AFRICOM under the Trump Administration

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Established in 2007, the United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) was mandated to coordinate the United States (US) military engagement across Africa by strengthening local defence capabilities, countering terrorism, protecting its interests, and supporting peacekeeping efforts. Traditionally, AFRICOM has worked alongside US civilian agencies such as USAID and the Voice of America and supported multilateral missions conducted by the United Nations, European Union, African Union, and regional organisations. Its operational focus included counterterrorism training, maritime security, intelligence sharing, humanitarian relief, and stabilisation efforts.

However, under President Trump’s second administration, AFRICOM’s role is coming under significant reassessment. USAID operations in Africa were effectively discontinued in September 2025, leaving a major vacuum in development, humanitarian assistance, and governance support that had complemented AFRICOM’s security mandate. Much of USAID’s US$48 billion budget has either been terminated or transferred to the State Department, with limited clarity on implementation mechanisms. Although some global health programmes, including HIV/AIDS initiatives, have been restored, there remains uncertainty over who will execute and monitor them on the ground. This has diminished the US’s soft power, reduced its leadership in humanitarian and Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) initiatives, and placed greater emphasis on hard security tools such as AFRICOM.

A 2019 AFRICOM list identified 13 permanent bases and 17 temporary sites. However, several facilities, including the drone base in Agadez, Niger, have since been closed following military takeovers in Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso.

Simultaneously, geopolitical dynamics in Africa have shifted quite drastically. French forces have withdrawn from the Sahel, while Russia has expanded its footprint through the Africa Corps, a state-controlled military group succeeding the Wagner Group. It now supports military juntas in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger while securing strategic resources and displacing Western influence.

Given this environment, AFRICOM’s relevance may increase as the primary remaining instrument of the US engagement in Africa. However, without a parallel civilian, diplomatic, and developmental strategy, AFRICOM risks operating in isolation, limiting its ability to shape outcomes or counter competitors like Russia and China. The key question is whether the Trump administration will redefine AFRICOM’s mandate or let US strategic influence to erode further.

AFRICOM was established to address rising terrorism, instability, and growing Chinese and Russian influence in Africa, while recognising the continent’s strategic importance due to its resources, demographics, and economic potential. Its mandate focuses on five key areas: counterterrorism operations against groups like al-Shabaab and ISIS affiliates; training and equipping African forces through security assistance programmes; strengthening maritime security in strategic waters; supporting humanitarian relief and disaster response efforts; and conducting intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance through a network of drone and monitoring bases. These missions aim to enhance regional stability, protect the US interests, and build long-term partnerships with African governments and institutions.

 AFRICOM has made notable gains in counterterrorism and capacity building across Africa. Operations such as Juniper Shield have strengthened security forces in countries like Niger, Chad, and Mali, though these states—now under military rule—have turned away from Western alliances in favour of Russian backing. In Somalia, AFRICOM-supported operations have degraded al-Shabaab through targeted strikes and intelligence sharing with ATMIS and Somali forces. Humanitarian missions, including assistance during the Ebola outbreak, enhanced US credibility. Maritime cooperation efforts improved coastal security and reduced piracy in the Gulf of Guinea. However, long-term success remains fragile due to political instability and rising anti-Western sentiment.

Limitations and Criticisms

Despite its contributions, AFRICOM faces significant limitations that undermine its overall effectiveness. A central criticism is the over-militarisation of US policy in Africa, with security tools often prioritised over development, governance, and diplomacy. This approach has achieved tactical gains but failed to deliver sustainable stability. Many partner militaries suffer from corruption, weak institutions, and poor accountability—issues that training alone cannot fix. US-trained officers in Mali later led coups, exposing the risks of military aid without political reform.

AFRICOM’s reliance on drone strikes in Somalia and Libya has eliminated militants but also caused civilian casualties, eroding local support and fuelling anti-American sentiment. Additionally, AFRICOM lacks broad public buy-in across Africa, as many view it with suspicion, reinforcing perceptions of U.S. neocolonialism. Its reactive posture has limited its strategic impact, with continued instability in the Sahel showing the inability to prevent long-term crises. Meanwhile, growing Chinese and Russian influence challenges AFRICOM’s role, as Beijing and Moscow offer alternative security models. Despite being a key US instrument, AFRICOM remains constrained by limited resources, political resistance, and strategic ambiguity.

The Trump Administration

The Trump administration has a complex, largely transactional approach to US Africa Command's (AFRICOM) activities, focusing heavily on 

counterterrorism, countering Chinese and Russian influence, and securing access to strategic minerals. While the administration considered merging AFRICOM with the US European Command to reduce bureaucratic overlaps, it ultimately decided to maintain AFRICOM as an independent command, with plans for it to play a central role in its Africa policy during its second term. Statements from Trump’s Defense Secretary, Pete Hegseth, and congressional testimony in mid-2025 from the former commander of AFRICOM, General Michael Langley, and Trump’s nominee as his successor, General Dagvin Anderson, reveal that AFRICOM will retain its current status, and will play an increasingly central role in the Trump administration’s Africa policy.

In essence, the Trump administration actively supports AFRICOM activities that align with its core national security and economic priorities, particularly those involving direct military action against perceived threats and strategic competition with other global powers.

