AI Influences on Strategic Stability in the New Nuclear Age

The varying integration of emerging technologies with applicability ranging from an enabling role to specific weapon systems is blurring the distinction between the conventional and nuclear domains of strategy. It is a defining characteristic of the new nuclear age. The adoption of artificial intelligence (AI) by the United States (US), Russia, and China—locked in a tripolar arms race—is influencing the dynamics of strategic stability. AI incorporation in the nuclear domain, particularly in the nuclear command, control, and communication (NC3) architecture, as well as non-nuclear strategic weapons (NNSWs), creates new vulnerabilities and challenges for nuclear-armed states. The vulnerability of AI-integrated systems to cyber-attacks, a non-nuclear electromagnetic pulse-based attack, or an AI-enabled hypersonic missile creates serious incentives for states to pre-empt adversaries and pursue an intense arms race for enhanced deterrence. The degree and extent of AI integration in both nuclear and non-nuclear systems is critical, as it will influence the elements of strategic stability among nuclear-armed states. Deterrence, escalation management and crisis decision-making become serious considerations for policymakers.

The changing nuclear landscape, strategic stability can be seen as an intellectual and policy tool for analysing how technologically advanced weapons can strengthen or undermine deterrence or the risks of escalation.

Evolving Strategic Stability in the New Nuclear Era

‘Strategic stability’ emerged during the early decades of the Cold War to describe the nature of the strategic interaction between the erstwhile Soviet Union and the US in the nuclear realm of strategy. It In general terms, strategic stability comprises two core premises: the absence of incentives to launch a first nuclear strike (crisis stability) and the prevention of the buildup of nuclear forces (arms race stability). Originally, it was conceived as a conceptual framework for strategic thinking on upholding nuclear deterrence. Over time, however, the notionof subjectivity about the ‘lack of incentives’ emerged as a paradoxical element threatening stability among nuclear states. Varying interpretation by state actors results in heightened risks of miscalculation with a destabilising effect on defence and deterrence. In the changing nuclear landscape, strategic stability can be seen as an intellectual and policy tool for analysing how technologically advanced weapons can strengthen or undermine deterrence or the risks of escalation. The new nuclear age, marked by new technologies, brings new interpretations and influences on the Cold War concept of strategic stability for strategists as well as policymakers.

AI and Escalation Risks in Nuclear Strategy

Today, the warfighting in the conventional domain carries a greater possibilty of transitiong into a limited or  full-scale nuclear war. In the context of strategic stability, geostrategic competition and a lack of consensus on arms control among the US, Russia, and China remain the defining trends. As a result, an arms race with deterrence failure as its extreme outcome becomes a looming possibility.  Advancements in AI are enabling states to explore options for strengthening their deterrence posture, which is increasingly shifting towards warfighting.

AI and Escalation Risks in Nuclear StrategyToday, the warfighting in the conventional domain carries a greater possibilty of transitiong into a limited or  full-scale nuclear war.

In terms of benefits, AI in NC3 could enable enhanced early warning and Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) inputs to inform the chain of command's decision-making. However, the diffusion of emerging technologies, specifically AI for warfighting purposes, is fuelling the incentives for states to gain a first-mover advantage over their adversaries. This impacts the stability of the arms race, reinforcing an action-reaction cycle that prioritises quality, response time, and overall decision-making processes. The integration of AI in the NC3 architecture by a state also contributes to an additional layer of readiness in the deployment of nuclear weapons. Simultaneously, AI could enhance non-nuclear strategic weapons with a counterforce potential to target an adversary’s nuclear infrastructure, including second-strike capabilities.  It creates serious incentives for the adversary to follow suit. A destabilising effect on crisis stability is created by creating a security dilemma for nuclear-armed states. The AI integration by the US, combined with a pre-existing ‘counterforce targeting’ strategy, could sharpen its edge over its adversaries. At the same time,China and Russia are attempting to offset this advantage by integrating conventional weapon systems with AI to create a similar effect during a crisis. In a real-time scenario, incentives for an attacker to use non-nuclear strategic weapons against an adversary's nuclear infrastructure would also add a layer of complexity for decision-makers.

