Bangladesh’s National Citizen Party must convert the momentum of the July Uprising of 2024 into organisational strength while preserving its inclusive agenda within an alliance dominated by Jamaat-e-Islami
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For many in Bangladesh, the National Citizen Party (NCP) represented a fresh and relatable voice in a political environment long dominated by two dynastic parties: the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and the Awami League. The NCP emerged from the July Uprising of 2024, which ended the Awami League government’s extended incumbency. Composed of student leaders advocating an inclusive, youth-centred ideology, the party was confident of forming the country’s next elected government. Yet its pre-election alliance with the Jamaat-e-Islami (JeI), the largest Islamic party in Bangladesh, sparked debate over whether this partnership could unsettle voters and undermine the NCP’s electoral prospects.
While the NCP celebrates the outcome as a promising electoral debut, critics attribute the low numbers to its alliance with the JeI and structural deficiencies within the party.
The results of the 13th general election, held on 12 February 2026, have fuelled this speculation, as the party secured 6[1] of the 299 contested seats in the Jatiya Sangsad, representing only 2 per cent of the elected parliamentarians. While the NCP celebrates the outcome as a promising electoral debut, critics attribute the low numbers to its alliance with the JeI and structural deficiencies within the party. As the NCP positions itself in opposition, it is worth revisiting its origins and assessing its role in Bangladesh’s democratic renewal.
On 28 February 2025, the NCP, which originated in the Students Against Discrimination movement and the Jatiya Nagorik Committee (National Citizens' Committee), was launched as a formal political party. Its leaders enjoyed wide popularity for their role in the July Uprising of 2024, which opposed the quota reservations imposed by the former Awami League government. Their protests resonated with large sections of the Bangladeshi populace who harboured critical views of the Hasina regime for its alleged autocracy and corruption. Built on anti-Awami sentiments, the NCP found common ground with right-wing parties and organisations such as the JeI and Hefazat-e-Islam (HeI), which were also critical of the government. For example, the NCP and HeI reached a consensus on the Awami League's trial as a party for “mass-killing” during the July Uprising, describing its political and organisational activities as “terrorist activities” until trial completion. However, it differed from these right-wing groupings in its ideology.
Indeed, Bangladesh’s first student-led party prioritised a centrist approach, with the vision of building a ‘second republic’. This signified a transformation of the political system through democratic means, constitutional reforms, and the restructuring of political institutions following a revolution or mass uprising. However, although the NCP was clear in its ideals, it lacked the political experience to transition effectively from a movement to a structured party capable of expanding its vote base without external support. It required organisational infrastructure, access to campaign machinery, and protection from political repression—a need amplified by the killing of the student leader Sharif Osman Hadi. Therefore, despite opposition from several members, the NCP allied with the JeI, which, despite contrasting ideologies, could provide these resources. As the emotional legitimacy of the July Uprising waned, evident in opinion polls ahead of the February election that suggested the NCP’s support in single digits, the party’s decision to enter an alliance was primarily one of political survival.
Built on anti-Awami sentiments, the NCP found common ground with right-wing parties and organisations such as the JeI and Hefazat-e-Islam (HeI), which were also critical of the government.
The decision prompted several of the NCP’s student members to resign, as they believed the alliance diluted the party’s core agenda—the very reason for its formation. Indeed, the JeI’s orthodox stance on the role of women in public life and its vision of an Islamic state diverged sharply from the NCP’s egalitarian outlook and secular, inclusive agenda. Consequently, critics argue, this led to a loss of support from a section of young voters who could no longer relate to the party. Ironically, analysts had interpreted the JeI’s partnership with the NCP as an attempt to attract the youth electorate, complementing its promise to establish a modern, democratic state governed by moderate Islamic ideals, if elected to power.
Apparently, the NCP has recognised this dichotomy post-election, emphasising that an electoral alliance does not constitute a political merger. The party maintains that in constituencies where NCP candidates prioritised “long-term community engagement,” they outperformed traditional patronage workers. Looking ahead, the NCP intends to build further on this model and is already considering contesting local elections independently.
Yet, as part of the opposition, the NCP’s role in parliament is already structured along party lines. It will therefore be difficult to uphold its ideals under the shadow of the JeI, which holds 68 of the 77 seats won by the broader alliance it leads. The NCP’s structural fragility is thus at odds with its aspiration to be a third democratic, inclusive, and secular front in Bangladesh. However, even under such circumstances, the NCP retains the emotional legitimacy of the July Uprising, a sentiment as potent as the memory of the 1971 Liberation War, which continues to shape political choices in the country. Indeed, one of the primary reasons the JeI partnered with the NCP was to share this emotional legitimacy, which it had hoped would overshadow its historical taint as ‘Razakars’—those who opposed the Muktijuddho and were accused of perpetuating war crimes against the liberation forces.
Emotional legitimacy alone is insufficient to secure a strong foundation. Beyond Dhaka, the most effective route to regain relevance lies in local elections, grassroots service, and issue-based coalitions that broaden its appeal without compromising its liberal core.
If the NCP is determined to carve out a niche in Bangladesh, even within the broader alliance, it is crucial that the party use its leverage in parliament to act as a principled pressure group rather than a junior appendage of the JeI. The heightened public scrutiny on the party, as part of the opposition, offers a distinct opportunity to demonstrate its commitment to its ideals and thereby expand an autonomous support base. However, emotional legitimacy alone is insufficient to secure a strong foundation. Beyond Dhaka, the most effective route to regain relevance lies in local elections, grassroots service, and issue-based coalitions that broaden its appeal without compromising its liberal core. The real test will be whether the NCP transforms the July Uprising’s mandate into organisation and credibility, or whether it becomes a movement that traded its moment for a place at someone else’s table.
Sohini Bose is an Associate Fellow with the Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation.
[1] The NCP was contesting for 30 seats in the Bangladesh Parliament of which they won 6.
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Sohini Bose is an Associate Fellow at Observer Research Foundation (ORF), Kolkata with the Strategic Studies Programme. Her area of research is India’s eastern maritime ...
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