maintaining the missile system purchased from China. The Army has also faced difficulties with the radar in the Chinese-provided SRSAM systems. Beijing has zero conditions on its arms exports to Dhaka but the suboptimal quality of weapons received indicates the hidden costs in buying them, such as the need for Chinese maintenance, and continued dependence on Beijing for spare parts along with equipment shortages. Naturally, this has made Bangladesh apprehensive of the Chinese arms supply, with Beijing’s offer to build a Missile Maintenance Facility inside Bangladesh reportedly being rejected. The first Sino-Bangladesh joint military exercise scheduled for May 2024 has also been postponed indefinitely. This has made it necessary for Dhaka to explore alternate sources of arms supply.
An unstable neighbourhood
The growing turbulence in neighbouring Myanmar has also made it necessary for Bangladesh to bolster its defence capacity. Increasing clashes between the Ethnic Armed Organisation (EAO) and the junta government in Myanmar have occasionally spilt into Bangladeshi territory, threatening to jeopardise peace in the latter’s Chittagong Hill Tracts. Furthermore, the EAO is aligned with China but has a complicated relationship with Bangladesh, which has made it even more necessary for Dhaka to strengthen its defence posture along the international boundary and diversify its defence cooperation.
National aspirations
Bangladesh, in its quest for development, has undertaken the ‘Forces Goal 2030,’ by which it seeks to modernise its military infrastructure. As a result, Dhaka is pursuing cooperation in this sector with a variety of partners including Russia, Turkey, and France. However, the ongoing conflict in Ukraine has diverted Western nations' arms supplies to Kyiv, while Russia is focusing on replenishing its own arsenal. The United States would have been a viable source but with the high cost of its weaponry and its criticism of Dhaka’s electoral process last year, the prospects are bleak.
Bangladesh, in its quest for development, has undertaken the ‘Forces Goal 2030,’ by which it seeks to modernise its military infrastructure. As a result, Dhaka is pursuing cooperation in this sector with a variety of partners including Russia, Turkey, and France.
Under such circumstances, India has emerged as a reliable and viable alternative for Bangladesh's military hardware needs, making their defence industrial partnership a strategic imperative. India has one of the largest Defence Industrial Bases and can provide Bangladesh with defence products ranging from Tejas Fighters to Akash SAM. It can help Bangladesh overcome its overt dependence on China’s arms exports while increased defence cooperation with Dhaka would ease New Delhi’s concerns over Beijing’s growing involvement in Bangladesh. The two countries also share the challenge of instability in the neighbourhood, and have an aligned vision of growth and development, making defence cooperation necessary. India and Bangladesh had already signed an agreement on UN Peacekeeping Training in 2023, a service for which both countries are internationally recognised. In 2024, Indian Air Force Chief Vivek Ram Chaudhari also assured PM Hasina of India’s support for improving the capability of Bangladesh’s Air Force and exhibitions like the Seminar on Indian Defence Equipment have been held to promote the export of Indian indigenous arms in Bangladesh. As Bangladesh Foreign Minister Hasan Mahmud stated in February 2024, “…we do have defence purchases from India and shall have defence purchases from India.” Defence industrial cooperation is therefore poised to elevate the India-Bangladesh partnership further in the near future.
Sohini Bose is an Associate Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation.
Khandakar Tahmid Rezwan is a Research Data Analyst at the Bangladesh Peace Observatory under the Centre for Alternatives (CA).
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Sohini Bose is an Associate Fellow at Observer Research Foundation (ORF), Kolkata with the Strategic Studies Programme. Her area of research is India’s eastern maritime ...
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Khandakar Tahmid Rezwan is a Research Data Analyst at the Bangladesh Peace Observatory under the Centre for Alternatives (CA) and previously was a Research Associate-STT ...
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