Table 1: AI-enabled systems in the US, Russia, and China

Source: SIPRI, War On The Rocks, CNAS, Global Times

An AI-based NC3 is also vulnerable to serious cyber-attacks with operational dysfunction as the immediate outcome in the pre-crisis or crisis period. The inherent ‘strategic-tactical dual-capability’ characteristic of NNSWs primarily cyber creates an effect-based outcome against the adversarial infrastructure. To this end,  offensive or pre-emptive integrity attacks arecapable of deceiving the AI-systems into making erroneous decisions. Evasive attacks, another form of integrity attack, could exploit imperfections in the AI model, leading to false identification in the NC3 architecture. A non-nuclear EMP attack can disrupt the hardware component of the NC3 as well as the autonomy of the systems. An autonomous kinetic system, say an AI-integrated hypersonic missile with a conventional warhead and non-predictable trajectory, could pre-emptively target the NC3 architecture. These NNSW options provide credible options without a resort to nuclear escalation, creating incentives for states to pre-empt and thus transition towards an escalation-prone warfighting posture. The misperceptions of an adversary’s intentions, combined with enhanced speed and compressed time factors, become a serious possibility for decision-makers to commit errors during a crisis. As a result, a commingling of nuclear and non-nuclear strategic weapons could result in inadvertent escalation and upset crisis stability among states.

NNSW options provide credible options without a resort to nuclear escalation, creating incentives for states to pre-empt and thus transition towards an escalation-prone warfighting posture. The misperceptions of an adversary’s intentions, combined with enhanced speed and compressed time factors, become a serious possibility for decision-makers to commit errors during a crisis.

Implications of AI Integration

The developments in AI and its integration by nuclear-armed states are part of a more competitive approach in international politics. These dynamics can have an influence on decision-making in both peacetime and crisis situations, with implications for strategic stability in three ways.

First, the advancement of AI is redefining, if not revolutionising, the parameters for upholding and maintaining deterrence. It is exposing the limits of the Cold War thinking on nuclear deterrence and simultaneously enabling warfighting in the nuclear environment. Second, with the evolving contours of deterrence, the problem of escalation and deterrence failure becomes more complex and more acute. Finally, AI in the new nuclear age poses new forms of challenges for human-level decision-making by exacerbating more complex, plausible crisis scenarios that require observing, orienting, deciding, and acting against the odds of precision, speed, and time-related factors.

Conclusion

The strategic environment has undergone a significant transformation, differing from that of the Cold War era. It is marked by strategic and technological competition among the US, China, and Russia, with implications for broader strategic stability. The nuclear realm of strategy, as in past decades, has not remained immune to the changes in technological influences, creating challenges for states to strengthen and uphold the logic of deterrence. The integration of AI within the strategic framework of the new nuclear age is blurring boundaries between nuclear and conventional warfighting, increasing escalation risks during a crisis. This, in turn, threatens both crisis stability and arms race stability among states.

The first-mover advantage in AI-integration to enhance deterrence negatively influences arms race stability. 

The potential of AI as a technology to influence strategic stability is reliant on three key parameters. First, advancements in AI and its diffusion among nuclear as well as non-nuclear states, as well as its integration into NC3 and NNSW capabilities. Second, the bearing on the defence and deterrence calculus among states. Finally, the impact of AI-integrated systems on decision-making during times of crisis.

The fear of being pre-empted in a crisis by an adversary remains the biggest fear factor and destabiliser for crisis stability. The first-mover advantage in AI-integration to enhance deterrence negatively influences arms race stability. The new nuclear age, marked by advancements in AI, presents both challenges and incentives for states to revisit deterrence, crisis management, and arms control approaches to mitigate the risks to international security.          

Rahul Rawat is a Research Assistant with the Strategic Studies Programme at Observer Research Foundation.

Neha Kaushal is a former intern with the Strategic Studies Programme at Observer Research Foundation.

• Nuclear Security
• Artificial Intelligence
• India
• ai based nuclear command
• ai in nc3
• ai integration in nuclear
• ai technologies into nuclear operations
• nc3
• nuclear command control and communication
• nuclear energy and ai

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