India’s quantum strategy must move beyond deploying quantum-resistant technologies to building credible assurance frameworks—positioning the country to certify trust, not just claim security, in the emerging global quantum order
The quantum transition has begun. However, the global system is advancing without a clear framework to verify what it claims to secure. Governments and industries are investing in Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC), quantum communication, and hybrid quantum-safe security architectures. Standardisation efforts, such as those led by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) in the United States (US), are beginning to shape the next generation of cryptographic systems. At the same time, concerns around “Harvest Now, Decrypt Later” and commercial interests are driving early migration strategies. Yet, amid this momentum, a critical gap remains: the absence of credible mechanisms to independently verify whether systems are genuinely quantum-safe.
In the absence of robust assurance frameworks, ‘quantum-safe’ claims risk becoming a label rather than a guarantee.
The current approach has largely focused on building quantum-resistant technologies. Far less attention has been paid to the more fundamental question of who certifies trust in the quantum era. In the absence of robust assurance frameworks, ‘quantum-safe’ claims risk becoming a label rather than a guarantee. This creates a new category of vulnerability—not just insecurity, but the illusion of security.
The transition to quantum-safe systems is often framed as a shift in cryptographic algorithms. While extremely necessary, this view is incomplete. In practice, security failures rarely stem from mathematical flaws; they arise from implementation, integration, and system-level weaknesses.
A system may adopt a NIST-recommended PQC algorithm and remain vulnerable due to flawed integration with legacy architectures, weak key management practices, fallback mechanisms that enable downgrade attacks, and hardware-induced side-channel vulnerabilities.
Similarly, quantum communication systems such as quantum key distribution (QKD), while theoretically secure, have demonstrated implementation-level vulnerabilities and operational constraints in practical deployments. The implications are therefore clear: security cannot be assumed; it must be verified in deployment.
Across sectors, developers and vendors are increasingly offering solutions labelled ‘quantum-safe’ or ‘post-quantum compliant’. Consider a financial network adopting a PQC algorithm without ensuring secure integration across its legacy systems. While the algorithm may be quantum-resistant, vulnerabilities in implementation or interoperability may still expose the system to attack. This creates a structural risk: systems may be perceived as secure long before they actually are. The result is what could be termed ‘quantum security inflation’, where claims outpace verification.
The transition to quantum-safe systems is often framed as a shift in cryptographic algorithms. While extremely necessary, this view is incomplete.
For governments and critical sectors, this is particularly significant and dangerous. Procurement decisions based on unverified assurances risk embedding vulnerabilities into long-life critical systems that are difficult and costly to replace. In effect, the risk is not just technological; it is institutional.
Major global actors have made significant advances in quantum technologies, but their approaches to assurance remain fragmented. The United States has led efforts in standardising PQC algorithms, yet certification mechanisms continue to rely largely on legacy frameworks. Europe is investing in quantum communication infrastructure, but assurance mechanisms are evolving alongside deployment rather than guiding it. China has demonstrated scale in rolling out quantum networks, though its state-centric model limits broader international trust.
Across these approaches, one reality stands out: there is, as yet, no globally accepted, independent, and comprehensive framework for quantum testing, evaluation, and certification. The world is building quantum capabilities, but it has not yet built quantum trust.
Defence Forces: For India, this gap has direct and far-reaching implications. While operational communications may not be immediately impacted, sensitive communications and long-life classified data transmitted over public networks remain vulnerable to future decryption. Without validated quantum-safe systems, even upgraded networks may carry hidden risks. The impact is likely to be more severe for research and development, acquisition, finance, and public sector entities.
Digital Public Infrastructure (DPI): India’s large, population-scale platforms—including identity, payments, and governance—require quantum resilience to maintain public trust and systemic stability.
Financial Systems: Banking and financial networks depend on long-term confidentiality. The unverified adoption of PQC could introduce latent vulnerabilities.
Critical Infrastructure: Energy, telecom, and transport systems are increasingly digitised. The integration of inadequately tested quantum-safe solutions could amplify systemic risk.
Across all these domains, the issue is not the absence of technology but the absence of credible validation mechanisms to verify the integrity of these claims.
India is uniquely positioned to address this gap and to lead on this critical issue globally. First, the scale of its digital ecosystem makes quantum security an imperative. Second, strategic autonomy requires that the validation of critical systems cannot depend on external certification regimes. Third, India’s growing quantum ecosystem provides a strong foundation that should be complemented by assurance capabilities. Equally important is India’s credibility as a trusted and relatively neutral technology partner, particularly among the Global South.
