America Resumes Nuclear Testing: Implications for India

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The United States (US) President Donald Trump ordered the US military to resume nuclear testing. Albeit a surprise in some quarters, the announcement appears consistent with the policies of Trump’s first administration. Indeed, the first Trump Administration dabbled momentarily with resuming testing. Among the explicitly stated reasons for the resumption in nuclear testing lies Washington’s need to sustain and maintain the reliability and performance of the American nuclear arsenal. US Vice President J.D. Vance said while observing, “It is an important part of American national security to make sure that this nuclear arsenal we have actually functions properly, and that’s part of a testing regime.” Although Washington has not conducted a nuclear test since 1992, concerns surrounding reliability appear far-fetched given its advanced capabilities in computer-simulated testing, hydro-nuclear testing, and sub-critical testing in laboratory-enabled environments. These tests are significantly derived from test data accumulated from over 1,000 “hot” nuclear tests the US conducted until 1992.

It is an important part of American national security to make sure that this nuclear arsenal we have actually functions properly, and that’s part of a testing regime.

It is plausible and accurate to conclude that the US wants to maintain a qualitative edge for its arsenal to validate new atomic device designs by resuming ‘hot’ testing. For instance, the US Department of Energy (DoE)’s National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) developed the first B61-13 gravity bomb by May 2025, a year ahead of schedule and under two years after its manufacture was first announced. This is among the first of the newly developed bomb designs that is likely to be tested. Although it incorporates several features of its predecessor, the B61-12—such as its advanced safety, security, and accuracy—the B61-13 produces a higher yield to penetrate hardened targets and covers a larger geographic area. It is one among seven new devices as part of the “warhead modernisation programme” being pursued by the NNSA. Nonetheless, at this stage, it is unclear from the available evidence if it will be tested as part of the testing programme announced by President Trump. Yet, it is not the only device that could be tested. Since it is one of seven bomb development programmes, the two parallel programmes the NNSA is pursuing must be considered, notably the Life Extension Programme (LEP) and the Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) programme. Under the NNSA’s LEP, the Last Production Unit (LPU) for the B61-12 gravity bomb was completed quickly in December 2024, just as the second Trump Administration was transitioning into power. This reflects a cross-party consensus on modernising the American nuclear arsenal, especially when Trump, in his second term, has diverged from his predecessors over actual testing.

Furthermore, the RRW programme is dedicated to the development of new warhead designs, whereas the LEP seeks to improve, upgrade, and enhance the reliability of existing warhead designs. Inevitably, the RRW programme will mandate testing because strategic and force planners from the US military and the other four designated Nuclear Weapons States (NWS) are likely to do the same. Since new designs under the RRW will require validation through ‘hot’ testing, the Trump Administration’s decision to order a renewed round of atomic testing is entirely explicable. In any case, as noted earlier, Trump’s decision to resume testing was considered in his first term. Furthermore, the Chinese have been fairly active in testing at least their existing nuclear warhead designs through sub-critical tests and preparing their Lop Nur nuclear test site for ‘hot’ testing for new designs.  Consequently, some Indian commentators have misleadingly concluded that Trump’s recent announcement to break the 30-year American moratorium on atomic testing will produce a cascading effect that will be exploited as an “alibi” by Beijing and Moscow to conduct their own tests. If anything, the reverse is equally valid in that Washington sees evidence of Beijing’s nuclear test preparations at Lop Nur as a rationale to conduct its own nuclear tests.

The RRW programme is dedicated to the development of new warhead designs, whereas the LEP seeks to improve, upgrade, and enhance the reliability of existing warhead designs.

Implications for India

In terms of the supposed implications, New Delhi faces unenviable and difficult choices laden with risks and costs. Breaking the indefinite moratorium on nuclear testing that the Atal Bihari Vajpayee government announced following the atomic tests of 1998 comprises only a part of this quandary. The sanctions that ensued and the nuclear dialogue between Strobe Talbott and Jaswant Singh under the Clinton Administration continued into the George W. Bush Administration, culminating in the India-US nuclear deal in 2005. After this, the 123 Agreement between the US and India was negotiated, and in 2008, the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) granted a clean waiver that would facilitate New Delhi’s access to nuclear fuel, technology, and commerce. Certainly, the 123 Agreement leaves little room for India to carry out additional tests. However, with New Delhi viewing it as a necessary sovereign choice exercised under exigent circumstances, the NSG, if not all of India’s nuclear partners, can also perceive India’s renewed round of nuclear tests as a violation of the 123 Agreement and the NSG waiver, prompting the imposition of sanctions. The consequences are likely to be substantial, especially in the face of the Modi government’s decision to open the nuclear energy sector to private sector investment and development. Moreover, if India were compelled to break its moratorium on testing, it would have to contend with a mercurial Trump Administration that has already imposed a 50 percent tariff against India. With both Washington and New Delhi engaged in trade negotiations that are delicately poised, India may be compelled to withhold the possibility of testing. This is not to imply that India should never revisit or reconsider its test moratorium. Rather, for purely tactical reasons, it is wiser to defer a decision of this scale irrespective of what the US or China do.

Kartik Bommakanti is a Senior Fellow at the Strategic Studies Programme, Observer Research Foundation

• International Affairs
• Nuclear Security
• India
• USA and Canada
• B61 nuclear bomb
• indo us civil nuclear agreement
• national nuclear security administration
• rrw program usa
• us nuclear arsenal
• us nuclear policy under trump
• us nuclear test
• us nuclear weapon testing
• us nuclear weapons
• us nuclear weapons stockpile

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