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With the 27th Amendment, Pakistan edges toward overt military dominance as Parliament and provinces watch their authority shrink
Even before the ink had dried on the 27th Constitutional Amendment Act, government ministers began discussions on the 28th and perhaps even 29th Amendment bills, all set to be rammed through the rubber-stamp parliament well before the end of the financial year in June 2026. While the 26th and 27th Amendments were primarily aimed at neutering the judiciary and giving more powers to the Chief of Army Staff (COAS), the forthcoming amendments are reportedly aimed at neutering the provinces by reducing the resources and power given to them, and cutting them to size by creating new provinces. All these constitutional amendments were not designed to address structural anomalies that impact the political economy and create governance issues. They aim to consolidate and concentrate all power in the hands of the military, headquartered at Rawalpindi, as well as the increasingly nominal civilian government that sits in Islamabad. The military is driving the power grab, which is being eagerly supported by politicians who largely owe their political existence to the military.
The military is driving the power grab, which is being eagerly supported by politicians who largely owe their political existence to the military.
Political power games in Pakistan are as old as the country itself. The international media’s lament over the military’s recent move, the emasculation of the judiciary, and the reduction of parliament into a rubber-stamp in the service of the military is, therefore, quite unnecessary. This is classic Pakistan, where the rules of the game are seldom decided by the constitution and instead by those who wield power. Depending on the power equation and its balance, any powerful/power-hungry actors, be it politicians, generals, judges, clerics, media houses, or businessmen, misuse it for self-aggrandisement. When times change, rules change. The 27th Amendment has essentially prompted a reversal in the power that Pakistani politicians and the judiciary clawed out after ousting the military dictator Pervez Musharraf. Since then, the military has been trying to regain control, and the recent 27th Amendment is merely a part of its parcel.
While the 26th Amendment signalled a demise of the judiciary, the 27th Amendment conducted its final rites. However, the judiciary was already in crisis, deeply divided and having lost all credibility as an impartial arbiter. It had been rendered toothless when the federal government and Election Commission, backed by the military, refused to follow the court verdict to hold elections to the Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa provincial assemblies after Imran Khan’s Pakistan Tehrik-e-Insaf (PTI) dissolved the assemblies. The fact that the judges were seen to be politically partisan also damaged the judiciary’s legitimacy. In a sense, the judges had themselves taken the judiciary back to the times when it always ruled in favour of whoever was in power, not only endorsing military coups but also enabling dictators with powers to change the laws and constitution.
The 26th and 27th Amendments have only formalised this reality by giving the executive branch of government the power to pressure the judiciary and push judges to pass judgments in favour of the regime. Nevertheless, these amendments have also transformed the judicial structure of Pakistan into an overwhelming pile of unstructured mess. The Supreme Court (SC) is now subordinate to the newly created Federal Constitutional Court (FCC), which holds the power to overturn SC verdicts. At best, the SC is now going to hear appeals from High Courts, thereby adding another layer to the final disposal of the case. The establishment of the FCC overlooks the judicial system in Pakistan, where legal and constitutional questions arise in every appeal presented to the superior courts.. This is exactly what happened with the ill-thought-out Constitutional Benches that were formed under the 26th Amendment. Far from decongesting the judicial system, the FCC risks clogging it up.
Under the 27th Amendment, the Pakistan Army chief is now a constitutional post and will concurrently also be the Chief of Defence Forces (CDF), enjoying lifelong immunity from any form of prosecution.
Apart from putting a leash on the judiciary, the 27th Amendment has, in all but name, formalised the ‘hybrid civil-military model’ of governance that has been in play since around 2018, when the military manipulated Imran Khan’s victory in elections. Since then, the hybrid model has become increasingly military-dominated and less civilian in terms of who calls the shots. While amendments to the Army Act in 2024 allowed all service chiefs a five-year term with the possibility of indefinite extensions, these remained statutory posts. Under the 27th Amendment, the Pakistan Army chief is now a constitutional post and will concurrently also be the Chief of Defence Forces (CDF), enjoying lifelong immunity from any form of prosecution. While the COAS/CDF has yet to be officially crowned King Emperor of Pakistan, the parliament has not only subordinated itself and the judiciary to the Army chief, but also the Pakistan Air Force and the Pakistan Navy. Moreover, the CDF has been given almost complete control and power over the strategic (read nuclear and missile) force command. The civilian-controlled National Command Authority, which, at least on paper, served as the apex decision-making body on nuclear issues, is now, for all intents and purposes, going to be under the CDF’s operational control.