This positions it to offer not only domestic assurance but also global trust services. The convergence of scale, necessity, capability, and credibility thus creates a rare strategic opportunity. While Indian efforts, as outlined in the Department of Science and Technology (DST) Committee Report of February 2026, propose a national, tiered PQC testing and certification programme—with laboratories under the Telecommunication Engineering Centre (TEC), Standardisation Testing and Quality Certification (STQC), and the Bureau of Indian Standards (BIS)—this framework may not be adequate to meet the emerging challenges in the quantum domain. It may therefore need to be separated from existing conventional testing and certification models.
To address this gap, India should establish a National Quantum Testing, Evaluation, and Certification Facility (Q-TEC)—an independent, government-recognised institution dedicated to quantum assurance. Q-TEC would serve as a validator of quantum-safe claims, a trusted benchmark for national procurement, and a globally credible certification body in the domain.
Its functional scope would include validation of PQC implementations and cryptographic agility, testing of secure hardware and embedded systems, evaluation of quantum communication technologies, and system-level certification across sectors. The emphasis would be on end-to-end assurance, ensuring that systems are secure not only in design but also in fully deployed conditions.
Quantum assurance requires a combination of technical depth, operational agility, and institutional credibility. A public-private partnership (PPP) model is likely the best way forward, given the scale of the challenge, as it offers an optimal balance. Under this model, the government would provide strategic oversight, policy direction, formal recognition, and alignment with national security priorities. Industry and academia would contribute specialised domain expertise, innovation, rapid capability development, execution, and operational efficiency.
This structure would ensure that Q-TEC remains technically current, operationally effective, and globally credible, while maintaining independence from commercial influence—essential for trust. Importantly, it would also make the organisation financially self-sustaining and viable, though modalities for initial capital investment and creation of infrastructure and assets would need to be determined by a joint high-level committee.
While Q-TEC addresses a domestic requirement, its implications are global. At present, no universally trusted institution exists for quantum assurance, creating an opportunity for India to emerge as a certification hub. India could provide quantum assurance frameworks and expertise to countries lacking such capabilities, and help shape global standards and best practices in this nascent domain—potentially a game changer for the digital ecosystem of the future.
The quantum transition is not just about technological capability—it is about credibility. As quantum technologies evolve, the defining question will not be who can build secure systems, but who can demonstrate that they are secure.
Much like India’s leadership in digital public infrastructure, quantum assurance can become an area where the country delivers scalable, trusted solutions to the world. In this sense, Q-TEC represents not only a national asset but also a potential global public good.
The establishment of Q-TEC will require addressing several challenges: developing interdisciplinary talent across cryptography, hardware, and quantum systems; adapting to rapidly evolving global standards; balancing sovereign capability with international interoperability; and building long-term credibility through transparent and rigorous processes. These challenges are real but manageable with a phased, well-governed approach.
If India does not act swiftly, the consequences could be significant. The country would remain dependent on external certification frameworks, limiting its control over validation processes. It risks deploying unverified quantum-safe systems, potentially embedding vulnerabilities into critical infrastructure. Indian firms may face barriers in global markets due to the absence of recognised certification support. Time is already running out, as several systems claiming to be quantum-safe are being inducted into Indian digital ecosystems—some of which may not meet the required standards.
More fundamentally, India risks becoming a consumer of trust frameworks rather than a provider of them.
The quantum transition is not just about technological capability—it is about credibility. As quantum technologies evolve, the defining question will not be who can build secure systems, but who can demonstrate that they are secure. Here, India has a unique opportunity to lead—not by competing in narratives of quantum supremacy, but by establishing quantum assurance as a pillar of global trust.
The creation of a National Quantum Testing, Evaluation, and Certification Facility, anchored in a public-private partnership model, offers a pathway to secure national systems, ensure strategic autonomy, and shape global standards.
In doing so, India can move beyond merely participating in the quantum transition to becoming a definer of trust in the quantum era.
Lt. Gen. M.U. Nair (Retd.) is the former National Cyber Security Coordinator (NCSC).
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Lt Gen M Unnikrishnan Nair PVSM, AVSM, SM (retd) is a former Signal Officer-in-Chief of the Indian Army with nearly four decades of service in ...
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