A nuclear Iran may upend fears of chaos—deterrence theory argues it could instead impose an uneasy but lasting stability in West Asia.
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Discussions around Iran becoming a nuclear power have been ongoing for several decades, driven by deep concerns over regional security, global non-proliferation norms, and the broader balance of power in the Middle East. While concerns surrounding nuclear proliferation and an arms race are often cited as a reason to oppose a nuclear-armed Iran, it is also valuable to discuss whether stability in the Middle East is more achievable from the perspective of strategic realism that analyses a nuclear-armed Iran versus a single military superpower, namely, Israel. ‘‘The power to hurt is a bargaining power’’ succinctly describes strategic realism, put forth by Thomas Shelling in The Strategy of Conflict. Therefore, the question arises: Does a nuclear-powered Iran have the potential to introduce a measure of strategic equilibrium in the region and reduce the likelihood of military interventions?
The military clashes between the two nuclear-powered nations, India and Pakistan, in May 2025, which ultimately culminated in a ceasefire, establish a case that vehemently argues for nuclear deterrence in recent times. While the situation remains fragile between the two states, the theory of nuclear deterrence, which encompasses the logic of mutually assured destruction (MAD), has likely influenced both nations to refrain from proceeding to a full-scale war. A term attributed to Donald G. Brennan of the Hudson Institute in the 1960s, it refers to states with a nuclear arsenal that deters each other from attacking by threatening a devastating retaliatory strike and increasing the cost of aggression.
Iranian national security is comparable to an open wound, and the absence of nuclear deterrence leaves it susceptible to external strikes with very tenuous recourse. The deep vulnerabilities of the Iranian security environment make a compelling case for the state to acquire nuclear weapons that can offer adequate protection from military aggression.
Political Scientist Joseph Nye, in his book Nuclear Ethics, has likened nuclear weapons to a ‘crystal ball’, the use of which predicts consequences both so devastatingly final and perspicuous (more so when all adversaries involved are nuclear armed) that such use becomes almost unthinkable, reinforcing the logic of deterrence through mutual vulnerability.
Iran’s bid for nuclear weapons could create such mutual vulnerability, which is the core of nuclear deterrence. When its foremost adversary—Israel—is widely believed to possess a sophisticated and unacknowledged nuclear arsenal, Iran has repeatedly framed this arsenal as a threat to itself. With decades of hostile rhetoric marring their relationship, the obvious military asymmetry between the two nations would be significantly levelled with a nuclear-powered Iran.
With the United States (US) powering Israel with robust security guarantees, Iran faces a strategic disadvantage. To counter this disadvantage, Iran has developed a complex and homegrown inventory of missiles for a modicum of deterrence. A look at Iran’s current missile capabilities shows an arsenal of ballistic and cruise missiles with drones and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). Furthermore, intelligence analysts have opined that Iran has the largest inventory of ballistic missiles in the region. However, this arsenal has offered a very weak deterrence, as witnessed in the recent 12-day war between Iran and Israel. Fabian Hinz’s analysis of the Iranian missile capability during the war has deemed it insufficient to deliver a strong retaliatory strike, while adding that “the deterrence balance between Israel and Iran is unravelling at an even faster pace.” This erosion of Iran’s deterrence, coupled with an ineffective form of air defence, largely due to international sanctions that have prevented Iran from acquiring hi-tech military equipment, makes the Iranian pursuit of nuclear weapons a very rational one. Iranian national security is comparable to an open wound, and the absence of nuclear deterrence leaves it susceptible to external strikes with very tenuous recourse. The deep vulnerabilities of the Iranian security environment make a compelling case for the state to acquire nuclear weapons that can offer adequate protection from military aggression.
The case of North Korea bears similarity to Iran. Driven by concerns about regime change, North Koreans initiated a nuclear-weapons program after the 1950–1953 Korean War in contravention of many agreements that it signed with the US. North Korea officially became a nuclear power in 2006. Now, the likelihood of coercive and deliberate use during crises remains low. That North Korea has not been involved in any full-scale wars needs no mentioning. It is reasonable to deduce that North Korea’s nuclear weapons are aptly poised for deterrence. While skirmishes in the Korean peninsula have occurred, the conflicts have remained contained and full-scale wars have been avoided.
