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Trillion-dollar deals and strategic resets: the Arab world finds fresh footing in Washington’s shifting Middle East priorities.
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The United States (US) President Donald Trump’s first international visit as the world’s most powerful man was to the Middle East—a break from tradition, as American presidents have historically chosen Europe, more specifically the United Kingdom (UK), as their first foreign port of call. This time, however, it was Riyadh that won the lottery, as Arab powers such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) courted Trump with trillion-dollar deals.
After years of tensions and fractures among the Gulf states, there now appears to be some semblance of cohesion in what the region seeks to achieve geopolitically—even with former foes. Trump’s speech in Riyadh partly exemplified why these reconciliatory shifts are taking place. In this speech, he declared that the Middle East was entering an era defined by “commerce, not chaos”, where the region would be known for exporting technology rather than terrorism. He further added that America, under his leadership, would not preach or give lectures—emphasising that the successes of Abu Dhabi and Riyadh were not products of the Pax-Americana worldview pushed by neocons and so-called ‘nation builders’ who spent trillions in Afghanistan and Iraq, and yet failed to foster sustainable development. “In the end, the so-called nation builders wrecked far more nations than they built,” he remarked, much to the delight of those in attendance.
The United States (US) President Donald Trump’s first international visi as the world’s most powerful man was to the Middle East—a break from tradition, as American presidents have historically chosen Europe, more specifically the United Kingdom (UK), as their first foreign port of call.
This revised White House perspective of the region is seen by regional powers as an opportunity to consolidate positions in a manner where conflict is minimised. This includes bringing historically estranged countries such as Saudi Arabia and Qatar, with the former installing an economic blockade against the latter for almost half a decade over geopolitical disagreements, closer and becoming more cooperative. In Syria, with the fall of Bashar al-Assad and the rise of former Al-Qaeda (AQ) jihadist Ahmed al-Sharaa as interim leader, Doha and Riyadh are collaborating to stabilise the embattled state’s economy and public services. The Saudis have also normalised their diplomatic ties with Iran, reducing the likelihood of a direct Saudi–Iran conflict. This shifts the primary crisis points in the region, specifically between Iran and Israel. Riyadh is now positioning itself as a neutral kinetic power in the broader Tehran–Tel Aviv equation while maintaining its political stance on core issues such as Palestine and the war in Gaza.
Even Türkiye—under President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who often challenges Saudi Arabia’s leadership within Sunni Islam—is working in concert with Riyadh to stabilise Syria. During Trump’s pathbreaking meeting with al-Sharaa, who belonged to a group (AQ) that the US fought for over the decades after 9/11, Erdogan also joined via teleconference. Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MbS) urged Trump to act, aligning it with the announcement of trillion-dollar Saudi investments in the US. For businessman Trump, this was a relatively inconsequential price to pay; he agreed to ease sanctions against Damascus, following the blueprint as promoted by MbS.
The dash to secure Syria’s sovereignty remains critical. The Arab state has been a consequential player and power in the region for a long time. Following the fall of Assad, it is not a priority for the US to prevent Iran, Russia, and China from reinstating/regaining their influence, which they had built and have now lost. This was delivered by MbS, collaborating across the board to make sure his regional partners, who also have stakes in the Syrian future, can address their security concerns. For example, Türkiye moved to dismantle Kurdish militant movements such as the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), which has been designated as a terror group by many. The PKK announced it would lay down arms and disband after a 40-year insurgency. Al-Sharaa, formerly the leader of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, had previously been useful to the Turks in curbing Kurdish dominance in northern Syria. His first two trips abroad as interim president were to Riyadh and Ankara.
Meanwhile, Trump’s negotiations with Iran on its nuclear programme faced little pushback from Arab powers. Unlike the 2013–2015 negotiations that led to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), between Tehran and the P5+1 group of states—which Saudi Arabia had opposed—Riyadh is now more receptive. It is even leveraging Trump’s policy vis-à-vis Iran to negotiate a potential civil nuclear arrangement for itself. The Saudis reportedly even pushed Iran to finalise such an agreement swiftly, to avoid potential Israeli airstrikes on its nuclear facilities.
Trump’s negotiations with Iran on its nuclear programme faced little pushback from Arab powers. Unlike the 2013–2015 negotiations that led to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), between Tehran and the P5+1 group of states—which Saudi Arabia had opposed—Riyadh is now more receptive.
This finally brings Israel’s position in the strategic kerfuffle that the Middle East more often delivers. Israel’s Prime Minister (PM) Benjamin Netanyahu, who openly supported Trump’s candidature in the 2024 elections, is now witnessing the limitations of that relationship. While Trump has backed Netanyahu in the war against Hamas in Gaza and prioritised the return of hostages, on issues such as Iran and the Houthis in Yemen, Trump has promoted dialogue over military action—leaving Netanyahu somewhat constrained.
Today’s Washington lacks a clear long-term strategy for the Middle East. It is driven more by personality than policy. While Trump has articulated broad intentions to maintain the fundamentals of American presence and assuage fears that monarchies in the region may not have American protection anymore to preserve their political positions, the US is rapidly divesting from the region’s security architecture. Ironically, this is pushing Gulf powers toward strategic autonomy and multi-alignment—not out of desperation, but as a response to new opportunities and incentives.
The final question remains: how long will these alliances of convenience in the Middle East last? The tradition of Gulf powers undercutting each other’s influence in Washington may be witnessing a temporary moment of union. This is driven by the recognition that traditional interventionism in the US foreign policy is fading. However, Washington cannot fully detach, including from military-first strategies as seen by the continuing anti-ISIS operations and the operations taking place in the Red Sea. As the old proverb goes, “the Middle East is like a feast; you’re either on the guest list or on the menu. It’s easy to fall off the guest list, but it’s hard to get off the menu.” Despite Trump, the US remains the main course in this proverbial meal.
Kabir Taneja is a Deputy Director and Fellow with the Strategic Studies programme at the Observer Research Foundation.
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Kabir Taneja is a Deputy Director and Fellow, Middle East, with the Strategic Studies programme. His research focuses on India’s relations with the Middle East ...
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