Chemical Weapons Allegations in Sudan’s Escalating Conflict

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In response to ongoing humanitarian crimes in Sudan, the United States (US), in January 2025, imposed sanctions on Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) leader Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan. The European Union (EU) followed suit by imposing sanctions on two entities and two individuals from Sudan —-- Alkhaleej Bank [a bank owned by companies linked to Rapid Support Forces (RSF) affiliates], Red Rock Mining Company (a mining company that allegedly exploits Sudanese individuals), along with two RSF-affiliated individuals, Abu Aqla Mohamed Kaikal and Hussein Barsham—in July 2025.

The use of a taboo weapon, such as chemical toxins, is gross misconduct against the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).

In this “war of atrocities,” where the RSF has been accused of murder, rape, and other war crimes, the US also alleged the SAF’s use of chemical weapons, particularly chlorine gas, against the RSF in conflict areas hosting civilians in 2024. The conflict in Sudan illustrates how war crimes, political accounts, and humanitarian crises can often overlap. The use of a taboo weapon, such as chemical toxins, is gross misconduct against the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). However, if verified, the denial of such chemical attacks can affect civilian trust in treatment and impede medical relief.

Chemical Weapons and the Sudanese Conflict:

The conflict, however, is not limited to the Sudanese government's efforts to contain local rebel forces. There are larger geopolitical powers involved in this nation's economy and subsequent unrest. The Sudan crisis is not only an internal political unrest and humanitarian crisis, but also a geopolitical fault line, further deepening as world alliances fracture. The Sudanese officials have also dismissed the accusations of chemical weapon use as "political blackmail" and maintain that no chlorine gas was used in the conflict-laden regions. The government of Sudan, in the same strain, has announced it will establish a national committee to investigate. Despite this move, the lack of open and, more importantly, independent verification does little to reassure the global community. Sudan is a member state of the CWC, a treaty that bans the production, storage, and use of chemical weapons, as well as the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). Under the CWC, such a grave accusation should prompt an impartial investigation under the oversight of the OPCW, rather than by a national committee composed of existing political and military leaders.

In the midst of conflict, mere rumours of chemical attacks are enough to induce mass evacuation, saturate aid corridors, and destroy confidence in healthcare providers and humanitarians.

While chlorine gas has devastating impacts on individuals, the humanitarian costs exceed physical injury. Chemical weapon use exposure threatens to unleash pervasive fear and distrust in governments. In the midst of conflict, mere rumours of chemical attacks are enough to induce mass evacuation, saturate aid corridors, and destroy confidence in healthcare providers and humanitarians. For medical professionals and treatment centres, treating victims of suspected chemical exposure may be politically perilous, particularly in a context where both sides try to dominate the agenda. The use, or the mere accusation, of chemical weapons then becomes an instrument to oppress the freedom and movement of civilians under the fear of chemical attack.

Strengthening the OPCW and the Future of the CWC

The CWC and the OPCW must adapt to the realities of modern conflict and information warfare to prevent such crises from happening in the future.  The world community cannot continue to ignore the enormous gaps in enforcement, transparency, and verification that the Sudan case exposes.

1. The development of quick verification methods is crucial, which includes the timely collection of evidence and containing public fear amid allegations of chemical attacks.. The OPCW must establish a permanent rapid-response force which can be deployed to suspected attack sites. This will safeguard the evidence and foster trust in the integrity of the investigation. The CWC must expand its mandate. Today, conflict is not only between states, but also between states, paramilitaries, and private forces. The OPCW should be empowered to investigate any use of chemical weapons by any actor, anywhere within a member state’s borders.
2. Transparency must be improved for the sake of public awareness. To combat misinformation, the OPCW must publish interim reports during investigations, releasing authenticated facts as they are determined. Openness can eliminate conjecture and help the public maintain confidence in international organisations.
3. Strengthening local knowledge and treatment capacity is also extremely vital. Prevention relies on the strengthening of local institutions. The OPCW and CWC states parties can help conflict-ridden states such as Sudan build oversight agencies and verification units to support chemical monitoring and early-warning systems, making accountability not only an international requirement but also a domestic responsibility.

The world community cannot continue to ignore the enormous gaps in enforcement, transparency, and verification that the Sudan case exposes.

Conclusion

The allegations of chemical weapons use in Sudan underscore a critical test for global governance and humanitarian protection.  Such claims demonstrate the challenges in verifying evidence and the importance of making responsible, fact-based accusations in accordance with the CWC. The CWC must address the actions of state and non-state actors. Beyond this, the CWC and the OPCW need to collaborate with regional and national governments to hold rapid verification, hold global parties responsible for accusations that come up unverified and ensure the public is protected from chemical weapon use—even if by non-state actors—as well as misinformation that can make the public vulnerable to such attacks later. International regulations and treaties must evolve beyond mere gestures.

Shravishtha Ajaykumar is an Associate Fellow at the Centre for Security, Strategy, and Technology (CSST), Observer Research Foundation

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