During the 2021 summer offensive, the Taliban demonstrated their ability to function as a cohesive military-political entity. There was no doubt that the movement was commanded by a single command centre, with highly disciplined, qualified units who obeyed the instructions of the centralised leadership. On the eve of their entry, the Taliban sneaked their supporters into Kabul, who by then had grown in numbers. The onslaught in the south and east, as well as the actions of Taliban forces in the north, demonstrated a well-planned and determined strategy. Military operations involving the employment of terrorist diversion technologies, as well as the actions of tiny mobile groups, made it impossible for the Afghan Army and police to mount a successful fight against them. Over time, based on particular empirical material, it becomes evident that the Taliban demonstrated the ability to act as a single military-political tool.

Military operations involving the employment of terrorist diversion technologies, as well as the actions of tiny mobile groups, made it impossible for the Afghan Army and police to mount a successful fight against them.

This came as no surprise, since similar examples of rebel movements capable of mobilising forces and resources at critical junctures can be found throughout history. In theory, such an approach is only conceivable when such groups are supported by a player in the international relations, such as a nation-state, mostly major powers. In this case, it was (and still is) a regional player, Pakistan, which extended resources and procedures for insurgent patronage. It is worth noting that the Taliban leaders were visited by an Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) delegation led by Faiz Hameed just a few days after they arrived in Kabul. Following that, such visits grew routine, and open connections with Pakistani security forces in Kabul and other Afghan cities became the norm. As a result, it would not come as a surprise to learn that the Taliban’s military and political success during the conquest of Kabul was obviously linked to the Pakistani military's full cooperation and backing. Diplomacy and Islamabad's second track have historically denied this fact, but it does not raise major concerns within the expert community. Insurgent groups have won a few battles in the past, but following successful and long-term government cases are much more rare. That is because, once the enemy is defeated, what is theoretically required for the cohesive existence of any insurgent organisation—a shared enemy—vanishes. The Taliban now has a strong control over Aghanistan. The Taliban have no opponents capable of undermining their positions in terms of military, political, or even economic resources. At the same time, there have been no meaningful changes in the radical ideology of the Taliban. It is still a terrorist organisation with power over a UN member state.

The Taliban have no opponents capable of undermining their positions in terms of military, political, or even economic resources.

Outside and inside Afghanistan, more than 10 opposition organisations, parties, and associations have already been formed. The Afghanistan Freedom Front, the Afghan National Liberation Front, the Afghan National Resistance Front, and a Supreme Council of National Resistance in Turkey are all led by powerful warlords and governors. In actuality, such groupings remain lethargic and, it appears, lack real resource competences and a support network. However, first of all, we are dealing with a political process that tends to change. Second of all, historically, such conflicts are linked to great and regional powers’ will and changing policies.

The great powers’ role in Afghanistan

This is not to say that there aren't conditions in place in the near and medium term for shifting the political trajectory in global capitals. The main powers—the United States (US) and China—have shown no tangible signs of hardening their stance against the Taliban. On the contrary, Beijing is making hesitant attempts to work with Afghanistan's new leaders to secure economic and infrastructure projects. The allied relations between Beijing and Islamabad are likewise noteworthy, and can be viewed through the traditional theoretical patron-client dichotomy. In essence, China’s policy on this front is run by Pakistan, which has a much better understanding of Afghan realities. However, China is not the primary actor in this region, and it is certainly not the master of initiatives to fund opposing insurgent organisations. Chinese power, at least for the time being, will most likely reside in the economic plane in the near and medium term.

The allied relations between Beijing and Islamabad are likewise noteworthy, and can be viewed through the traditional theoretical patron-client dichotomy.

The US, as the most powerful actor in international affairs, outnumbers all others in terms of combined power, is the most intriguing player in Afghan history. Obviously, Washington would want to move on from the Afghan issue and focus on other critical issues, such as the growing threat posed by China. These are deep geoeconomic and geopolitical challenges to which the US wishes to commit all of its might and resource potential. However, Washington’s unique ability to shape social reality in world politics allows Washington to shift the Afghan policy as necessary.

Regional powers’ interaction with Afghanistan

Regional actors in international life are uninterested in Afghan politics and do not strive to alter the prevailing power balance. This stance is taken after they reviewed their top-tier allies or partners’ position. Moreover, interest in Afghan politics has waned across the board and they realise that real fundamental changes in the trajectory of events in Afghanistan’s politics are likely to be created only by the big powers. Perhaps this is not entirely true, but according to the events of recent months in world politics, we see that regional powers are significantly inferior to the great powers. India, understandably concerned about the development of terrorist forces, remains wary of Pakistan’s role in the region. However, it can be assumed that New Delhi will not employ moves that, according to some experts, as it would serve its national interests. Given the relatively contentious position in the Eastern Europe, Russia appears to have pulled out of other major regional politics for some time. Sanctions, which are unlikely to have analogues in history, will slow down the development of Russia, which will certainly affect Moscow’s influence in the world—mostly the Eurasian continent. Moscow, which has made mistakes, faces serious challenges: There is no opportunity to think about the “Big Game”. Given an ineffective foreign policy, playing around with the Afghan problem will become an appropriate luxury for Russia. The Central Asian countries will be affected by Russia’s decline and would most likely be more cautious. Uzbekistan believes the latent support vector for the Taliban administration is correct. This course appears to be continuing in some form or another. Tajikistan is deeply concerned about the Taliban's rise, but the fact that it lacks strong sponsors and is bound by allied duties with Moscow will not exacerbate its anti-Taliban stance. A weaker Iran has bigger concerns than the Afghan crisis. Thus, due to various reasons, regional powers will not be able to become a factor changing the current balance of power in Afghanistan.