While North Korea has become a pariah state in its pursuit of nuclear deterrence, the Iranians do not risk such isolation. Iran was already isolated by the West ever since the ousting of Reza Shah Pahlavi, but it has considerable allies in the global south.
Iran's aspiration to become a nuclear state is also driven in part by the prestige factor. The regime covets the status conferred by possessing such weapons in international politics and for Iran to be seen as capable of technological sophistication. As Commander Dean Martins noted, “In the wake of the premature disclosure of its program in 2002, Tehran was driven in part by a desire to become a member of the ‘select club’ of countries in the world that had mastered the enrichment process…”. Such aspiration powered the completion of the Bushehr nuclear power plant, which took over two decades and made little financial sense at the time, notes Abbas Samii. Thrown in the mix is the enormous public support, where 69 percent of Iranians support the pursuit of nuclear weapons. It is no surprise that such a number has only grown in the light of Israeli attacks on the Iranian embassy in Syria in April 2024 and Operation Rising Lion. It reflects the Iranian mindset that not only wants to exercise its prerogative to nuclear rights as a sign of Iran’s progress, but also resonates with the deterrence power of such weapons.
The fact that Iran continues to fight for its right to have nuclear weapons despite heavy international sanctions points to Iran’s desperation for weapons that it considers essential for its national security and maintains will be used for peaceful purposes only. There is no direct evidence to suggest that Iran seeks to use nuclear weapons for coercive or offensive purposes.
Iran’s support for proxy groups often leads critics to fear that a nuclear-armed Iran would extend the umbrella to its proxy groups. A comparison with Pakistan shows the West has overlooked Pakistani facilitation of known terror groups. Pakistan—as an ally of the West—faced far less pressure and sanctions in the development of its nuclear programme, which Pakistan’s military keeps under close watch and out of the hands of proxy groups. Moreover, such fears and mistrust of Iran miss the primal instinct of a state that seeks survival above all, a core principle of international law. Kenneth Waltz, the renowned political scientist, in his seminal work “Theory of International Politics,” writes that “the first concern of states is not to maximize power but to maintain their position in the system. Survival is a prerequisite to achieving any goals that the states may have.”
That Iran will risk national security and its annihilation by placing nuclear weapons in the hands of its proxies is flawed. It fails to understand that the regime’s prized priority is its own legitimacy and survival. It also does not account for the fact that Israeli intervention has weakened Iranian proxies. Hezbollah, which was thought of as a primary deterrent against Israeli strikes, atrophied after the death of Hasan Nasrallah and the fall of the Assad regime, with the Lebanese government now looking to undertake the task of disarming the group. More importantly, nuclear weapons require a scientific and technical infrastructure for their maintenance and deployment, costing billions of dollars; often, a struggle for states themselves.
The fact that Iran continues to fight for its right to have nuclear weapons despite heavy international sanctions points to Iran’s desperation for weapons that it considers essential for its national security and maintains will be used for peaceful purposes only. There is no direct evidence to suggest that Iran seeks to use nuclear weapons for coercive or offensive purposes. Gideon Hanft emphasised the point in the context of ‘rogue states’ like Iran and North Korea acquiring nuclear power, stating, “While we often consider rogue states to be irrational, there is no evidence suggesting they are suicidal.”
A combination of Iran fighting for its survival, the operation ‘Midnight Hammer’ that did not fully destroy Iran’s broader nuclear program with no verified loss of stockpiled uranium and the threat to pull out of the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty (NPT) indicates that Iran may leap towards nuclear capability, only this time, irrespective of global resistance and more covertly. A mature and realistic policy towards Iran would factor in this shift and reassess whether maximalist containment strategies have long-term sustainability.
Another nuclear power in the Middle East could fundamentally change the very calculus of aggression in the region. An increased risk of volatility could be the way to stabilise a region riven with infighting, sectarianism, extremism, and authoritarianism.
When Kenneth Waltz made a case for nuclear deterrence, he referred to nuclear weapons as “peacemaking weapons”, adding that “never has there been an instance in the almost 70 years of nuclear era in which a nuclear capable country has attacked the obvious vital interest of another nuclear state.” The cause of peace and stability in the Middle East is better served if nuclear weapons are viewed as instruments of deterrence rather than instruments of aggression.
Unnati Mishra is a Research Intern at the Observer Research Foundation.
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Unnati Mishra is a Research Intern at the Observer Research Foundation. ...
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