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After a historic election marked by record turnout and political upheaval, South Korea’s new president faces the daunting task of restoring democratic norms, reviving the economy, and navigating a deeply fractured political landscape.
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After months of political unrest followed by former President Yoon Suk Yeol’s impeachment, South Korea finally has Lee Jae-myung, the leader of the Democratic Party of Korea (DPK), as its new president. Lee’s victory has provided much-needed relief for the country, which has experienced cascading political turmoil and economic uncertainties in recent months, following the implementation of martial law and Yoon’s impeachment. While Lee Jae-myung’s election has reinstated South Korea’s credentials as a resilient liberal democracy, the new president has diverse challenges on the domestic and international fronts to address, an uphill task early in his tenure.
After the 3 June snap elections, Lee Jae-myung became the country’s 21st president, defeating the People’s Power Party’s (PPP) candidate Kim Moon-soo. The presidential election results showcased citizens' strong discontent with former president Yoon and the ruling party. The public anger towards the incumbent government was already visible in pre-poll surveys, suggesting a potential win for the opposition candidate. However, the results exceeded the DPK’s expectations, breaking earlier election records. The recent election witnessed the country’s highest voter turnout in 28 years, touching 79.4 percent. This was higher than in the 2022 elections, which saw a 77.1 percent turnout. The cherry on the cake was that Lee received 49.42 percent of the total votes—around 17.29 million—the highest in South Korea’s history, beating his predecessor's 2022 record of 16.39 million votes.
After months of political unrest followed by former President Yoon Suk Yeol’s impeachment, South Korea finally has Lee Jae-myung, the leader of the Democratic Party of Korea (DPK), as its new president.
Even though Yoon’s anti-democratic decision to declare martial law was one of the primary reasons that consolidated the anti-conservative vote, other issues, particularly the country’s worsening economic situation, led many centrists to vote for the opposition. For instance, the economy’s contraction by 0.2 percent in the year’s first quarter, marking the first dip in nine months, in addition to declining exports and falling reserves following US President Donald Trump’s tariff announcement, increased concerns among citizens. Apart from this, the DPK ran a strong campaign based on issues that mattered to the populace, unlike the PPP, which was left to combat the anti-democratic legacy of its former leader. All these factors benefited Lee, culminating in strong support from his party base and citizens who wanted to see the incumbent out of power. In addition, Lee was also able to clearly articulate his agenda—reestablishing Korea’s democratic credentials and addressing the nation’s surmounting economic issues, particularly the cost of living—which helped his campaign.
Lee reiterated his three key commitments during his inauguration as president. He pledged “to restore democracy,” “to rebuild livelihood and the economy,” and “to reclaim national security and peace.” While most of these agenda points are popular with large swathes of his base, the same cannot be said of the PPP. Therefore, given the political fragmentation and absence of national consensus, Lee initially refrained from taking a strong stand on controversial issues. He instead advocated pursuing a vision of economic pragmatism (addressing livelihood and financial matters) over fighting ideological battles (i.e., pursuing reforms that would lead to political strife with the opposition), making his political dealings easier. However, given domestic political compulsions, Lee had to navigate key sticking points. Primarily, his agenda covers four main issues.
The first issue on Lee’s agenda is to address the domestic division that has widened along ideological and gender lines. According to the Dankook Centre for Dispute Resolution, at the end of 2024, South Korea’s social fracture was in the ‘severe’ category, the highest since the 2016 political turmoil under former conservative President Park Geun-hye. The election result also highlighted a wide political cleavage along gender lines. Consolidating both male and female votes has become a serious concern. For instance, Lee received 55.1 percent of women's and 38.3 percent of men’s votes, compared to the PPP candidate, who secured 39.2 and 39.4 percent, respectively.