Tajikistan is deeply concerned about the Taliban's rise, but the fact that it lacks strong sponsors and is bound by allied duties with Moscow will not exacerbate its anti-Taliban stance.

As previously stated, the competitive and primary advantage of an insurgent band is intense motivation. Such a practice is only possible if there is an external (or internal) adversary. There is currently no such thing in Afghanistan. The Taliban has been left alone with Afghan’s complex economic, social, and political issues. According to the United Nations, the country is facing a humanitarian disaster and hunger. External financial reservoirs are frozen, and there is little reason to assume that the Taliban will gain access to them very soon. Over the last few decades, the country’s budget has been built primarily on the backs of foreign financial support. The economy is still in a state of flux, and export potential is essentially non-existent. Afghanistan's economy is a narconomics. The movement’s top leadership is primarily made up of members of the old school. These are senior citizens who have spent the majority of their lives in Jihad in the underground. The Taliban, as an institution, has never been involved in the development of economic or political institutions. The Taliban simply do not know what to do or how to establish more or less functional systems. It is important noting here that the conditions in which Afghanistan found itself under Taliban administration are exceedingly hostile. Six months later, the dictatorship is still not recognised by any member of the international community. As a result, the insurgents, who only know how to conduct sabotage and terrorist war, found themselves alone with a wrecked economy and a multi-million population facing starvation and humanitarian disaster. Any system is doomed to self-destruction in such circumstances, as internal conflicts arise. All of this is taking place against a backdrop of deteriorating economic and resource potential, which foreign sponsors can only partially counteract. Cases that can be viewed as the presence of a possible dispute with the patron have become more common. So, the world media reported on clashes between the Taliban and Pakistani security forces and some cases of attacks by Afghans on Taliban leaders in the provinces.

External financial reservoirs are frozen, and there is little reason to assume that the Taliban will gain access to them very soon.

These variables combine to create a situation that has the potential to destabilise the movement in the medium term—a conflict inside the movement. The Taliban's contradictions are becoming more evident. We can explore the presence of two entrenched competing factions. They have a mild, underlying conflict that is accompanied by constant encounters, relationships, and conversation. Some would describe this system of interactions as a rivalry amongst the many elite groups in the government, rather than a conflict. The distinction between silovoki versus systemic liberals, for example, is well-known in Kremlin studies. This remark can be agreed upon, but it is worth contemplating in the context of a volatile state structure, where such conflicts might rapidly escalate into a military confrontation. The Afghan conditions do not assume institutions, a system of checks and balances. Moreover, in the conditions of a decrease in the nutritional base, an economic crisis (collapse), and an increase in protests, conflict is likely to occur. At the same time, it is worth emphasising that the Taliban manages to maintain a unified command, at least in Kabul, despite all the difficulties. However, given the above factors, such a structure may undergo certain transformations.

A possible split?

The author’s hypothesis states that there are two conditional clans (groups) within the Taliban movement. The first clan: Eastern Pashtuns, representatives of the Pashtun tribal confederation—Gilzay—and the Zadran Union of Free and Militant Tribes. This clan is the most radical, and it is largely made up of radicals who have been responsible for the majority of terrorist strikes in the Afghan capital during the last two decades. The Haqqani Network, the Taliban's most hardline wing, is an integral part of this clan, and its commander is Sirajuddin Haqqani. In many ways, this group is made up of representatives from Afghanistan’s “Big Paktia,” or eastern regions. The Gilzay-Zadran partnership is unusually stable, yet this tendency cannot be called strong. Perhaps this clan will split along tribal lines, with supporters of the Haqqani Network (Zadran) and Mullah Yakub (Gilzay). The Pakistani military and the ISI keep a close eye on this clan. The second clan: The Durrani tribal confederation is a group of southern Pashtuns. This group is made up of lawmakers from the so-called “Greater Kandahar,” which includes the biggest provinces of Helmand and Kandahar. Many members of this class were participating in the negotiation process and were better integrated into foreign interactions than the Taliban leaders. This is a conditional “Doha group” of moderate Taliban led by Mullah Baradar. This clan’s leaders are committed to reforms, dialogue, and inclusion into the international relations system.

Many members of this class were participating in the negotiation process and were better integrated into foreign interactions than the Taliban leaders.

The clan sought in every way possible to preserve the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan's distinctive achievements. It was not a supporter of the indiscriminate destruction of the political system's infrastructure, and was not so dogmatic even about the flag of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. They are primarily in charge of the humanitarian and economic ministries. Their ties to Pakistan and the ISI, are substantial but conflicting. The second group, represents extremists, Emirate supporters, and a return to 1990s behaviors. They are mostly led by law enforcement authorities.

Conclusion

In conclusion, for six months now, the Taliban has ruled Afghanistan undividedly. The swift victory of the radical movement changed the regional balance of power and the priorities of the great and regional powers. It transformed the political vector of the actors of international relations in the region. At the same time, the economic situation in the country is on the verge of disaster, as the Taliban’s resource potential is narrowing. Secondly, the missing of an external and partly internal enemy leads to an increase in potential conflict and tension. In this regard, it is possible to think that the Taliban movement in the mid-term is nearing a split. Several clans are in a latent confrontation with each other. This factor alone can lead to further destablisation of the country in the medium term.

• Neighbourhood
• China
• India
• Neighbourhood
• Pakistan
• USA and Canada
• Aghanistan
• diplomacy
• Economic
• military operations
• military-political
• Mullah Baradar
• Taliban
• terrorist

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