India’s underwater defence remains underpowered as delayed submarine projects, foreign tech dependence, and policy hurdles expose critical security gaps.
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On July 8 2025, India’s Defence Minister Rajnath Singh congratulated the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), Indian Navy (IN), and associated industry partners for the successful development and testing of the Extended Range Anti-Submarine Rocket. He also highlighted the growing global demand for Indian defence equipment following ‘ Operation Sindoor’, whilst asserting that a ‘big market’ awaits India. However, his claim is at odds with India’s underwater assets, wherein capabilities remain nascent and India remains a major market for the world. Developing capabilities in Underwater Domain Awareness (UDA)—total situational undersea awareness through monitoring and profiling water columns and seabed is an urgent imperative for India. Essentially, China’s increasing submarine and Unmanned Underwater Vehicles (UUV), the degrading marine environment and unexplored underwater and deep-sea resources in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) highlight the multifaceted necessity of UDA for India.
Despite the ever-expanding significance of UDA technologies, India’s capabilities remain largely at an elementary stage.
Despite the ever-expanding significance of UDA technologies, India’s capabilities remain largely at an elementary stage. For instance, the development of UUVs, despite their development, remains in the modular phase. Most of the components required for developing UUVs are imported, along with existing assembly and integration challenges. Performance remains basic across propulsion, payload, and acoustic systems—especially considering the United States (US)-developed UUVs. India’s maiden, DRDO-developed phosphoric acid fuel cell-based Air Independent Propulsion (AIP) system for submarines compares poorly to advanced technology—lithium-ion fuel cell-powered AIP, in parameters such as power density, environmental-friendliness, and maintenance. Similarly, Unmanned surface vehicles (USVs), also under development, face operational capability limitations. Bharat Electronics Limited developed ‘Swadheen’ USV, designed for bathometric surveys, mine countermeasure, and reconnaissance operations, which has only 30 kilogram payload capacity despite being the country’s maximum for any USV. This restricts payload space for critical equipment such as radar, automatic identification system, and mines—limiting its operational versatility, while confining its manoeuvrability to coastal areas. India’s critical underwater capability gaps, among other equipment, have meant huge external dependency on submarines, minesweepers to sonobuoys, and sensors.
India’s UDA capability gaps primarily can be attributed to structural issues experienced by the niche-technology industry, induced by acquisition procedures and schemes such as Innovations for Defence Excellence (iDEX).
Firstly, there remains apprehension among some firms regarding their respective Internet Protocol (IP) protection under the ‘Make-2’ procedure of the Defence Acquisition Procedure (DAP), 2020. After the inventor develops a prototype of any UDA technology, India, much like other service wings, is obligated to issue Make-2 cases on the portal SRIJAN for industry’s open participation. This undermines first-mover advantage, and discourages innovation—especially for larger firms like Larsen & Toubro (L&T).
Secondly, while iDEX has fostered small-scale innovation through project-based public funding of start-ups and research and development (R&D) institutes, it is flawed in design. India procurements generally require 20–30 years of lifecycle support, which startups often cannot provide due to a lack of the required infrastructure and components. They are forced to rely on private firms, capable of obsolescence management—an area yet to be addressed by DAP or iDEX.
India’s UDA capability gaps primarily can be attributed to structural issues experienced by the niche-technology industry, induced by acquisition procedures and schemes such as Innovations for Defence Excellence (iDEX).
Moreover, UDA technology startups such as Aikairos highlight iDEX’s restricted focus on defence, while overlooking civilian technologies, which are also indispensable for official initiatives, including the Ministry of Earth Sciences' Deep Ocean Mission. This negates the potential incentives for start-ups working on civilian-use UDA technologies with applications such as deep-sea survey, ocean climate change advisory services, and marine biodiversity exploration.
iDEX also faces broader ecosystem-related bottlenecks. Despite huge grants and testing facility access, only 10 percent of the iDEX agreements have led to procurement contracts. This reflects cumbersome regulatory approvals, certification processes, and high-stakes field trials experienced by start-ups, including those developing UDA-related technology.
Financial constraints persist under iDEX as well. iDEX funds are disbursed only after startups win an open innovation challenge, while banks demand confirmed orders for lending. This leaves start-ups with no reliable capital recourse for prototype development, which often cannot afford the expenses incurred for No-Cost-No-Commitment (NCNC) trials. This funding gap restricts innovation possibilities, besides confining the scope of private sector involvement in the IN contracts.
Gaps in the policy framework and India's underwater arm, along with continued external dependence, warrant consideration of policy shifts in incentives, R&D, and prioritisation of certain equipment.
Firstly, introduce policy-based assurance to compensate start-ups, Micro, Small, and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs), and R&D institutes for a portion of the NCNC trial costs. Secondly, amend iDEX regulations to allow private firms to maintain equipment developed by start-ups, without compromising Quality Assurance. Thirdly, amend DAP 2020 to protect inventors’ first-mover advantage by avoiding public disclosure on the SRIJAN portal. Fourthly, focus on ‘blue-skies’ R&D in the long term to explore undiscovered underwater concepts, materials, propulsion, and detection technologies. Herein, collaboration between the IN’s Naval Innovation and Indigenisation Organisation (NIIO) and start-ups should be explored. Moreover, introducing upfront R&D subsidies to start-ups and private firms for prototype development remains necessary, given the minimal private sector involvement in making systems such as sonars and Anti-Torpedo Defence Systems (ATDS).
Gaps in the policy framework and India's underwater arm, along with continued external dependence, warrant consideration of policy shifts in incentives, R&D, and prioritisation of certain equipment.
Additionally, indigenisation of navigation control of the UUVs for deployment as blue water assets should be prioritised over other components of the UUV in the short term for maintaining operational confidentiality. Leveraging foreign industrial and R&D expertise in India’s underdeveloped systems, such as AIP, advanced sensors, sonars and ATDS, remains critical in bridging capability gaps and ensuring eventual self-reliance. International collaboration in developing Multi-Aperture Sonars and ATDS, effective in shallow waters, must be considered. For deep-sea awareness, underwater sensor development and sensor network grid, supported with adequate analysis software, required enhanced focus.
Thus, India's strategic imperatives in the IOR, coupled with nascent UDA capabilities, necessitate immediate policy reforms—the absence of which would make New Delhi increasingly vulnerable in an evolving maritime threat environment.
Araudra Singh is a Research Assistant at the Council for Strategic and Defense Research, New Delhi.
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Araudra Singh is a Research Assistant at the Council for Strategic and Defense Research, New Delhi. ...
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