The second item on Lee’s agenda is to ensure that those responsible for the martial law declaration are held accountable, without signalling political retribution. To make Korea’s democracy more resilient, it will be crucial for Lee to address both these issues. This will require serious political investment and careful handling of the precarious situation by the new president and his party. To amicably address the situation, Lee and his party must ensure an independent investigation into the imposition of martial law, free from political interference—especially in light of the recent passage of three bills probing the actions of Yoon and his wife.
After the 3 June snap elections, Lee Jae-myung became the country’s 21st president, defeating the People’s Power Party’s (PPP) candidate Kim Moon-soo. The presidential election results showcased citizens' strong discontent with former president Yoon and the ruling party.
Besides the above agenda items, decentralising judicial as well as executive powers will be another primary focus of Lee’s presidency. Aspects of the reform agenda include reduced presidential tenure, strict checks and balances over presidential powers, separating investigative and prosecutorial powers, increasing the number of judges, and greater parliamentary oversight. According to a poll, about 90 percent of progressives and 68 percent of centrists support these reforms, whereas 65 and 58 percent of those on the conservative political spectrum (supporters of the PPP and the minor Reform Party, respectively) see them as unnecessary. Considering this stark divide, the issue risks becoming a political gridlock for Lee, diverting him from his immediate priorities. Hence, Lee will need to build political consensus with the opposition to avoid any legislative stalemate—a challenging task given the bitter relations between the two post the elections.
Besides domestic politics, the economy still rests firmly atop Lee’s agenda: he identified economic challenges as threatening the country’s survival in his inauguration speech. Following martial law imposition, the country’s economy took a hit, as exemplified by falling consumer spending and rising household debt. Trump’s tariffs and the absence of stable political leadership in recent months further exacerbated the issue. According to one survey, thirty-four percent of citizens are concerned about the country’s “economic recovery and improvement of public livelihood.” Most Koreans, across political dispensations, favour government intervention to reverse months of economic mismanagement. Part of the economic challenge will be to revive Korea’s exports to foreign markets, which will entail dialogue with the Trump administration to resolve the tariff issue. For instance, Trump's tariffs on exports of Korean automobiles, steel, and aluminium have proven to be a pain point for a country that is heavily export-reliant.
Finally, among the most critical issues that South Korea faces is on the national security front: particularly the institutionalisation of North Korea as a nuclear-armed state and the declaration of South Korea as an enemy state by Kim Jong Un. Besides the North Korean challenge, increasing trade friction and questions over US alliance commitment have rendered the security situation more challenging. To resolve these issues, Lee will have to strategise a new foreign policy template that protects his country’s security and economic interests while maintaining existing alliances.
The first issue on Lee’s agenda is to address the domestic division that has widened along ideological and gender lines. According to the Dankook Centre for Dispute Resolution, at the end of 2024, South Korea’s social fracture was in the ‘severe’ category, the highest since the 2016 political turmoil under former conservative President Park Geun-hye.
Considering the myriad political, economic, and security challenges at Lee’s doorstep, prioritisation will prove a daunting task. While the new president has signalled his intention to address economic matters for now, he will soon likely not be left with a choice but to address the political issues that divide South Koreans the most.
While Lee’s primary focus has thus far been on economic recovery and restoring public trust in political leadership and institutions, he has shown a growing willingness to wade into controversial territory despite earlier hesitations. This is evident in the DPK’s push for contentious judicial reforms early in his tenure—for example, expanding the number of judges and a potential decision to appoint the President’s former lawyer to the Supreme Court. These moves are especially fraught given that Lee himself is currently on trial. They not only contradict the promises he made during his campaign but also suggest that Lee and the DPK may be mistaking electoral success for a wholesale mandate of public trust. In doing so, Lee risks repeating the missteps of his predecessor: choosing political battles that may prove difficult to win.
Abhishek Sharma is a Research Assistant with the Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation.
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Abhishek Sharma is a Research Assistant with ORF’s Strategic Studies Programme. His research focuses on the Indo-Pacific regional security and geopolitical developments with a special ...
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