Aftermath of Op Sindoor: Revisiting Pakistan’s Nuclear Posture

The India-Pakistan relationship has long been crisis-prone and is likely to remain so,  owing to Islamabad’s pursuit of a sub-conventional warfare strategy against New Delhi. Against this backdrop, India’s execution of  ‘Operation Sindoor’ has established a new normal. Rawalpindi’s intended asymmetric nuclear posture is a fragile deterrent against India’s strong conventional response. Field Marshal General Asim Munir’s nuclear sabre-rattling reflects this fragility. It is meant to reassure his domestic constituency, signal resolve to New Delhi and to rope in the international community, particularly the United States (US), to play a role in the India-Pakistan crisis. This demonstrates why Pakistan is now seeking to recalibrate its nuclear posture vis-à-vis New Delhi.

Elements of Pakistan’s Nuclear Posture

Pakistan’s nuclear weapons are an equaliser against India’s growing conventional military capabilities. Rawalpindi’s nuclear posture, and associated risk of escalation, are aimed at deterring an Indian response against Pakistan’s low-cost option of a sub-conventional warfare strategy. As a gradual evolution to India’s quest for developing options, Pakistan perceived the gap in its nuclear posture and introduced tactical nuclear weapons into its arsenal. Pakistan’s Tactical Nuclear Weapons (TNW) facilities, as shown in Figure 1, are instruments for signalling rather than credible battlefield weapons. Thus, the TNWs helped create an asymmetric nuclear posture to frame a full-spectrum deterrence strategy to limit New Delhi’s conventional response options.

Figure 1: Pakistan’s TNW Facility, Pano Aqil, Sukkur District, Sindh

Source: Col Vinayak Bhat

Figure 2: Pakistan’s TNW Facility, Gujranwala, Punjab

Source: Col Vinayakk Bhat

Pakistan’s threat of nuclear escalation is intended to draw in third parties, particularly the US, to intervene if Pakistan’s nuclear blackmail becomes ineffective against New Delhi. The latest remarks by Field Marshal Asim Munir on US soil are an effort to develop a catalytic nuclear posture, providing a safety valve against Indian conventional responses to its new doctrine in the near future. This doctrine is guided by political will and risk-tolerant in employing conventional responses against Pakistan’s sub-conventional warfare strategy, as Operation Sindoor vividly demonstrated.

Modernisation and Diversification of the Arsenal

As per the US Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) led Worldwide Threat Assessment 2025, “Pakistan regards India as an existential threat and will continue to pursue its military modernisation effort, including the development of battlefield nuclear weapons, to offset India’s conventional military advantage”. Pakistan has been developing its targeting options and delivery vehicles. Two substantial capabilities, including the tests of the Shaheen-III and the Ababeel medium-range ballistic missiles in April 2022 and November 2023, respectively, have been aimed at targeting India’s growing ballistic missile defence capabilities. The Ababeel has been MIRVed by Islamabad to increase deterrence vis-à-vis New Delhi.

In the aftermath of Operation Sindoor, Pakistan is likely to pursue its quest for a nuclear triad more vigorously. They will focus on the sea-based leg of the deterrent to counter India’s advantage to ensure the survivability of its nuclear arsenal. The submarine variant of the cruise missile Babur-3, as shown in Table 2, was already tested twice in 2017 and 2018 and is likely to be deployed on Agosta-90B submarines to develop a credible second-strike capability against India.

Beyond sub-surface nuclear capabilities, Pakistan announced the formation of a separate conventional rocket force, which would primarily be aimed at a range of targets, including India’s military and critical infrastructure. Table 1 shows a variety of missile capabilities geared mostly for nuclear missions, which can also be adapted for conventional roles. The well-integrated Chinese-origin Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) technology radars and Beidou satellite navigation system will serve as the nerve system to the Pakistani rocket force. Further, as part of their collusive effort, China and Pakistan have established a Centre for Artificial Intelligence and Computing (CENTAIC), helping the Pakistani Air Force (PAF) better integrate its sensor-to-shoot capabilities. It will help establish a smart kill-chain, resulting in shortened air-delivered (Ra’ad) nuclear weapons. It is geared for early escalation, and the Pakistanis may also mimic the Chinese approach of commingling conventional and nuclear forces to provoke India into an early conventional strike. In the past few years, India’s growing non-nuclear strategic capabilities have also become a cause for concern for Pakistan, compelling Rawalpindi to augment the country’s delivery capabilities.