During Hegseth's visit to Stuttgart HQs of AFRICOM and EUCOM, he said,  “Africa is very much on the front lines of a fight from Islamists to Christian populations that are under siege in Africa and have been ignored for far too long, and American interests there. It matters a great deal. And Islamists—we’re not going to allow them to maintain a foothold, especially to try to strike at America.”

Key aspects of the Trump Administration's support for AFRICOM activities include:

• Increased Military Operations: The administration has significantly escalated U.S. military operations in Somalia, primarily through a major increase in airstrikes against al-Shabaab and ISIS-Somalia targets. Hegseth has authorised AFRICOM's commander to launch strikes and commando raids without prior presidential approval.

They may deal with threats from “violent extremist organizations” (VEOs). These VEOs are officially designated by the Pentagon and include armed jihadist insurgents, many aligned with al-Qaeda or the Islamic State; ethnically-based insurgents like the Tuareg militias in the Sahel and the Hutu and Tutsi militias in the Democratic Republic of Congo; and armed groups fighting to achieve their rights to self-determination, like the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic. 

• “America First” and Transactional Approach: The administration's policy is characterised by an “America First” and highly transactional approach. This involves offering security assistance and military equipment to African nations in exchange for access to strategic raw materials (like those in the Democratic Republic of Congo). The US currently deploys about 6,500 military personnel in Africa. A 2019 AFRICOM list identified 13 permanent bases and 17 temporary sites. However, several facilities, including the drone base in Agadez, Niger, have since been closed following military takeovers in Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso.

• Countering Rival Powers: A major priority for AFRICOM under the Trump administration is to counter the growing economic, political, and military influence of China and Russia on the continent, including concerns about Chinese involvement in African ports and the presence of Russian mercenaries. Gen Anderson told the Senate Armed Forces Committee that ‘As the Commander of Special Operations Command Africa (SOCAF), I witnessed how Africa-strategically positioned between the Atlantic and Indo-Pacific, is increasingly at the convergence of great-power rivalry and terrorism. China is expanding its approach from a focus on economic influence to greater military and information operations. Russia’s actions are frequently destabilising and run counter to US interests. Terrorist networks continue to exploit ungoverned spaces, posing a direct threat to our safety and security.’

• Focus on Security for Investment: The administration views security as a necessary precursor to private American investment in Africa, with AFRICOM acting as a guarantor of a stable environment for U.S. commercial interests. Marine Corps AFRICOM Commander Gen Michael Langley earlier told the House Armed Services Committee that ‘USAFRICOM will achieve peace through strength by countering terrorist organisations that are increasing their ability to threaten the homeland while countering activities of China and other adversaries. Capabilities like Airborne-Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (A-ISR) and Counter-Unmanned Aerial Systems (C-UAS) are critical to addressing the increasing threat. We are acutely aware that if ISIS and al-Qaeda groups continue their expansion, they will pose a direct threat to the US homeland. Given this environment, USAFRICOM will work collaboratively with the intelligence community and interagency partners to keep the risk to US national security interests low.

• Reduced Development Aid: The focus has largely shifted from traditional foreign aid and development programs (some of which have been cut or dismantled) to a more purely military response to conflict drivers, which some experts argue may limit long-term stability efforts.

• Support for the Command's Independence: Despite initial considerations to potentially downsize or merge AFRICOM, top administration and military officials have since confirmed the command will retain its independent status to address ongoing security challenges. 

In essence, the Trump administration actively supports AFRICOM activities that align with its core national security and economic priorities, particularly those involving direct military action against perceived threats and strategic competition with other global powers.

Under the Trump administration, AFRICOM’s role shifted toward a more security-focused approach amid reduced civilian engagement in Africa. With USAID operations scaled back, the command became the primary US instrument for counterterrorism, military training, and regional security cooperation.

 On 29 May 2025, President Trump released the FY 2026 budget request for the State Department and foreign operations, including security assistance for Africa. While offering little country-specific detail, it signals key priorities shaping US national security policy toward Africa in his second administration, starting 1 October 2025. The FY 2026 budget proposes eliminating all US funding for UN and AU peacekeeping missions in Africa, citing mission failures and excessive costs. This includes missions in the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of Congo, South Sudan, Abyei, Western Sahara, and the AU peacekeeping force in Somalia, which in FY 2025 received over US$1.2 billion for UN operations and more than US$200 million for Somalia alone from the US.

Conclusion

Under the Trump administration, AFRICOM’s role shifted toward a more security-focused approach amid reduced civilian engagement in Africa. With USAID operations scaled back, the command became the primary US instrument for counterterrorism, military training, and regional security cooperation. The administration emphasised drone strikes, hard power, and support to partner militaries to counter jihadist threats and Russian-Chinese influence, but critics warn this militarised focus risks undermining long-term stability and US soft power.

To improve its effectiveness, AFRICOM needs to operate more holistically—supporting African-led security efforts, promoting good governance, and integrating more closely with civilian agencies such as USAID and the State Department. Without such adjustments, AFRICOM risks continuing a cycle of short-term security gains that fail to produce long-term stability.

Gurjit Singh has served as India's ambassador to Germany, Indonesia, Ethiopia, ASEAN and the African Union.

• International Affairs
• Defence and Security
• Africa
• africom
• africom countries
• united states africa command
• us africa command
• usaid
• usaid operations in africa

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