If the post of CDF was meant to advance jointness in military operations, the same could have been achieved by reforming the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (CJCSC)—a post that now stands abolished. The CJCSC was created for precisely this purpose. Additionally, in theory, any of the services could head the CJCSC. However, since 1999, the post has been held by the Pakistan Army and has been reduced to a ceremonial post. The Pakistan Air Force (PAF) and Pakistan Navy (PN) never made a big deal of the position being arrogated by the Pakistan Army. But the CDF will certainly cause heartburn, not just in the other two services but also in the Pakistan Army. While the CDF subordinates the PAF and PN, making them a supporting arm of the Pakistan Army, it also strangulates legitimate promotion opportunities of officers in all three services. How the inter- and intra-service dynamics will play out remains to be seen. It is unlikely that there will be any immediate fallout. This, despite rumours of the PAF chief sulking because while the PAF did most of the fighting, it was Asim Munir who took all the credit for the “victory” that Pakistan claimed during Op Sindoor.
The Pakistani media tried to deflect focus from the bigger questions by outrage over the immunity for life that the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) negotiated for Asif Ali Zardari as President of Pakistan. Even top clerics weighed in to oppose the lifetime immunity, calling it not in accordance with the spirit of Islam. The fact that a similar immunity had been accorded to the CDF/COAS was conveniently glossed over by Pakistan's “independent” media. The quest for immunity is not a new affair. Every military dictator in Pakistan has sought indemnification for his coup against a legitimate government. In any case, given the military’s dominance in Pakistan, top generals have always enjoyed immunity. For instance, when the Nawaz Sharif government tried to prosecute Pervez Musharraf, the army destabilised the government and eventually used the judiciary to get rid of Nawaz Sharif. Of course, in Pakistan, legal immunity holds little meaning because when power shifts, legal protections become useless. If and when Asim Munir’s luck runs out, and he is replaced by someone inimical to him, this immunity won't be worth the paper it is written on. In Pakistan, when generals and dictators cannot be removed, they often meet a fiery end like Ziaul Haq did in 1988, or face exile, as Musharraf did after being deposed.. Asim Munir has also set a precedent by prosecuting and jailing top generals, including the former Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) chief Faiz Hameed. Whoever succeeds him may not be kindly disposed towards him.
If Asim Munir prevails, this is the trajectory to expect, with movement anticipated before the next budget cycle.
With the 27th Amendment enacted, the air is rife with the new amendments that are likely to be introduced. Some of these, including tweaking the National Finance Commission (NFC) awards to provinces, devolving power and funds to local governments, taking away some functions such as education and population from provinces and transferring them to the federal government and perhaps changing the political map of Pakistan by creating new provinces—were removed from the 27th Amendment bill because there was no political consensus on these issues. The regime has also started an insidious campaign against how provinces are misusing the resources given to them under the NFC award by ignoring districts and focusing on the capital cities of provinces. A case is being made for direct transfer of resources to districts.
Following the capitulation of political parties, the military appears confident that it can arm-twist the PPP and other parties into agreeing to accept changes in the NFC allocations and perhaps even making more provinces. In any case, with a plant FCC in place, the constitutional protections offered to provinces in NFC allocations can be struck down by the judiciary, allowing the hybrid regime to change both the vertical and horizontal distribution formula in the next NFC. This is the classic formula of all military governments in Pakistan: concentrate power in the federal government, devolve power to local bodies, and strip the provincial governments of power. If Asim Munir prevails, this is the trajectory to expect, with movement anticipated before the next budget cycle.
Sushant Sareen is a Senior Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation.
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Sushant Sareen is Senior Fellow at Observer Research Foundation. His published works include: Balochistan: Forgotten War, Forsaken People (Monograph, 2017) Corridor Calculus: China-Pakistan Economic Corridor & China’s comprador ...
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