Table 1: List of Pakistani Missiles

Source: CSIS Missile Defense Project

Table 2: Pakistan’s air and sea-based nuclear arsenal

Source: Bulletin of The Atomic Scientists

Air-delivered and sea-based delivery capabilities, as shown in Table 2, are designed to strengthen Rawalpindi’s nuclear forces by expanding targeting options and delivery vehicles for credible signalling against New Delhi. As per an assessment in 2023 by the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Pakistan is producing fissile material worth 14 to 27 warheads, but the estimates suggest the actual number averages around 5 to 10 per year.

Obstacles to Islamabad’s Nuclear Posture

Despite its growing capabilities, Pakistan is likely to face some challenges. First, an overreliance on nuclear weapons for security has its limits. Pakistan's broad, yet ambiguous redlines for nuclear use, categorised into territorial, military, economic, and domestic destabilisation, suffer from an absence of clear-cut ‘when, where, and how’ elements in the execution of its first-use doctrine. Secondly, this ambiguity has been utilised by New Delhi to its advantage. To neutralise India’s conventional military strength, Pakistan has become excessively reliant on a first-use nuclear posture, which is not very credible, as Operation Sindoor visibly demonstrated. Thus, the onus to maintain strategic stability has fallen equally, if not more, on Pakistan. From Islamabad’s perspective, India’s use of conventional military options against its sub-conventional warfare has raised the risks of escalation. It has also shifted the onus of preserving stability equally, if not more, to Pakistan. Indian Prime Minister, in his 12 May addres,s has laid out the new policy of non-differentiation “…between the government sponsoring terrorism and the masterminds of terrorism”. India maintained restraint, distinguishing between terrorist and military targets. However, this distinction is unlikely to be made by New Delhi in the future.

Issues and Way Forward for New Delhi

For over three decades, Pakistan’s nuclear strategy has remained an instrument of statecraft, deterring Indian conventional response to its sponsorship of terrorism. However, this dynamic has shifted following the Uri, Balakot, and Operation Sindoor kinetic operations. India has made a credible demonstration of its will and intent through a conventional military response against Pakistan-sponsored acts of terrorism. However, such a doctrine may not become an absolute guarantor against future Pakistani terror attacks.

Pakistan is ramping up its military capabilities, including its latest announcement of a separate conventional rocket force against New Delhi. India’s Chinese military challenge, supplemented by Pakistan, has been the driving factor for a conventional missile-based Integrated Rocket Force (IRF). To this end, India needs to field a diverse set of missile capabilities that include ballistic, cruise, and hypersonic missiles with varied ranges to support an effective, credible conventional deterrent posture. However, given India’s capacity for greater fissile material production, it should pursue quantitative nuclear modernisation to cushion itself.

New Delhi must continue developing diverse technological vectors and strengthen its non-nuclear strategic arsenal. These efforts are necessary to keep Islamabad’s pathway to nuclear threshold in constant check to establish compellence through both denial and punishment against the decades-old sub-conventional warfare strategy of Pakistan.

Kartik Bommakanti is a Senior Fellow with the Strategic Studies Programme, Observer Research Foundation.

Rahul Rawat is a Research Assistant with the Strategic Studies Programme, Observer Research Foundation.

• International Affairs
• India
• Pakistan
• india pakistan conflict
• india pakistan conflict 2025
• india pakistan relations
• operation sindoor
• pakistan nuclear capability
• pakistan nuclear threat
• pakistan nuclear weapons
• tactical nuclear weapons pakistan

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